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2017 marks a milestone in recent Iranian history. In January, 
while the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) en-
tered the second year of implementation, in Washington the 
new hawkish Administration took office, with the promise 
to “renegotiate a disastrous deal”. In May, in Tehran, the in-
cumbent president Hassan Rouhani won re-election by a wide 
margin. In the same month, the US – although reluctantly – 
renewed the much-awaited waivers lifting the US sanctions, as 
agreed in the JCPOA. 
The events of the first half of the year draw a clear-cut picture 
of the current situation. 
In Tehran, a pragmatic and moderate government is keeping up 
with its commitments under the JCPOA, while making an effort 
to open up its country to new economic and political actors. As 
president Rouhani put it, he will keep up the promise of a “con-
structive engagement”. These efforts have been widely acknowl-
edged and rewarded in the February 2016 legislative election, as 
well as in the May 2017 presidential election, thus signalling the 
desire of the Iranian population to re-engage with the world. 
Unfortunately, the same is not true of Washington, where 
the Trump Administration keeps sending contradictory sig-
nals. While the State Department has renewed the waivers and 
certified Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA, new sanctions are 
under scrutiny in the US Congress, finally freed from the veto 
threat of Barack Obama. Not to mention US President Trump’s 
first foreign trip to Israel and Saudi Arabia, the two staunchest 
enemies of the Iran deal. Trump’s alignment with the “Sunni 
side” of the Gulf can only raise new fears in Tehran.
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Against this backdrop, an actor is increasingly at unease with 
the revamped cold war between Iran and the US: the European 
Union. With the signing of the JCPOA in July 2015, the EU – 
and its Member States – could breathe a sigh of relief as finally 
sanctions against Tehran were removed. Good news for the EU 
businesses which had been deeply penalized by the sanctions. 
On top of this, the mediation role played by the European 
External Action Service was widely recognized and praised. A 
diplomatic success for an actor like the EU – often described 
as an economic giant but a political dwarf. It comes as no sur-
prise that, in the aftermath of Trump’s election, the EU HR/VP 
Mogherini made a vow to protect the JCPOA. And, ever since, 
she has repeatedly pointed out that the EU remains strongly 
committed to the implementation of the deal. Indeed, EU-Iran 
relations have improved since the signature of the deal, as the 
number of state visits between Iran and numerous European 
countries demonstrates. Moreover, the leading role played by 
Iran in the region – “a neighbour of our neighbours” – clearly 
calls on the EU to strengthen the dialogue with Tehran with the 
aim of stabilizing a wide arc of crisis which extends all around 
its Southern borders.
Bearing this in mind, this Report intends to trace what lies 
ahead for Iran after the May 2017 Rouhani’s re-election. The 
analysis builds upon the assumption that Iran does not act in a 
vacuum: the US, as well as the EU actions, will inevitably help 
define the future trajectory of the country. A trajectory which is 
set domestically also by the generational transition Tehran is go-
ing through, with its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
looking for a successor. The inter-factional struggle affecting 
Iran since the early years of the Revolution is now revived by 
what is actually at stake: the very future of the Islamic Republic. 
Pejman Abdolmohammadi opens the Report by investi-
gating how Iranian political factions have repositioned them-
selves after the elections. While Rouhani’s victory has certainly 
tilted the balance of power in his favor, it has also incited the 
Conservatives’ and the Hardliners’ counteroffensive. Will the 
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president be able to implement his policies or will the system 
push back? Indeed, beyond the electoral and the day-to-day po-
litical dynamics, a question lies deep: can the revolutionary state 
sustain itself amidst a growing number of domestic and region-
al challenges? A key passage will definitely be the succession to 
the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This chapter addresses this 
issue too by exploring if and to what extent Rouhani will be 
able to set the stage for a “pragmatic” succession to Khamenei, 
or rather if the Hardliners and the other actors representing the 
“deep state” – namely the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) – will succeed in reclaiming the reins of power.
In this process, a crucial topic is the future of the Iranian 
economy. Indeed, the economy of the country has always played 
a leading role in setting the condition of the country’s political 
developments. Rouhani’s electoral victory, in both 2013 and 
2017, made no exception: in 2013, it was exactly the promise 
to bring to an end the Ahmadinejad’s era of economic hardship 
that brought Rouhani to power. In this year’s electoral round, it 
was the promise of capitalizing on the benefits stemming from 
the sanctions relief. However, the country’s economy suffers 
from structural problems that ultimately hamper its full recov-
ery. Eugenio Dacrema reviews the achievements and the short-
comings of the last two governments, highlighting some struc-
tural constraints, such as the overexpansion of the state sector. 
The author also tries to gauge the real impact of sanctions relief 
on the Iranian economy: which results have been achieved so 
far? What remains to be done? Which obstacles are still there 
for international investors? How does the Iranian economy af-
fect politics (and vice versa)?
The third chapter, by Annalisa Perteghella, shifts the spot-
light to Tehran’s role in the region. The signing of the JCPOA, 
as well as Rouhani’s re-election, have been greeted as an ulti-
mate success for the moderates, who, the argument went, once 
empowered would have broadened their agenda of moderation 
to include cooperation on thorny regional issues. However, if 
we look at the last years’ regional developments – the revamping 
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of the Syrian crisis, as well as the often-forgotten Yemeni war – 
Tehran has not always played a cooperative game. This is due 
to a plurality of factors, which are scrutinized in this chapter, 
which ultimately intends to assess whether Iran can be consid-
ered more of a spoiler or a security broker in the region. 
But, needless to say, any analysis of Iran’s role in the region, 
as well as of Iran’s future, cannot forgo to take into account 
the traditionally complicated – if not openly conflictual – re-
lationship between Iran and the United States. In the fourth 
chapter, Sanam Vakil analyses the possible implications of the 
November 2016 election of Donald Trump to the White House 
for the future of the JCPOA. By acknowledging that much of 
the hostility between the two countries is due to a mutual lack 
of understanding, the author presents both “the view from 
Washington” and “the view from Tehran”. After a wide review 
of the points of friction between Iran and the US, Vakil sheds 
a light on what to expect in the near future, by sketching out 
a number of scenarios which put together the US-Iranian rela-
tions and the wider regional and international developments.
In the fifth chapter, Rouzbeh Parsi looks at the European 
shore of the Atlantic, trying to assess what lies ahead for EU-
Iran relations. By analysing the downsides of the sanctions pol-
icy for the EU as a whole and its Member States, the author 
recalls the stages that ultimately led to the negotiations as well 
as the opportunities effectively opened by the signing of the 
JCPOA in 2015. In addition, the chapter traces the evolution 
of the EU-Iran dialogue over the last two years and offers deep 
insights on how the EU could benefit from its successful role as 
a diplomatic actor in the Iranian dossier to bolster its autonomy 
and ability to act on the international stage. 
Finally, in the sixth chapter, Cornelius Adebahr looks at the 
three apexes of the triangle – Iran, the US and the EU – by 
analysing the implications of the renewed Iran-US hostility for 
the EU-US relationship. In particular, the author explores the 
possible actions that the EU could take in order to “protect” 
the much-suffered and hardly-awaited deal. Indeed, while the 
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Europeans have made it clear that they would not reopen the 
nuclear file or embark on new sanctions – unless triggered by 
Iranian noncompliance – it would not be easy for them to resist 
a U-turn in Washington’s Iran policy. 
By paraphrasing John Donne’s poem, in our much-intercon-
nected world, no country is an island. Brussels has no interest 
in going back to the old US-sponsored policy of containment. 
Thus, it should act to preserve the JCPOA, as well as the del-
icate policy of engagement with Iran. The Report also offers 
policy recommendations to this aim. 
The Iran deal achieved in 2015 was a diplomatic success and 
a potential stepping stone to improve security in the Middle 
East, by removing the spectre of a nuclear-armed Iran and the 
risk of regional proliferation. The last two years seem to confirm 
that the deal is working, and that – though slower than ex-
pected – change is actually happening. Endangering Rouhani’s 
actions would mean shifting the Iranian domestic balance of 
power towards Conservatives and Hardliners, thus bringing the 
clock back to the old policy of confrontation. In a world that 
looks more and more chaotic and uncertain and that so easily 
goes up in flames, this is time for cooler heads to prevail. 
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President and Director

Section I
Iran: An Identity Card

1. The Struggle for Iran: 
    Rouhani’s Difficult Path to Reform
Pejman Abdolmohammadi
In the next two decades, Iran could exercise a crucial role in the 
stability and the peace process in the Middle East. First, because 
of its significant geographical collocation (between the Caspian 
Sea and the Persian Gulf and between Asia and Europe), Iran 
has the makings to act as both mediator and peace builder with-
in and between the Middle East and the West. Second, Iran is 
one of the major powers in the Middle East in terms of econom-
ic and military resources. Its foreign policy and the strategies it 
will adopt in the next two decades will influence the balance of 
power in the region significantly. Third, Iran has an important 
symbolic role, as it represents the major Islamic Shiite political 
system in the Middle East and consequently exercise relevant 
influences in its strategic areas, which are somehow affiliated to 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran has a voice in the matters 
of countries such as Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and Iraq. 
Finally, on the domestic level, Iran represents an impor-
tant “political laboratory” for the democratization process in 
the Middle East. The modern political history of this country 
shows that, since the early Twentieth century, there had been 
significant socio-political movements which demanded consti-
tutionalism and modernity and moved towards the creation of 
a pluralistic political system. It is worth to note that the first 
Constitutional Revolution in the Middle East happened in 
Iran in 1906 and the 1979 Revolution, under the leadership 
of Ayatollah Khomeini, and the consequent institution of an 
Islamic Republic in Iran, have been anticipating the rise of po-
litical Islam, which started to gain importance after the “Arab 
Spring” in 2010-2011. 
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A thorough analysis of Iran’s domestic politics, highlighting 
its main internal factions and players, is thus key. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran is a sophisticated political system which is 
neither a pure authoritarian system nor a pluralistic political 
regime. According to this paper, the Islamic Republic is a pe-
culiar hybrid regime which combines Islamic principles with 
Republican ones. It means that Iran’s political system is com-
posed of institutional bodies which are the expression both of 
the Islamic and the Republican sides. It can be seen as a sort of 
cohabitation between two worlds: the Institute of the Supreme 
Leader, the Council of Guardians, the Assembly of Experts, the 
Expediency Discernment Council, and the Judiciary represent 
the body of the Islamic State, while the President of the Republic 
and the Parliament constitute the heart of the Republic.
In such a complicated institutional system, the political fac-
tions and players have played a relevant role in determining 
the internal balance of power within the Islamic Republic. The 
various political players coming from the religious, military, 
paramilitary, and economic spheres of the society made several 
alliances and alignments during the last 38 years of the Islamic 
Republic’s life, influencing both the Iranian domestic politics 
and its foreign policy.
In such context, the last presidential election in May 2017 
could be seen as one of the most important moments in the po-
litical history of the Islamic Republic. The victory of the incum-
bent President Hassan Rouhani with almost 24 million votes 
represented an important moment in the Iranian political life. 
The main outcome of such victory has been the confirmation of 
Rouhani’s foreign policy based on the pragmatic idea of open-
ing the country to free market and liberalization. Moreover, the 
Iranian voters pinned once again their hopes on a government 
which promised economic progress and development. To better 
understand the importance of the last election, this paper will 
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The Iranian presidential election of 2017
Iran’s presidential election took place last 19 May, and President 
Hassan Rouhani was re-elected for a second mandate. 
Five official candidates ran for the presidency, all of whom 
were preselected by the Council of Guardians from among 
1,653 registered candidates. This means that, according to the 
Council of Guardians, these five candidates had all the require-
ments, in accordance with the Constitution, to eventually be-
come the President of the Islamic Republic. It also meant they 
had met with the approval of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei.
The President of the Republic is the second highest official 
after the Supreme Leader, who functions as the country’s head 
of state. The Supreme Leader (rahbar-e mo’azzam-e enghelab-e 
eslami) is the most important constitutional body of the Islamic 
Republic. It was introduced into the Iranian legal system in 
order to guarantee the application of sharia (Islamic law) in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.  
The President of the Islamic Republic is the head of the gov-
ernment. The executive power is responsible for implement-
ing the Constitution and maintaining order among the three 
branches of the state. During the first nine years of the Islamic 
Republic, the Prime Minister exerted the greatest influence on 
the executive branch. However, following the revision of the 
Constitution in 1988 and the abolition of the office of Prime 
Minister, the President became the highest office of executive 
power, absorbing all the authority previously shared with the 
Prime Minister. After the constitutional amendment, almost 
concurrent with the death of former Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, the office of the President became the 
fundamental center of power of the institutional framework of 
the country after the Supreme Leader. The President appoints 
and supervises the Cabinet and the Vice Presidents who, by ap-
pointment, oversee the ministries they are assigned. In terms of 
foreign policy, the President can sign treaties, conventions, and 
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international agreements, subject to approval by the Parliament. 
On a domestic level, the President determines government 
policies, in consultation with the ministers. The Council of 
Guardians is the institution tasked with preselecting presiden-
tial candidates and verifying their requirements to participate 
in the elections. Iran has universal suffrage, and the President 
must obtain an absolute majority of the votes. If no candidate 
obtains it, there will be a runoff between the two candidates 
who received the highest number of votes in the first round. 
The elected President must receive the approval of the Supreme 
Leader before entering the presidential office1.
The last electoral competition was quite challenging, particu-
larly between the conservative front and the pragmatist one.
The five candidates who competed for the presidency were: 
the incumbent, President Hassan Rouhani; Ebrahim Raisi; 
Eshaq Jahangiri; Mostafa Mirsalim; and Mostafa Hashemitaba. 
The last three were not among the main competitors as they 
were lesser known figures or quite marginalized within the main 
factions of the Islamic Republic. Mirsalim, for example, comes 
from a traditional conservative front and served as Minister of 
Culture and Islamic Guidance in the mid-1990s. Hashemitaba 
comes from a more pragmatist front; he was the Minister of 
Industries and Mining in the 1980s and head of the National 
Olympic Committee of Iran. Jahangiri’s candidacy was more 
strategic and likely on behalf of Rouhani, as he is one of his 
main allies. He was supportive of Rouhani during the electoral 
campaign, particularly during the televised debates as the can-
didates challenged each other in front of the public. Jahangiri 
performed well during the television debates and supported 
President Rouhani against the conservative front.
The real challenge has been between Rouhani and Raisi, who 
were the main competitors. Rouhani comes from the pragma-
tist faction of the Islamic Republic, while Raisi comes from 
1 See P. Abdolmohammadi and G. Cama, “Iran as a Peculiar Hybrid Regime: 
Structure and Dynamics in the Islamic Republic”, British Journal of  Middle Eastern 
Studies, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 558-578, 2015.
Post-Vote Iran: Giving Engagement a Chance20
the conservative front. Rouhani also had the endorsement of 
the reformist front and the support of a part of the opposition 
groups which are open to a negotiated and gradual political 
change, the so-called Melli-Mazhabi (Religious-Nationalist) 
faction, which is affiliated with the unrecognized Nehzat-e 
Azadi (Freedom Movement) party. Moreover, Rouhani relied 
on certain traditional conservatives who are supportive of his 
foreign and economic policies. 
Rouhani enjoys a high standing among both international 
and domestic audiences since he negotiated the nuclear deal 
with the United States and five other countries in 2015, and 
some Iranian voters support him for this. However, the eco-
nomic crisis in Iran has also grown during his first term as has 
the gap between the rich and the poor, while inflation and un-
employment are still high. Moreover, Rouhani did not keep his 
electoral promise to increase civil liberties in Iran. These issues 
could have damaged his popularity in the last election and lead 
to a lack of consensus among Iranians compared with the 2013 
election. However, the result of the 2017 election showed that 
Rouhani’s policy had success among Iranians as almost 24 mil-
lion citizens voted for his reconfirmation. 
Rouhani’s campaign tried to emphasize that the economic 
initiatives of his first term would be realistically felt by the pop-
ulation in the long term, and not in the short term, and that 
during his second term he would focus on guaranteeing more 
civil liberties and creating a more open society. It will not be 
easy for him to stake out this position as a part of the popu-
lation is living in poverty, and society continues to experience 
limitations on civil liberties.  
On the conservative front, Raisi had different affiliations and 
supporters. Raisi is supported by the so-called deep state and has 
close ties with Khamenei. He is among the most loyal clergy of 
the Supreme Leader, has taken relevant positions within Iran’s 
judiciary system, and has filled strategic roles in the national se-
curity apparatus. Finally, Raisi was appointed as head of one of 
the most important and wealthy religious foundations, Astan-e 
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Quds-e Razavi, in Mashhad, with responsibility to oversee the 
country’s holiest Shia shrine of Imam Reza. 
Moreover, Raisi had and continues to have the endorsement 
of the conservatives and hardliners of the Shia clergy in the holy 
cities of Qom and Mashhad. He is also supported by a part of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Supreme 
Leader’s office. However, Raisi has not been a very public figure 
in recent decades, and for this reason not many Iranians know 
him well. Furthermore, his public image was damaged by his 
conduct as an Islamic judge in the so-called death commission 
during the 1980s: he was responsible for sentencing to death 
many political prisoners opposing the Islamic Republic. 
The victory of President Rouhani in May 2017 election has 
been very significant. Two crucial elements set the 2017 presi-
dential election apart from the previous one.
First, the candidacy of former President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad was blocked by the Council of Guardians. 
Ahmadinejad registered as a presidential candidate, together 
with one of his loyal collaborators, Hamid Baghaei, ignoring 
the recommendation of Ayatollah Khamenei, who had sug-
gested that he should not run in this election. Khamenei had 
warned him not to create tension in the Iranian political are-
na with his candidacy, but Ahmadinejad did not listen. The 
Council of Guardians, determined by Khamenei, stopped 
Ahmadinejad from running because his candidacy represented 
a challenge on two levels: it would reveal a deep fissure with-
in the elite of the Islamic Republic, particularly among the 
IRGC and part of the conservative Shia clergy; and it would 
have proved that the Supreme Leader’s power has diminished, 
as normally no politician in the Islamic Republic ignores his 
public recommendations. 
The second element is the deep state’s support for Raisi. 
In the last 20 years, the deep state supported the incumbent 
President, assuring his election for a second term, as a re-elec-
tion was likely perceived as enhancing the stability of the 
Islamic Republic, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. 
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Starting with ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, the three 
Presidents – Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad – were all 
re-elected regardless of their political affiliation. The establish-
ment did not promote challengers to impede their re-elections. 
In 2009, the candidacy of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi 
Karroubi against Ahmadinejad was not promoted by the deep 
state, but by the pragmatist and reformist fronts together, which 
were trying to stop Ahmadinejad’s re-election. In that occasion, 
Ahmadinejad was supported by the establishment and the 
Islamic Republic was also ready to pay a heavy cost to guaran-
tee his re-election. The Green Movement protests following the 
2009 election were only the outcome of the intra-elite struggle 
between the establishment (made up of the Supreme Leader’s 
office, the IRGC, and the National Security Council) and their 
rivals from the pragmatist and reformist fronts, at that time 
represented by Rafsanjani. 
The situation on the last presidential election was different. 
Rouhani is a pragmatist and the establishment promoted a con-
servative competitor such as Raisi. As stated, Raisi had the en-
dorsement of the office of the Supreme Leader, together with 
the support of an important part of the Shia conservative clergy 
and part of the IRGC. This made the election more sensitive 
and less predictable than previous contests. 
Certainly, the recent death of the former President Ayatollah 
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a balancer for the domestic pol-
itics of the Islamic Republic, has increased the internal conflicts 
of interest among the factions. 
However, this current scenario could be influenced and exac-
erbated by two exogenous shocks.
The first is the paradigm shift in global policy promoted by 
President Donald J. Trump in the United States, which will 
also influence Iran’s domestic political balance of power. The 
opening of former President Barack Obama and his Secretary 
of State, John Kerry, toward Tehran strengthened the pragma-
tist position in the Islamic Republic and consequently allowed 
Rouhani to increase his power. Now, with Trump in office, the 
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pragmatists might suffer and become less successful in dealing 
with conservative challenges. Furthermore, should Trump in-
crease pressure on the Assad regime in Syria and on other allies 
of the Islamic Republic in Yemen and Lebanon, the Iranian 
establishment might feel threatened and decide to support a 
more conservative President as a reaction to the new US foreign 
policy in the Middle East. 
The second is the health of the Supreme Leader and its im-
plications for the 2021 presidential election. Even though the 
news concerning Khamenei’s health problems have been cir-
culating in the media for several years, according to different 
internal sources it seems that his health is failing quickly. If 
true, this might justify the establishment promoting the candi-
dacy of Raisi, who is a trusted ally of Khamenei. There are also 
several hypotheses confirming that Raisi might be one of the 
possible candidates to succeed Khamenei as Supreme Leader. 
If Khamenei were to die relatively soon, then it would be im-
portant for conservatives to have the presidency of the Islamic 
Republic in their pocket, since it would help them better han-
dle the transition of power to a new Supreme Leader. Having a 
pragmatist in charge might be seen as an obstacle to guarantee 
a peaceful transition of power on behalf of the conservatives. 
The election of Rouhani has been increasing the concern of 
the conservative front to guarantee a peaceful transition of pow-
er in case of death of the Supreme Leader between 2017-2021. 
Last but not least, a portion of the population normally does 
not vote in presidential elections as an expression of protest to-
ward the Islamic Republic. Normally, this oppositional portion 
of the Iranian electoral body has been around 30% of voters, 
which is quite significant. Surprisingly, a high percentage of 
this block decided to go to the polls and they likely voted for 
Rouhani, following the logic of supporting the “lesser of two 
evils”. This has been helpful to Rouhani in his challenge against 
Raisi and the conservative front. 
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The result of this election will influence significantly the 
domestic and foreign policies of Iran in the coming years. 
Following Rouhani’s victory, Tehran would likely continue its 
opening toward the West, particularly on the economic level, 
while it will not be clear the effect over Iran’s involvement in 
the Middle East crisis. The role of Russia and China would 
be weakened as global allies, and the opening toward the West 
would increase significantly. On the economic front, there will 
likely be more attention on liberalizations and privatizations. 
To better understand the guidelines of Rouhani’s pragmatist 
faction, I will devote a paragraph to the pragmatist front of Iran. 
The pragmatists: Rouhani’s main political base
The Executives of Construction Party (Hezb-e kargozaran) is 
the main pillar of this political group. It was established in 1995 
by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one year before the end of 
his second presidential term. 
This was the first party within the Islamic Republic that was 
established with the support of the incumbent President, his 
Vice Presidents, and about ten cabinet Ministers. Rafsanjani’s 
move was actually aimed at countering the rise of the conserva-
tive right and at creating a new political space in which he could 
strengthen his power. After Khomeini’s death, it was precisely 
because of Rafsanjani’s support inside the Assembly of Experts 
that Khamenei was appointed as Supreme Leader; nevertheless, 
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after eight years, Rafsanjani’s alliance with Khamenei was already 
eroded, and he could not rely anymore on the initial synergy 
with the Supreme Leader. Over time, Khamenei began to act 
independently, breaking the original alliance: thus, Rafsanjani 
knew that he needed to enhance his political and economic po-
sition, and the creation of the Executives of Construction Party 
was part of this new strategy.
In addition to Rafsanjani, other leading figures of the 
Executives of Construction Party are Faezeh Hashemi, daugh-
ter of the former President, Hossein Mar’ashi, Qolamhossein 
Karbaschi (former Mayor of Tehran), Mohammad Atrianfar, 
Mohammad Ali Najafi (Education Minister of Rouhani’s 
government), and Eshaq Jahanghiri (current Vice President 
of Rouhani). Their main slogans are the fulfilment of Islamic 
greatness, the continued renewal of the country, and the 
achievement of prosperity in Iran2.
This party is marked by a technocratic approach that affects 
all its policies. Economically, it supports a less statist view, in 
favor of an open market and liberalizations. In terms of regu-
latory policies, it is willing to accept cautious openings in the 
field of civil rights and to tolerate certain exceptions on social 
customs. Ultimately their foreign policy is open to diplomatic 
ties with the Western Countries3. 
The electoral base of the pragmatists is composed of a sec-
tion of the bazaris with more modern political views; part of 
the urban middle class, including some foundations such as 
the Astan-e Qods-e Razavi in Mashhad; private banks such as 
Karafarin, Parsian, Pasargad etc.; a minority within the militias 
and the Army, and part of the intellectual class, including pro-
fessors, journalists, and writers in line with the regime.
Unlike the conservative and the reformist front, the pragma-
tists have not yet experienced internal divisions and the group, 
2 A. Shadlu, Ettela’ati darbare-ye Ahzab va Jenah-haye Siasi-ye Iran-e Emruz (Information 
about Parties and Factions in Contemporary Iran), Gostareh, Tehran, 1379/2000, p. 
309.
3 Ibid.
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until 2016, was still well centered on the figure of Rafsanjani 
and the Executives of Construction Party. After the death of 
Rafsanjani on January 2017, this front lost its main leader and 
founder. This will likely weaken this political faction within the 
Islamic Republic. 
The presidential elections in Iran are not only a ritual, as it 
could happen in other authoritarian systems, but they represent 
an unexpected moment of changing, which could influence 
and even relatively change the internal political balance of pow-
er among the various factions and also influence the evolution 
or involution of the Islamic Republic.
The hardliners strike back
The re-election of Rouhani has basically strengthened the prag-
matist front and weakened the conservative one. This has been 
provoking a relatively harsh reaction from the hardliners who 
are trying to increase tensions within the Islamic Republic and 
to obstacle the new Rouhani government. One of their first 
moves has been the arrest of Hossein Fereydoun, brother of the 
President, to undermine his second term in office. According 
to the Guardian: “The brother of Iran’s moderate President, 
Hassan Rouhani, has been arrested amid escalating tensions 
between the government and the country’s hardline judiciary 
ahead of his swearing-in ceremony”4.
The hardliners’ reactions against Rouhani is also made appar-
ent by the IRGC increased involvement in the region and their 
harsh statements against the West. For example, they issued a 
statement trying to deny credit to Rouhani for the missile at-
tacks against the Islamic State in Syria on 18 June 2017.
According to the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) 
“[…] the Leila Olqadr (Night of Power) operation was carried 
4 K. Dehghan, “Hossein Fereidoun, Brother of  Iran’s President, is arrested”, 
The Guardian, 16 July 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/16/
hossein-fereidoun-hassan-rouhani-brother-iran-arrested 
The Struggle for Iran: Rouhani’s Difficult Path to Reform 27
out according to military’s hierarchical command system and 
per orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
[Supreme Leader Khamenei]”5. It is not yet clear why the state-
ment was published three days after the missile attacks. Hours 
earlier, President Hassan Rouhani had reiterated that the IRGC’s 
missile attacks were ordered by the Supreme National Security 
Council (SNSC) that he presides over. The operation was an-
nounced as retaliation for the June 7 terror attacks targeting 
the mausoleum of the founder of Islamic Republic, Ayatollah 
Rouhollah Khomeini, and the Iranian Parliament in Tehran. 
The Islamic State group claimed responsibility for the attack.
While hailing IRGC’s missile attacks as “correct, timely and 
necessary”, President Rouhani emphasized that it “is not a de-
cision made by one individual or a military organ, but such de-
cisions are made in the Supreme Council of National Security” 
and he added that the council had given even more authority to 
the armed forces to retaliate against “terrorists”6. 
According to Ahmad Majidyar, another example of the high 
tension between Rouhani and a part of the IRGC is the chief 
commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ rejec-
tion of President Hassan Rouhani’s criticism of the IRGC’s in-
volvement in Iran’s economy and defence of his forces’ track re-
cord. “According to IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, Major 
General Mohammad Ali Jafari said it was inappropriate for gov-
ernment officials to ‘delegate difficult tasks with minimal profits 
to Sepah (IRGC) and boast about projects executed by Sepah 
[…] but at the same time speak unfairly against Sepah’. Jafari 
made the remarks after Rouhani said last week that ‘part of the 
economy was in the control of a government without a gun, and 
we gave it to a government with a gun – this is not economy and 
privatization’. Rouhani’s comments referred to the Ahmadinejad 
5 “Anti-Daesh operation successful: IRGC spokesman”, Islamic Republic News 
Agency, 19 June 2017, http://www3.irna.ir/en/News/82569807/ 
6 “IRGC Contradicts Rouhani - Missile Attack Was Ordered By Khamenei”, 
Radio Farda, 22 June 2017, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-irgc-contradicts-
rouhani-missile-attack-is/28571762.html 
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Administration, which transferred the ownership of government 
assets and projects to the IRGC under a privatization scheme. 
Without naming Rouhani, Jafari blasted the President’s remarks 
and emphasized that the IRGC is the main guarantor of Iran’s 
security and stability. ‘A government without a gun is humiliat-
ed and ultimately forced to surrender’, he said, adding that the 
Iranian people need the IRGC’s help now more than ever”7.  
Another element has been the pressure of Ayatollah Khamenei 
on Rouhani’s government over the adoption of the UNESCO’s 
Global Education 2030 Agenda. According to the official website 
of the Leader office, during this meeting, Ayatollah Khamenei 
stressed that the Islamic Republic of Iran would not surrender to 
UNESCO’s Global Education 2030 Agenda.
Khamenei added, “The UNESCO 2030 education agenda 
and the like are not issues that the Islamic Republic of Iran could 
surrender and submit to”8. Ayatollah Khamenei slammed the su-
perpowers’ dominance over the United Nations by saying, “Why 
should a so-called ‘International’ community – which is definite-
ly infiltrated by the superpowers – have the right to make deci-
sions for the nations of the world with various cultures?”. The 
Leader said that Iran would not sign such documents and added, 
“This is wrong per se. That we sign an agenda and begin to carry 
it out secretly is wrong. It is not permitted at all. I declared it”. 
The Leader of the Islamic Revolution went on to express griev-
ances of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution for ne-
glecting to supervise the signing of the document, further stating 
that, “I am disappointed by the Supreme Council of the Cultural 
Revolution. They should have taken care of it and prevented it 
from getting to where it is now, so that I would not have to take 
action and prevent it. It is the Islamic Republic here!”.
7  A. Majidyar, I.R.G.C. Commander Rejects Rouhani’s Criticism about Guards’ Role in 
Iran’s Economy, Middle East Institute, 27 June 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/
io/irgc-commander-rejects-rouhani-s-criticism-about-its-role-iran-s-economy 
8 “Iran won’t submit to agendas like UNESCO 2030: Ayatollah Khamenei”, Office 
of  the Supreme Leader, 7 May 2017, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/4796/
Iran-won-t-submit-to-agendas-like-UNESCO-2030-Ayatollah-Khamenei 
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As Rouhani, at first, was supportive of the adoption of the 
UNESCO Global Education 2030 Agenda, the direct criticism 
of Khamenei emphasises tensions between the conservatives 
and the pragmatists within the Islamic Republic.  
At last, it should be pointed out that Rouhani’s second term 
will likely be weaker; he might not be able to implement its 
main domestic and foreign policy objectives. In other terms, 
Rouhani will govern for another four years, but without the 
power he had in his first term. In the meantime, the hardlin-
ers might prepare a hegemonic takeover of the presidency in 
the 2021 election. This scenario would become more likely 
should Iran perceive an immediate military threat, coming, for 
example, from the new US Administration or one of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries such as Saudi Arabia, or 
if the Islamic Republic should come under some significant and 
immediate economic sanctions.
According to this analysis, if Rouhani will not be able to im-
pose his agenda against the conservatives, there is the real chance 
that they could gain hegemony over the Islamic Republic in the 
next four to eight years. Up to this point, the Islamic Republic 
guaranteed a kind of turnover within its own political elite and 
factions. After Rafsanjani’s death, such balance of power is se-
riously at risk of being undermined. His passing might weaken 
both the reformists and the pragmatists, thus opening space for 
the conservatives to take control. This will paradoxically create 
a polarization in the Iranian political system, potentially mar-
ginalizing the reformists and the pragmatists alike.
The consequences of this shift within the Islamic Republic, 
in combination with some changes at the international level 
such as the election of President Donald J. Trump in the United 
States, could also end up influencing Iran’s foreign policy in the 
next four to eight years. First, the opening of Rouhani’s govern-
ment toward the West will be halted and the Islamic Republic, 
at least in the short term, could reinvigorate its anti-Western 
and anti-Israel orientation. The economic opening of Tehran 
toward the West might suffer a backlash. Such backlash will be 
Post-Vote Iran: Giving Engagement a Chance30
limited in the next four years as Rouhani has just been re-elect-
ed. Second, Tehran will reinforce its strategic alliances with 
both China and Russia. The economic ties with Beijing would 
likely grow and the security and military alliances with Russia 
could be reinforced. If Russia abandons Iran in order to build 
a new alliance with the United States, however, there could be 
a total alliance of Iran with China. Third, Iran would increase 
its support for Shia factions in the region and the proxy war 
against Saudi Arabia might intensify. Finally, the politics of the 
Islamic Republic in the Gulf region could become more secu-
rity-oriented and tensions with the GCC states, particularly 
Saudi Arabia, could escalate.
Conclusion: a precarious balance of power
The range of institutional and social actors moving within the 
Iranian political system is very diverse and heterogeneous. Its 
main components are institutional actors who are included for 
various reasons into the state structure and social actors such as 
foundations, banks, and the class of bazari, which constitute 
one of the social pillars of the Islamic Republic. In particular, 
the military organizations and the system of semi-public foun-
dations described above, denote the range of these components: 
in contemporary Iran, a large number of pro-system actors and 
power groups compete for power, sometimes joining their forc-
es and sometimes colliding, but always within the limits out-
lined by the Islamic regime.
This apparently heterogeneous reality guarantees the longevity 
of this political system: each actor, beyond the differences and 
conflicts of interest that may arise, support in various forms the 
“system” (Nezam), and take part in its activities, including control 
and repression, obeying its laws and directives, and supporting 
it also economically. Like many other complex systems, Iranian 
politics is animated by political alliances and competition among 
different political factions. These are heterogeneous political real-
ities, united by fundamental interests and common values. 
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Three are the main fronts that characterise Iranian contem-
porary political landscape: the conservatives, the pragmatists, 
and the reformists.
On economic issues, the conservatives and reformists have a 
more statist orientation, while the pragmatists’ views are more 
free-market oriented. Then again, when it comes to civil and 
political rights the conservatives are extremely intransigent, 
whereas the pragmatists and the reformists are more inclined, 
albeit with different nuances, to cautious openings. On the for-
eign policy level, the attitudes of the conservatives and many re-
formists are strongly anti-Western and anti-American, whereas 
the pragmatists have open and less sectarian views. Nevertheless, 
the ever-changing alliances and conflicts among these main po-
litical fronts continue to shape the political process. Currently, 
for instance, the government rests upon the alliance of the most 
moderate factions of these three political groups. In different 
historical moments, other coalitions emerged, such as the one 
headed by Khatami (between the reformists and the pragma-
tists) or the one headed by Ahmadinejad, dominated by the 
conservatives.
The alternation of these alliances is crucial in shaping the 
country’s major public policies both internally and internation-
ally. These pro-system factions are relevant to guarantee the 
equilibrium of the Islamic Republic. 

2.  Not for the Price of Watermelons: 
     Is it Possible to Reform 
     the Iranian Economy?  
Eugenio Dacrema
Iran’s economy has always been a key element in setting the con-
dition of the country’s political developments. As it often is the 
case, the outcomes and trends of its economy have always been 
a matter of political dispute between supporters and opponents 
of the current regime1. Western observers have tended to focus 
on the numerous shortcomings of the post-revolutionary re-
gime’s economic management. However, since its foundation, 
the current regime has spent considerable effort on propaganda 
to advertise and glorify its achievements in the economic field, 
especially in the struggle against poverty and social inequalities. 
A significant number of slogans throughout the 1979 
Revolution reflected the Shah regime’s mismanagement of the 
economy and the unfair distribution of national wealth. Hence, 
since 1979, the economy has become a central focus of the new 
regime that, along with the instauration of the Velayat e-faqih 
political model, had promised the inauguration of a fairer and 
prosperous Islamic economic model. 
However, while the Velayat e-faqih had been carefully craft-
ed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, no one in the new re-
gime knew how to shape an Islamic economic model, apart 
from reiterating the usual rhetoric on poverty and inequal-
ity2. Khomeini himself used to dismiss the technicalities of 
1 D. Salehi-Isfahani, “Oil wealth and economic growth in Iran”, in A. Gheissari (Ed.), 
Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009.
2 J. Amuzegar, The Islamic Republic of  Iran: Reflections on an Emerging Economy, 
Abingdon, Routledge, 2014.
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economic management. He was quoted as saying: “Economics 
is for donkeys” and “We did not make a Revolution to cut the 
price of the watermelons”3. Hence, especially after the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war, this became soon a matter of contention be-
tween the main groups competing for political primacy within 
the Islamic Republic and their different visions of the measures 
to be undertaken to develop the national economy. 
Due to historical reasons and the demographic of the country 
the Iranian economy has always been relatively more diversified 
than those of other Gulf states. However, although several mod-
els of economic development have been applied since 1979, no 
unified method of economic management has proved able to cut 
Iran’s dependency on oil revenues. The economic performance 
has always been correlated with the oil price fluctuations, of-
ten with dramatic effects on the government’s ability to improve 
living conditions and spur the creation of jobs. During the last 
decade, economic issues became of primary importance within 
the domestic political debate. The high degree of economic mis-
management of the Ahmadinejad Administration, coupled with 
the new heavy round of sanctions – including an oil embargo 
– applied by the international community in 2011, led to deep 
imbalances and skyrocketing inflation despite the prolonged pe-
riod of high oil prices, causing great hardship and discontent 
among the population. Thus, the economy has become one of 
the main issues in determining the electoral results that brought 
to power the moderate government of Hassan Rouhani and in 
inciting popular support for his moves on the international are-
na – namely the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal – aimed at easing the 
tension with the international community4. 
This chapter starts with summarizing the achievements and 
shortcomings of the Islamic Republic’s economic management 
3 G. Wawro, Quicksand: America’s pursuit of  power in the Middle East, New York, The 
Penguin Press, 2010.
4 H. Hakimian, Iran’s Long Economic Journey, Project Syndicate, 24 May 2017, 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/iran-rouhani-election- 
economy-by-hassan-hakimian-2017-05
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from 1979 to present. The second part reviews the main models 
applied in the management of the Iranian economy from the 
Revolution onwards. The third part focuses on the economic 
performance of the Ahmadinejad Administration, whose ef-
fects are crucial to understanding the following political devel-
opments both at the domestic and at the international level. 
Finally, the fourth part reviews the achievements of the Rouhani 
Administration as of now, especially in the wake of the Iran nu-
clear deal and the partial lifting of the international sanctions. 
A general assessment of the post-revolutionary era 
The economy was one of the main issues in the protests that led 
to the 1979 Revolution. The government of the Shah was ac-
cused of opening the country to foreign influence, developing 
a manufacturing sector heavily focused on assembly parts and 
dependent on foreign inputs, overexploiting the hydrocarbon 
resources, neglecting rural productions, and, in general, of fa-
voring a Western model of development against the national 
interest and responsible for widening the wealth and income 
gaps between the different economic strata5. Such accusations 
of mismanagement were translated by the religious opposition 
into accusations of transgressions against the nation’s morality: 
the government was pushing the population toward a Western-
style, consumeristic, and unfair model and suffocating its spirit-
uality and virtue6. 
Therefore, once in power, the new regime began promot-
ing an economic vision based on egalitarian distribution, state 
ownership, self-sufficiency, and religious values of community 
and austerity, which were also embedded in the text of the new 
5 J. Amuzegar (2014).
6 The idea that the West was a source of  impure morality and habits was particu-
larly widespread, especially after the clandestine publication in 1962 of  the novel 
Occidentosis: A Plague from the West by the novelist Jalal Al-e-Ahmad who coined 
the term “Gharbzadegi” (“Westoxification”, or “Intoxication of  the West”).
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Constitution7. Not being able to translate such values into a 
working economic structure, subsequent governments experi-
mented with various economic models, often including meas-
ures similar to those adopted by the Shah’s regime, based on lib-
eralization and the attempt to attract foreign capital. However, 
the inability to follow a coherent model of development and the 
continuous experimentations led to the overall stagnation of the 
economy. Per capita income is today only slightly higher than it 
was in 1979. Even factoring in the effects of the long war with 
Iraq and the international sanctions, the outcome is disappoint-
ing, especially compared to other countries that, in 1979, had 
a similar GDP per capita. See, for instance, Turkey: in 1979, it 
had almost the same GDP per capita as Iran and, in the 1990s, 
it went through a long period of tension and civil war in the east 
of the country. Furthermore, although Turkey was never targeted 
by international sanctions, unlike Iran it was neither endowed 
with enormous natural resources. Nevertheless, due to a more co-
herent economic policy, especially since the 2000s, Turkey’s per 
capita GDP today is more than double compared to that of Iran. 
Fig. 1 – GDP per capita
                 
 Source: World Bank
7 The Constitution of  Islamic Republic of  Iran, Iran Chamber Society, http://www.
iranchamber.com/government/laws/ constitution.php  
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The post-revolutionary regime has achieved more remarkable 
results in its struggle against poverty and inequality. While in 
1986 the percentage of people living on less than 2 dollars a 
day was above 7%, today’s figure calculated at 2010 PPP value 
stands at less than 1%. Also, the GINI index – the most adopt-
ed measure of economic inequality – witnessed a significant 
reduction from 47.4 in 1986 to 37.3 in 2013. 
Fig. 2 - Poverty headcount Ratio (2011 PPP)
Source: World Bank
Fig. 3 – GINI Index
                   
 
Source: World Bank
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The first decade: 
looking for an Islamic economic model
The 1979 Revolution was not just a revolution in name only. 
It deeply changed the political and social order of the country, 
creating new elites and hierarchies and deposing the old ones. 
During the first ten years, the economy was subject to a similar 
wave of change involving both the social groups empowered in 
its management and the principles applied to its development. 
The few months that preceded the spark of the Iran-Iraq war 
were characterized by thousands of expropriations and substi-
tutions at the top of state-controlled and private industries and 
in the main economic institutions. Western-educated manag-
ers and owners close to the Shah’s regime were expelled or ex-
propriated without compensation and substituted with young 
and loyal revolutionaries or religious figures close to the new 
regime. Their properties were transferred to ad hoc religious in-
stitutions, charitable foundations (bonyads) charged with the 
administration of the country’s industries and financial insti-
tutions according to the precepts of Islam. The economic pol-
icies were still influenced by the alliance between Marxists and 
Shiite clergy that characterized the inception of the Revolution 
and that ended with the progressive elimination of the former 
and the domination of the latter. The vaguely Marxist doc-
trine of Abolhassan Bani Sadr, President until 1981, and the 
“Islamist Marxism” of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Prime Minister 
from 1981 to 1989, went hand in hand with the firm religious 
principles of Ayatollah Khomeini, who consolidated his posi-
tion as Supreme Leader of the country until his death in 1989. 
The economic policies of Prime Minister Mousavi during the 
war (1981-1988) planted the seeds of the current econom-
ic structure of the country, including its main shortcomings. 
War-related measures such as rationings were accompanied by 
the introduction of nationalizations, price controls, and sub-
stantial food and fuel subsidies that still burden the state budget 
and fuel political disputes. Overall, the first decade after the 
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Revolution was marked by a dramatic worsening of all the main 
economic indicators. The first post-revolutionary years saw the 
substitution of the old economic management with a new one, 
often lacking the essential skills to run industries and finan-
cial institutions, thus leading to a temporary stall followed by a 
slow recovery. However, the eight-years conflict with neighbor-
ing Iraq had a major role in preventing economic consolidation 
for several more years. The economic policies adopted during 
this period probably represent the only real attempt to build an 
authentic alternative to the Western-style development encour-
aged by the deposed Shah. They were based on the principles 
expressed by the two main currents that sparked and led the 
Iranian Revolution at its beginning: the Marxist left and the 
Shiite clergy. However, even after the end of the conflict with 
Iraq, the positive results remained limited, leading to a new 
economic course inaugurated at the beginning of the 1990s by 
the Rafsanjani presidency. 
The years of pragmatism 
The beginning of the 1990s marked a significant change in the 
country’s economic policy. Such a change was made possible by 
three main factors: first, the devastation left by the war against 
Iraq and the economic mismanagement of the first decade had 
made the population tired of the strict ideological approach of 
the first revolutionary period and keen to support the introduc-
tion of radically new measures. Second, the death of Ruhollah 
Khomeini had left more room for power sharing within the 
leadership. The new Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, did not 
enjoy the same degree of charisma and favor among the popu-
lation as his predecessor and, at the beginning of his presidency, 
he was too weak to stop other figures within the regime, such as 
the President, from having a more independent and prominent 
role. Third, the war had enormously strengthened the new par-
amilitary organizations within the regime, such as the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij, which after 
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the end of the conflict were looking for new fields to exert their 
recently-acquired influence and power.
The year 1989 marked the rise to power of the “pragmatic” 
wing of the Shiite clergy led by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
and the launch of the first Five-Year Economic Development 
Plan, which included measures of structural adjustment to revive 
the private sector, liberalizations, and openings to foreign invest-
ments in clear contradiction with past emphasis on self-sufficien-
cy. However, after a few years, the ability of the government to 
predict and control the effects of the new policies proved insuffi-
cient. Both state and private consumption rose significantly more 
than forecasted, causing imbalances in the national balance of 
payments and drying the country’s foreign reserves. Furthermore, 
in 1993, the government unified the different exchange rates of 
the rial into one floating rate (1600 rials for 1 US dollar instead 
of the pre-Revolution exchange of 70 rials for 1 dollar), a decision 
that proved catastrophic for the country’s financial stability: the 
government was not able to keep the consequent financial out-
flows under control. After a few months from its introduction, the 
government found itself compelled to reintroduce foreign trade 
and exchange restrictions. The repercussions of these short-sight-
ed first attempts to liberalize the Iranian economy reverberated in 
the following years and led to a dramatic increase in the inflation, 
which reached the highest peak of the entire post-revolutionary 
era during the last year of the Rafsanjani presidency. 
Although Rafsanjani remained a prominent personality in 
the national political scene, his failure to revive the national 
economy determined the demise of his government and the 
electoral victory in 1997 of the reformist Mohammad Khatami, 
who promised to accompany economic reforms with more po-
litical openness both domestically and internationally. 
The economic performance of Khatami’s government was 
helped by the significant increase in oil prices during his term. 
In order to better administrate the abundant oil revenues, the 
new Administration created a new financial institution, the Oil 
Stabilization Fund, which was meant to become the recipient 
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of excess revenues during high-price periods. These excess rev-
enues would be put to use during periods of low prices to bal-
ance the state budget. Thanks to the new more favorable condi-
tions and a more cautious approach, the new government was 
able to successfully unify the foreign exchanges and to join the 
International Monetary Fund in 2002. Trade tariffs and restric-
tions were rationalized, and a new law for the attraction of for-
eign investments was approved. Some legislative advancements 
also occurred in other economic spheres such as budgetary poli-
cies – with the issuance of debt certificates – and the permission 
for state banks to set deposit and loan rates. 
Fig. 4 - Brent prices (Annual $)
 
Source: World Bank
However, these advancements proved insufficient to spur the 
economic modernization promised by the government8: in 
fact, it failed to carry out the planned privatizations and mod-
ernize the obsolete subsidy system with a new and more efficient 
8 A. Siddiqi, “Khatami and the search for reform in Iran”, Stanford Journal of  
International Relations, vol. 6, no. 1, 2005.
Post-Vote Iran: Giving Engagement a Chance42
system of social safety nets. State expenditures increased signif-
icantly, and the resources of the Oil Stabilization Fund were 
often employed to stabilize the budget even during periods of 
high oil prices. Moreover, the lack of significant advancements 
in the simplification of the regulatory system and the highly 
bureaucratic fiscal system, coupled with the ongoing lack of 
transparency, failed to attract a significant amount of foreign in-
vestments, despite the introduction of the new law. The targets 
outlined in the government’s Third Economic Development 
Plan were therefore widely missed, thus leading to a loss of 
popularity for the Khatami Administration. In the same years, 
the country’s major problems of public corruption, drug ad-
diction, and criminality started to emerge in the public debate, 
smoothing the way for the rise of a radically different approach 
to the national economy and, in general, to the leadership of 
the country. A new approach that, in the 2005 election, was 
embodied by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.     
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or the second generation
It is not possible to understand the factors that led to the sign-
ing of the 2015 deal on the Iranian nuclear program without 
analysing the effects of Ahmadinejad policies on the country’s 
economy and society. Like his approach to domestic politics 
and international relations, his economic policy can be better 
understood by looking at Ahmadinejad’s personality. 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been, first of all, a populist lead-
er. Born in a modest family and raised in poverty, he was given 
a chance to advance in society thanks to his membership in 
the revolutionary regime’s newly formed paramilitary organiza-
tions (specifically, he militated in the Basij’s ranks). Since their 
foundation, these organizations have had their main recruiting 
pools in the countryside’s lower-medium classes and the de-
prived urban youth. During and after the Iran-Iraq war they 
progressively developed powerful networks of contacts deeply 
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entrenched in all levels of political power9. The IRGC- and 
Basij-associated networks started developing economic interests 
in several sectors such as constructions, real estates, and telecom-
munications. Their newly-acquired influence coupled with the 
highly-respected role they enjoyed within the regime allowed 
several of their members, including those of the humblest ori-
gins, to be elected to prestigious political posts. This was the case 
for Ahmadinejad who, before running for the presidency, had 
been Mayor of Tehran. In this respect, Ahmadinejad represented 
the successful son of the Islamic Revolution: a simple and pious 
believer elevated to the highest ranks of national politics thanks 
to his faith and service to the homeland. But Ahmadinejad also 
perfectly embodied the most zealot regime rhetoric, both do-
mestically and internationally. Domestically, he fought against 
inequality and poverty through bold fiscal and social housing 
policies while giving increasing economic power to the enter-
prises close to the IRGC and the Basij. On the international 
level, he escalated the confrontational stance against the regime’s 
traditional enemies such as Israel and the US and increased the 
Iranian projection in the Middle East region. 
Ahmadinejad’s economic policies reflected, for a big part, his 
background and beliefs, coupled with a complete lack of trust 
in the rules of the mainstream economic science. This led him 
to follow more his intuitions and his likeminded advisors than 
independent economic experts. 
His management of the economy can be summarized in two 
main trends: “economic populism” and the “militarization of 
the economy”. By the end of his second term, such trends had 
brought the country’s economy to its knees. 
Economic populism
Ahmadinejad’s two terms as President were characterized by 
a dramatic increase in the fiscal budget, from 1,590,000,000 
9 F. Wehrey et al., The Rise of  the Pasdaran: Assessing the domestic roles of  Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps, RAND Corporation, 2009.
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million rial in 2005 to 7,280,000,000 million in 201310. This 
expansion was supported by a significant increase in oil prices 
during the same years and, above all, by a dramatic increase in 
the liquidity provided by the Central Bank. 
The new liquidity was utilized to finance the subsidy and so-
cial housing programs that were at the core of Ahmadinejad’s 
political message. New buildings for low-income families were 
built in the peripheries of the biggest urban centers, while banks 
were compelled to grant risky loans to enterprises for projects 
that were supposed to spur employment. However, the poten-
tially positive effects of these interventions were curbed by the 
measures undertaken by the government to cope with the infla-
tion caused by the huge increase in liquidity. In utter disregard 
of the basics of fiscal management, the government put in place 
a policy of price control and artificially high foreign exchange 
rates that led to a fast and dramatic deterioration of the econ-
omy’s fundamentals instead of controlling public spending and 
allowing exchange rates to adjust to a sustainable level. The gov-
ernment kept the interest rates at low (when not negative) levels 
causing massive capital outflows, a stiff decrease in saving rates, 
and an increase in consumption. In the short term, the artificial-
ly high value of the national currency imposed by the govern-
ment boosted the poor’s purchasing power of primary goods. In 
the long term, however, it ended up redirecting consumption 
toward cheaper imported goods, thus damaging the domestic 
companies’ ability to compete in the domestic market, let alone 
in the international one, with dire consequences for the indus-
trial sector’s ability to spur (and even maintain) employment. 
Such measures in the domestic sphere were accompanied by 
a tough international stance against the West and Israel and 
heavy investments in the country’s nuclear program which, 
in 2011, led to the imposition of the toughest sanctions ever 
endured by the country. By blocking the country’s oil exports 
– the only significant source of hard currency – and most of 
the domestic banking system’s connections with the outside 
10 J. Amuzegar (2014).
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world, the new round of sanctions inflicted the final blow to 
the Iranian currency and to all the measures put in place to keep 
it artificially strong. In 2013, the inflation rate reached 34.4%, 
hitting the population’s purchase power harshly. 
The stiff and rapid effect of a set of sanctions imposed only 
two years before is explainable only by looking at the gener-
al economic mismanagement that preceded their imposition, 
which had deeply deteriorated the country’s economic funda-
mentals. Furthermore, their effect would have been probably 
even stronger if, in the previous years, the economy had not 
enjoyed unprecedented levels of oil prices. The collapse of the 
economy and the people’s purchasing power caused both the 
fall of the government’s popularity and Ahmadinejad’s loss 
of credibility among the conservative front, including the 
Supreme Leader. Khamenei’s support for a new government – 
less confrontational and more cautious in the management of 
the economy – was decisive for Rouhani’s election and for the 
successful outcome of the negotiations that led to the signing 
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which, 
in exchange for the freezing of the country’s nuclear program, 
brought to the lifting of most international sanctions. 
Fig. 5 - Inflation
Source: World Bank
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The militarization of the economy
The dramatic increase in the IRGC and Basij’s influence in the 
economy – and consequently in politics – is the second decisive 
outcome of the significant effects still exerted by Ahmadinejad’s 
tenure on today’s Iranian political scene11. 
As mentioned earlier, after the Revolution the IRGC rapidly 
took the regular army’s place at the top of the Iranian mili-
tary organizations; during Rafsanjani’s tenure, they also became 
important players in the economic field. But it is only under 
Ahmadinejad that they acquired a de facto dominant position. 
His cabinet included several previous members of both the 
IRGC and the Basij whose influence soon translated into major 
participations of their business networks in the new big pub-
lic projects inaugurated by the Administration. Construction 
and engineering firms linked to the business circuits became 
suppliers of several public services and the main winners of the 
state’s tenders for the realization of new projects. IRGC and 
Basij-linked enterprises were also among the top-benefiter of 
the massive amount of loans conceded by the banking sector 
during this period. 
The economic distortions created by Ahmadinejad and the 
self-reliant economy imposed by the 2011 sanctions benefit-
ed dramatically these organizations, which also supported the 
President’s hawkish foreign political stance. The vested interests 
developed by these organizations during Ahmadinejad’s presi-
dency constitute one of the biggest challenges that the current 
Administration is facing in order to liberalize the economy and 
attract the investments of foreign companies that could poten-
tially endanger their dominant position.
11 A. Basiri, “Iran and the Revolutionary Guards’ Economic Powerhouse”, 
Forbes, 29 March 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/03/29/
iran-and-the-revolutionary-guards-economic-powerhouse/#6fb56d26cf4e.
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Rouhani’s election and the challenges of the post-
JCPOA period
When Hassan Rouhani was elected President in 2013, he was 
tasked by the electors and the Supreme Leader with two prima-
ry goals: first, to stabilize the economy, in particular by keeping 
the skyrocketing inflation under control; second, to boost the 
depressed job market, whose decline was taking its toll on the 
youth and, in general, on the regime’s popularity. 
 
Fig. 6 - Unemployment (modeled ILO estimate)
Source: World Bank
Obtaining the lifting of the sanctions that had hit hard Iran’s 
exports of oil and gas and had reflected on the state’s ability to 
accumulate foreign reserves to stabilize the currency was key to 
achieve such goals. Furthermore, access to significant amount 
of foreign financial inflows – now subject to the sanctions’ 
banking embargo – was considered the only way to attract the 
necessary investments to renew the country’s crumbling infra-
structure and spur economic growth and job creation. 
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These factors might explain the widespread popular support 
for the JCPOA negotiations and the Supreme Leader’s favora-
ble stance toward the agreement, which hushed up the oppo-
sition of the regime’s hardliners. The agreement, signed on 14 
July 2015, led to the lifting of the nuclear-related sanctions in 
January 2016. 
The signing of the JCPOA was strongly welcomed by the 
Iranian population, whose expectations for quick and visible 
improvements in the country’s economy grew rapidly12. Such 
expectations have constituted a double-edged sword for the 
Rouhani Administration. In the short run, the signing of the 
JCPOA has boosted the government’s popularity, although the 
difficulty to match such high expectations was feared to pro-
duce a “Khatami-like effect”, i.e., the disillusionment of the 
more moderate and progressive voters leading to massive vote 
abstention and the election victory of a conservative-populist 
government as it already happened with Ahmadinejad. 
This scenario was particularly dreaded in occasion of the 
2017 presidential election13. Since the lifting of the sanctions, 
Iran’s economic performance did not meet the expectations of 
the population and the most optimist observers. The failure to 
sufficiently revive the economy and create jobs was exploited by 
the conservative opposition, also favored by the Supreme Leader. 
During his campaign, Rouhani’s opponent, Ebrahim Raisi, 
promised “populist” economic measures similar to those that 
had granted Ahmadinejad two terms in office14. In addition to 
these domestic difficulties, since the end of 2016, the President 
has also had to face the increasing confrontational stance of 
12 M. Khalaji, “Great Expectations: Iran after the Deal”, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
38, No 3, Fall 2015, pp. 61-77. 
13 P. Hafezi, “Iran reformists to back Rouhani re-election, though some vot-
ers grow cool”, Reuters, 4 May 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-iran-election-rouhani-rights-idUSKBN1802J3.
14 S. Peterson, “The Iran election, lackluster economy opens door to a pop-
ulist push”, The Christian Science Monitor, 17 May 2017, https://www.cs-
monitor.com/World/Middle-East/2017/0517/In-Iran-election-lackluster- 
economy-opens-door-to-a-populist-push.
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the new American Administration. However, Rouhani’s re-elec-
tion by a large margin shows that the population is still keen to 
give him a chance to revive the economy and to implement his 
reform agenda. But the spectre of a new rise of the conserva-
tives – either to the presidency or even to the Supreme Leader’s 
post in case of the increasingly probable death of Khamenei 
– still looms on Iran’s re-opening to the world and the nuclear 
agreement. 
In the last year and a half, Rouhani’s government has had to 
face two main economic challenges that are likely to be central 
also during his second term: first, his Administration is faced 
with the need to stiffly increase the oil and gas production in or-
der to accumulate precious resources necessary to revitalize the 
economy. During the sanctions period, the Iranian oil produc-
tion fell under 2 mb/d due mainly to the restrictions imposed 
on its exports but also to the increasingly deteriorating oil and 
gas infrastructure. Foreign investors could not invest in its re-
newal nor in the explorations necessary to substitute the nu-
merous fields close to maturation. After the sanctions’ lifting, 
production rapidly increased, surpassing 3.5 mb/d by the end 
of 2016. However, the potential positive effects of the produc-
tion rise were curbed by the low oil prices. Furthermore, this 
rapid rise is slowing down due to the infrastructure’s shortcom-
ings and the difficulties of attracting foreign firms to provide 
the necessary technological and financial support. After sever-
al stop-and-goes, in 2016 a new framework for energy con-
tract, the Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC), was approved by the 
Iranian Parliament (Majlis), allowing investing foreign firms to 
obtain profits based on production and not on fixed prices, as 
the conservative wing tried to impose – a measure that would 
have discouraged most foreign oil companies. In June 2017, 
Total signed a $5bn contract for the development of South Pars 
gas field, the biggest in the world (shared by Iran and Qatar)15. 
It represents the first major agreement in the energy sector since 
15 “Total marks Iran return with South Pars gas deal”, Reuters, 3 July 2017, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-total-southpars-idUSKBN19O1IO.
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the lifting of the sanctions. Total could finally give full commit-
ment only after reassurances from the US Administration that 
its investment would not have been subject to the US sanctions 
still in place. Reassurances had to be also given to the American 
airplane-maker Boeing, which in April signed a $3bn contract 
for supplying Iran Air with new aircraft16. 
In fact, the still applied American sanctions – the primary 
ones and the secondary non-nuclear related ones, which forbid 
international companies to carry out transactions in dollars with 
Iranian entities or to deal with them if one member of their 
board is an American citizen, constitute the main external obsta-
cle for attracting foreign investments. This is the second greatest 
challenge for Rouhani’s government. The fact that no American 
financial institution is allowed to interact with Iranian entities 
or with other banks interacting with Iranian banks poses a great 
barrier for most major financial institutions worldwide wishing 
to deal with Iran. A problem that will require time in order to 
create alternative paths for the financial inflows. 
However, American sanctions are only one of the main prob-
lems that Iran faces in attracting foreign capital. Domestic regu-
lations and laws are equally challenging. While the government 
has set the ambitious goal of reaching $35bn in foreign invest-
ments per year, observers consider the goal highly improbable 
due to the likely political obstacles that the Administration will 
find in the Parliament to update the 2003 investment law and 
all the regulations related to foreign investments17. The attrac-
tion of foreign investments is key to revive the economy, and 
especially to spur job creation in a country where youth unem-
ployment has grown steadily in the last decade, and the gener-
al unemployment rate has been at two digits since the 1990s. 
16 J. Holzer, “Boeing’s Iran deal puts Trump in tough spot”, Foreign Policy, 26 May 
2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/26/boeings-iran-deal-puts-trump-in- 
tough-spot/.
17 F. Rezaei and S. Khodaei, “Iran needs foreign investment. But they’re not mak-
ing it easy”, The National Interest, 28 February 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/
feature/iran-needs-foreign-investment-theyre-not-making-it-easy-19621.
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Social frustration caused by unemployment and economic 
hardship is particularly worrisome for the long-term survival of 
the current regime and constitutes one of the primary sources 
of potential instability for the country. Despite the significant 
economic growth witnessed in the last years (especially com-
pared with the last period of Ahmadinejad’s Administration), 
the measures adopted during Rouhani’s first term have failed 
so far to spur significant growth in the private sector and have 
favored mainly state-connected entities and the IRGC business 
networks18. Furthermore, in order to appease such networks, 
the government has allocated a major part of the new oil rev-
enues to the military budget, which witnessed a 145% rise19.
In fact, the greatest problem is represented by the vested in-
terests accumulated during the previous Administrations by the 
business networks linked to the military apparatus – in par-
ticular the IRGC. Such networks and their representatives in 
the Majlis and in other institutions of the Islamic Republic 
are expected to exert the greatest influence in order to protect 
their interests and impair the potential economic successes of 
the Administration, trying to lure electoral support by propos-
ing, instead of economic liberalization, a new round of popu-
list economics. As never before, the future of Iranian politics is 
therefore deeply entrenched to the country’s future economic 
performance.
 
18 Y. Torbati, B. Sharafedin and B. Dehghanpisheh, “After Iran’s nuclear pact, 
state firms win most foreign deals”, Reuters, 19 January 2017, http://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-iran-contracts-insight-idUSKBN15328S.
19 A. Majidyar, Rouhani says Iran’s military budget increased by 145 percent during his 
term, Middle East Institute, 18 April 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/io/
rouhani-says-iran-s-military-budget-increased-145-percent-during-his-term.

3.  Security Spoiler or Political Broker? 
     Iran’s role in the Middle East
Annalisa Perteghella
Two roads diverged in a wood 
When in July 2015 Iran and the P5+1 reached the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), two different in-
terpretations emerged as for the consequences for the Middle 
Eastern region. Indeed, the two interpretations reflect a broader 
issue at stake: the future of Iran, the big question being “will 
Iran moderate” (as betted upon by Barack Obama’s pivot to 
Tehran)? Or will it simply free-ride, benefitting from the sanc-
tions relief and the reintegration in the world order, without 
relinquishing anything in exchange?
Actually, this kind of reasoning bears an inner fallacy: in deal-
ing with Iran – as well as other countries – pundits often tend 
to think of the country they would want to deal with, not of 
the country they are actually dealing with. As an International 
Crisis Group report puts it “If world powers hope to progress 
on areas of concern and common interest, they must engage 
Iran as it is, not the Iran they wish to see”1.
But, as former President Barack Obama acknowledged in 
an interview in April 2015 (three months before reaching the 
JCPOA), “We want Iran not to have nuclear weapons precisely 
because we can’t bank on the nature of the regime changing […] 
If suddenly Iran transformed itself into Germany or Sweden or 
1 Iran after the nuclear deal, International Crisis Group, Report no. 166, 15 
December 2015, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf- 
and-arabian-peninsula/iran/iran-after-nuclear-deal 
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France, there would be a different set of conversations about 
their nuclear infrastructure”2. Actually, the deal was focused 
only on the nuclear program, without pressing for regime re-
form, which is something that would have definitely prevented 
the formation of a consensus in Tehran and thus nullified the 
possibilities of reaching a deal. 
In any case, as for the consequences of the JCPOA on Iran’s 
foreign policy – and especially on its role in the region – pro-
ponents of the deal argued that – by strengthening the mod-
erates – it would have encouraged Iran to engage further with 
the West and to lessen its aggressive behavior in the region. 
Actually, this would have worked in both ways: the regional 
moderation would have strengthened the moderates and, at 
the same time, the strengthening of the moderates would have 
opened room for cooperation in the region and brought about 
a less aggressive behavior. 
More broadly, Obama’s Iran policy was linked to a compre-
hensive strategy regarding the Middle East and the US role in 
it, the ultimate goal being the creation of a concert system of 
states – resembling, in the best scenario, a security complex of 
regional cooperation in which responsible and stable countries 
would have worked together in order to settle the regional dis-
putes and contrast the regional challenges. 
Indeed, these ideas seemed to rest upon the recommenda-
tions provided by the 2006 report by the Iraqi Study Group 
– the so-called Baker-Hamilton Commission – a bipartisan 
commission of foreign policy experts asked to provide recom-
mendations on resolving the conflict in Iraq, at that time in the 
midst of a worsening security situation and deepening sectarian 
divide3. The Commission’s final report acknowledged the need 
2 “Transcript: President Obama’s Full NPR Interview On Iran Nuclear 
Deal”, NPR, 7 April 2015, http://www.npr.org/2015/04/07/397933577/
transcript-president-obamas-full-npr-interview-on-iran-nuclear-deal 
3 The Commission was led by former Secretary of  State James A. Baker III and 
former Indiana Democratic Congressman Leo Hamilton, and was coordinat-
ed through the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), https://www.usip.org/
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to engage adversaries and enemies – with specific reference to 
Iran and Syria – in order to try to resolve conflicts and differ-
ences consistent with US’ own interests, thus recommending 
the active engagement of Tehran and Damascus in a diplomat-
ic, no-preconditioned, dialogue. The final aim was to obtain 
their cooperation to constructive policies towards Iraq and the 
region (as, in the case of Iran, already happened in the post-
2001 cooperation in Afghanistan)4. 
Among Obama’s closest foreign policy advisors was Benjamin 
Rhodes. Rhodes, working with Leo Hamilton as the chief 
note-taker for the Iraqi Study Group, ended up helping in 
shaping the Report’s conclusions, and soon became one of the 
staunchest advocates of US diplomatic engagement with Iran5. 
A similar approach guided the EU, which played a decisive 
role in reaching a final agreement, both through its diplomat-
ic arm (the European External Action Service, EEAS) and 
through the comprehensive sanctions regime that provided the 
EU with political clout during the negotiation6. In the peaceful 
and negotiated resolution of the Iranian nuclear dossier, which 
had monopolized EU-Iran relations since 2006, the EU saw 
the possibility of de-securitizing the dialogue with Tehran and, 
instead, opening up room for the normalization of economic 
relations as well as for cooperation on security issues of mutual 
concern, such as the fight against terrorism and the re-compo-
sition of a stable order in the Middle East7. 
publications/2009/03/iraq-study-group 
4 The Iraqi Study Group Report, Vintage Books, 2006, https://www.usip.org/sites/
default/files/files/USIP-full_iraq_study_group_report.pdf  
5 “The Aspiring Novelist Who Became Obama’s Foreign-Policy Guru. How 
Ben Rhodes rewrote the rules of  diplomacy for the digital age”, The New York 
Times, 5 May 2016,  https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/magazine/the-as-
piring-novelist-who-became-obamas-foreign-policy-guru.html 
6 Brussels Briefing with S. Riegraf, R. Parsi, and C. Adebahr, The EU and the 
Iran Nuclear Deal, DGAP - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V, 29 
September 2015,  https://dgap.org/en/node/27182. 
7 E. Geranmayeh, Détente with Iran; how Europe can maximise the chances of  a final 
nuclear deal, European Council on Foreign Relations, 3 June 2014, http://www.
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Opposed to this broader view, skeptics and critics of the 
deal argued that any hope of moderation should be abandoned 
when dealing with Iran. Iran already had a reformist President 
and a reformist Parliament (in the 2000-2004 period): if these 
were the ingredients required for political change, it would have 
already happened. Instead, the temporary presence of Hassan 
Rouhani and his smiling, Western-educated, aides would only 
serve as the attractive, charming face of the Islamic Republic, 
put in power by Khamenei and his inner circle with the only 
purpose of reaching the deal; once their transactional role is 
fulfilled, their “utility will disappear”8. 
Another argument put forth by the opponents of the deal 
was that, given the term-limitedness of the agreement (the 
sunset clause), once it expires Iran will be free to resume its 
nuclear-related activities, thus “becoming like Japan”, with the 
difference that – the argument goes – Japan is a peaceful and 
democratic state that can be trusted, while Iran is a rogue state 
which can’t be offered such forbearance9.
Most of all, critics argued that the billions of dollars in 
sanctions relief would have ended up not reviving the Iranian 
economy and surely not helping ordinary people. Instead, the 
rewards of sanctions relief would have been reaped by the secu-
rity-military complex, which – by means of their entrenchment 
in the Iranian economy – would have been given the numer-
ous competitive advantages originating from the opening of the 
economy10. And, again, this additional money would have been 
used to fund proxies and allies in the region, thus expanding 
ecfr.eu/publications/summary/detente_with_iran_how_europe_can_maxim-
ise_the_chances_of_a_final_nuclea309 
8 R. Takeyh, Evaluating Key Components of  a Joint Comprehensive Plan of  Action 
with Iran, Statement before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States 
Senate, 25 June 2015,  https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
062515_Takeyh_Testimony.pdf, p. 5.
9 Ibid. 
10 “Iranian nuclear deal set to make hardline Revolutionary Guards rich-
er”, Reuters, 6 July 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear- 
economy-insight-idUSKCN0PG1XV20150706 
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Iranian influence in the region and leading to greater instability. 
To sum up, it was a debate between those – like the Obama 
Administration, the EEAS, and the other states that participated 
in negotiations – arguing that a nuclear deal with Iran would 
strengthen the moderates in Tehran and reassure the country of a 
less bold US approach in the region, thus producing a less fearful 
and therefore less aggressive Iran, ultimately leading to greater 
stability, and those arguing that a less constrained Iran would 
turn more aggressive, ramping up its support for terrorist and 
proxy groups in the region, thus leading to greater instability, and 
a major threat to American and US allies’ interests in the region11. 
But the debate took place – and continues to do so – also in Iran. 
Far from being a unitary regime, Iranian politics are complicated, 
and this is why the next section will try to shed a light on this mul-
ti-level complexity.  Indeed, as Jeffrey A. Stacey pointed out, one of 
the fallacies that the opponents of the deal fell in, was “considering 
the Iranian state structure as a unified regime and seeing any bad 
behavior as necessarily representative of the regime as a whole”12.
Recently re-elected President Hassan Rouhani has shown a 
commitment to pursuing a pragmatic agenda in foreign policy, 
as highlighted in his campaign platform: in his view, Iran should 
continue down the road of  “constructive engagement” with the 
Western world and should reduce regional conflict, with the aim 
of prioritizing the economic recovery of the country and the 
well-being of its people over the safeguard of ideological, revolu-
tionary pillars. But will Rouhani be able to implement his vision? 
This chapter will analyse the structural as well as institutional bar-
riers to his success, thus trying to assess whether one of the many 
bets surrounding the JCPOA (namely, empowering the moder-
ates in order to moderate Iranian behavior) can actually play out. 
11 K.M. Pollack, Iran’s regional policy after a nuclear deal, Brookings, 2 March 
2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/03/02/irans-regional- 
policy-after-a-nuclear-deal/ 
12 J.A. Stacey, “Strengthen Iran’s Moderates before it’s too late”, Foreign Affairs, 
2 March 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2017-03-02/
strengthen-irans-moderates-its-too-late 
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Who determines Iran’s foreign policy? 
It’s complicated 
While its definition escapes political scientists’ taxonomies, the 
Islamic Republic can be best described as a unique and com-
plex state system13. The intertwining of institutional complexity 
(different and competing organs coexisting and struggling for 
power, the so-called “dual state”) with political factionalism, 
which has intensified after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, 
makes it impossible to speak of a unified regime. 
This multi-level complexity also applies to foreign poli-
cy, which might somehow be perceived as schizophrenic or 
Janus-faced. 
According to Iran’s Constitution, the Supreme Leader is 
in charge of delineating the general policies of the Islamic 
Republic, as well as supervising their proper execution. He is 
also commander-in-chief of the armed forces and has the power 
to declare war and peace, as well as to appoint the chief com-
mander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and 
the supreme commanders of the armed forces. So, the general 
definition of foreign policy according to the Constitution lies 
with the Supreme Leader. 
At the operational level, security-related issues are discussed 
by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), established 
by art. 176 of the Constitution. The Council, whose aim is 
“to safeguard the national interests and preserve the Islamic 
Revolution, the territorial integrity, and national sovereignty”, 
is charged with the responsibilities of:
• Determining the defence and national security policies 
within the framework of general policies determined by 
the Leader; 
• Coordinating activities in the areas relating to politics, 
13 H.E Chehabi, “The Political Regime of  the Islamic Republic of  Iran in 
Comparative Perspective”, Government and Opposition, vol. 36, no. 1, January 2001, 
pp. 48-70.
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intelligence, social, cultural, and economic fields in re-
gard to general defence and security policies;
• Exploiting the materialistic and intellectual resources of 
the country for facing internal and external threats.
The Council is headed by the President, who appoints the 
Secretary, who also acts as a representative of the Supreme Leader. 
Other members of the Council include the head of the legisla-
tive branch (the Speaker of the Majles) as well as members affili-
ated with both the President and the Supreme Leader. Members 
of the former camp are the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, 
and Intelligence; the Head of Management and planning organ-
ization and – depending on the agenda of the meeting – anoth-
er minister related with the subject. Members of the Supreme 
Leader’s camp include the Head of the Judiciary, the Chief of 
the General Staff, the Chief of the Army, the Chief of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, and two Supreme Leader repre-
sentatives (one of which is the Secretary of the Council).  The 
Supreme Leader oversees the activities of the SNSC. 
Elected organs, too, have a say in the definition of Iranian 
foreign policy, albeit with many caveats. Non-security related 
issues are handled by the President and his cabinet, especial-
ly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The President is the sec-
ond-highest ranking official in the country but, as seen above, 
the Constitution limits his authority by subordinating it to the 
Supreme Leader. An example of this is that the President’s choice 
for his Minister of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) must re-
ceive the approval of the Supreme Leader. Furthermore, once 
appointed the MOIS answers directly to the Supreme Leader: 
the President cannot remove him without the Supreme Leader’s 
approval. However, this does not mean that the President does 
not matter in the definition of the country’s foreign policy. If 
it were so, there would not have been different foreign policy 
orientations between the Presidents. 
The Parliament has a very indirect role in foreign policy: ar-
ticle 77 of the Constitution limits its role to the ratification 
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of international treaties and agreements. So, even though the 
February 2016 elections delivered a victory for Rouhani and his 
pragmatist allies, there is no indication that this gain will result 
in any shift in regional foreign policy. 
Finally, off the radar of Constitutional assignments, an in-
creasing role in foreign policy is played by the IRGC. 
Established in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini as a loyal and ide-
ological force that would protect the newborn Islamic Republic, 
the IRGC was given the Constitutional task of defending the 
country against foreign attacks; fighting counterrevolutionary 
forces disrupting internal security; gathering intelligence on 
threats to the regime; and supporting global liberation move-
ments (article 150). Following contingent factors – in particu-
lar, the “reconstruction era” inaugurated by former President 
Rafsanjani following the end of the Iran-Iraq war – its involve-
ment in the consolidation of the Iranian state grew exponential-
ly, in particular in the economic sector: the demobilized Guards 
were granted reconstruction contracts that allowed them to gain 
significant stakes in virtually every sector of the Iranian econo-
my. Their role grew even more during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
term in office (2005-2013), when they were awarded billions of 
dollars in new, no-bid government contracts, thus consolidating 
a quasi-monopoly position in the Iranian economy14. 
In parallel, they expanded their role also in the security sec-
tor. During the Iran-Iraq war, they gained extensive experience 
on the field in asymmetric warfare, and soon the IRGC activi-
ties dwarfed the army’s. 
Today, they can count on about 150,000 operatives, and their 
activities are largely detached and independent of the army. The 
IRGC is the regime’s primary security force both for domestic 
and external operations. The Quds Force, an elite subdivision 
responsible for extraterritorial operations, which helped train-
ing and organizing Hezbollah in 1982-1985, is today in charge 
of implementing Tehran’s security policies in the region.  
14 See chapter 2 in this volume.
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This often results in an apparently schizophrenic situation in 
which President Rouhani’s calls for “constructive engagement” 
and “cooperation between states”15 clash with the IRGC calls 
for “resistance to US influence in the Middle East” and distin-
guishes itself for the brutal operations carried out on the field. 
Indeed, the IRGC has not sparred criticism of Rouhani’s for-
eign policy positions, on the basis that they could open the 
door to foreign intrusion in the country, as well as decrease 
their role in the regime. When President Rouhani calls for in-
ternational cooperation – that, in the President’s view, would 
de-securitize Iran’s role in the region in a way that it is no longer 
seen as a threat – the IRGC perceives it as a threat to their role 
as a bulwark against the menace of Western intrusion. 
The pervasiveness of the IRGC in the country’s economic 
and security complex, as well as the special relationship it en-
joys with the Supreme Leader, makes it extremely difficult for 
Rouhani or his fellow proponents of a “moderate” foreign pol-
icy to reign in their power and impose their own agenda of 
moderation. 
Actually, the contrary is true: the IRGC informal power in 
foreign policy dwarfs that of the elected moderates, and this 
makes it possible for them to carry out a proper sabotage of 
Rouhani’s agenda, by means of provocations such as the testing 
of ballistic missiles carrying the writing “Israel must be wiped 
out” (see section below). 
In conclusion, although foreign policy decisions are made by 
the Supreme National Security Council, they are actually the 
result of a multi-level decision-making process which sees the 
Supreme Leader in a preeminent position, in a synergy of inter-
ests with the IRGC. This results in a highly compartmentalized 
foreign policy, with differing messages emerging from differ-
ent parts of the political establishment. In particular, Rouhani’s 
15 “President of  Iran Hassan Rouhani: Time to Engage”, The Washington Post, 
19 September 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-of-
iran-hassan-rouhani-time-to-engage/2013/09/19/4d2da564-213e-11e3-966c-
9c4293c47ebe_story.html?utm_term=.cb2e6458b262 
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agenda of international cooperation and moderation in foreign 
policy seems to be restricted to particular issues – such as the 
improvement of Iran’s economic situation and the subsequent 
opening to the West. More security-related issues, such as 
the events in the Levant, are exclusive domain of the IRGC. 
However, even Rouhani’s efforts to improve Iran’s standing 
with the aim of reviving the economy and re-gaining a seat in 
the regional and international fora can be viewed with suspect 
by the Guards, which are not keen to permit an opening of the 
system that could eventually lead to its crumbling. The ultimate 
aim of regime survival – and the safeguard of its vested inter-
ests – drives the Supreme Leader’s and the IRGC’s behavior in 
domestic as well as in foreign policy. 
A nation or a cause? The determinants 
and principles guiding Iran’s foreign policy
In his interview with the Financial Times in May 2008, Henry 
Kissinger reiterated the need for the United States to have com-
prehensive negotiations with Iran, recalling what he had already 
stated in his 2001 book Does America Need a Foreign Policy?. 
He then wrote, “There are few nations in the world with which 
the United States has less reason to quarrel or more compatible 
interests than Iran”16. In 2008, however, he added the famous 
quote “Iran must decide whether it’s a nation or a cause”17. 
Indeed, when dealing with Iran as a whole, and with its for-
eign policy in particular, the debate whether revolutionary ide-
als or national interests prevail is one of the most inflamed. 
Even if attempts at exporting the Revolution ended with 
the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the subsequent faction-
al readjustment – and revamping –, the revolutionary ethos 
16 H. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st 
Century, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2001 
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survived, at least as a means to keep the Revolution alive in 
the face of a gradual acknowledgment of its shortcomings and 
failures to meet its expectations18. The factional infighting, as 
well as the growth of multiple centers of power and foreign 
policy decision-making, only complicated the situation. Make 
no mistake: all the political actors moving on the Iranian arena 
are loyal soldiers of the Revolution, deeply committed to the 
Islamic Republic’s values and survival; anyway, in this revolu-
tionary fervor, there is room also for national interests.
Indeed, we could say that much of this revolutionary fervor is 
subordinate to the ultimate national interest: the survival of the 
Islamic Republic. As Khomeini himself stated in his January 1988 
edict on the “interest of the state” (maslahat), his ultimate legacy 
was the message that the interests and the survival of the Islamic 
Republic should have had the precedence over any other issue19. 
In Iranian foreign policy, thus, ideology and national in-
terests are deeply intertwined. As Kaveh Afrasiabi and Abbas 
Maleki argue20, the Iranian definition of pragmatism is differ-
ent from the Western one: rather than seeing it as a dichotomy, 
for Iranian officials pragmatism and ideology are not mutual-
ly exclusive. Ideological goals and national interests, far from 
being a zero-sum game, can be pursued in parallel, with one 
mutually reinforcing the other. 
Before entering into the details of how revolutionary prin-
ciples coexist with realpolitik and pragmatic purposes – and 
which these principles are –, it is useful to review the main 
determinants shaping Iranian foreign policy. 
The first determinant is Iran’s geopolitical situation21 which, 
in the course of centuries, has given birth to an enduring sense 
18 A. Ehteshami, After Khomeini. The Iranian Second Republic, Abingdon, Routledge, 1995.
19 D. Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini. The Struggle for Reform in Iran, The University 
of  Chicago Press, 2001.
20 K. Afrasiabi and A. Maleki, “Iran’s Foreign Policy After 11 September”, Brown 
Journal of  World Affairs, vol. 9., no. 2, Winter/Spring, 2003, pp. 263-264.
21 R. Redaelli, Why Selective Engagement? Iranian and Western Interests are Closer than 
You Think, The Stanley Foundation, June 2008, https://www.stanleyfoundation. 
org/publications/pab/RedaelliPAB608.pdf.
Security Spoiler or Political Broker? Iran’s Role in the Middle East 65
of “strategic loneliness”, the perception of being alone in a fun-
damentally hostile and profoundly alien world. There is no 
need to visit Iran’s martyrs’ shrines to understand how the lega-
cy of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war – the “sacred defence” or the 
“imposed war” in Iranian war lexicography – still unfolds today. 
The perception of being encircled by hostile neighbors, and of 
having been abandoned to its own destiny (except for Hafez 
al-Assad’s Syria) still resounds in Iranian officials’ words and 
still shapes Iranian self-perception in the region. This sense of 
siege was given new strength in the first 2000s, when the US in-
tervention in Afghanistan and then in Iraq brought the United 
States right at the door of the Islamic Republic. This percep-
tion was reinforced by George W. Bush (in)famous discourse 
on the “axis of evil”, through which the then-President, rather 
than building upon Iranian cooperation and goodwill showed 
in Afghanistan, put Iran on the black list, raising fears of a pro-
spective regime change. If it is true that with their 2003 inter-
vention in Iraq the US inadvertently delivered a gift to Tehran 
– freeing it of its arch-rival Saddam Hussein – it is equally true 
that American interventionism in the region ringed a bell of 
alarm in Tehran, which suddenly felt encircled by the US mili-
tary or by their allies. 
The second determinant, linked to the first, is Iran’s pro-
found nationalism – deriving from a sense of religious-cultur-
al uniqueness and historical greatness – and translating into a 
deep attachment to national sovereignty and independence. 
The sense of being the heir of one of the most sophisticated 
civilizations (recalling the Achaemenid Eranshahr) shapes Iran’s 
self-perception of its peculiar historical and cultural identity22. 
Yet, the fact of having been subjected to the hostile or antago-
nistic behavior of its neighbors, as well as that of foreign powers 
interfering in Iranian domestic affairs – often with predatory 
aims – reinforces Iran’s strategic loneliness and sense of encir-
clement, thus bringing it to demand the acknowledgment of 
its independence and its “role among the nations” as one of the 
22 Ibid. 
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pillars of regional security. In other words, Iran claims the right 
to be recognized as a major power in the region.
These two determinants, which we could say represent the 
Iranian zeitgeist and the lenses through which it sees itself, its 
neighbors, and the world, translate into foreign policy princi-
ples – or constants – that are intertwined among them and that 
further translate into actual foreign policy decisions. 
These principles – dating back to the Revolution – are ide-
ological in form, and yet they contain the seed of pragmatism 
as conceived in the Iranian view. They are – namely – justice, 
independence, and resistance. 
The revolutionary goal of social justice (‘adl) – which was 
Ali Shariati’s main (perhaps involuntary) contribution to the 
construction of the Khomeinist ideology – was presented dur-
ing the Revolution as the never-ending struggle between the 
oppressors and the oppressed. The depiction of Mohammad 
Reza Shah Pahlavi as Caliph Yazid, the usurper par excellence, 
found its complement in the depiction of the oppressed and 
disinherited Iranian masses as thousands of Imam Hossein. 
The invitation to rebel, to stand up for their rights, in other 
words, to abandon “black shiism” and paint it red, became one 
of the central themes of the Revolution, giving birth to a call 
for a new political – and economic – structure which would 
have avenged the traditionally oppressed people (mostaz‘afin) 
against the permanent oppressors (mostakhbarin)23. This latter 
category, in Khomeini’s re-reading of Shariati’s work, included 
heterogeneous segments of people, such as the Capitalists, the 
Communists, the Zionists and – more broadly – all the per-
ceived enemies of the Revolution. The principle of justice as a 
universal value was enshrined in the article 154 of the Islamic 
Republic Constitution, which states that “The Islamic Republic 
of Iran […] considers rule of justice and truth to be the right of 
all people of the world”. 
23 A. Shariati, Red Shiism (The Religion of  Martyrdom) vs. Black Shiism (The Religion of  
Mourning), Iran Chamber Society, http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/
ashariati/works/red_black_shiism.php 
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The day-to-day translation of this principle of justice in the 
foreign policy of the Islamic Republic takes form in the Iranian 
support for those people perceived as “oppressed”, namely the 
Palestinians and the Shiites living as underrepresented and dis-
advantaged minorities in many countries of the region. Yet, Iran 
pays very much attention to not presenting itself as a sectari-
an, pan-Shia power, looking only after the interests of its fellow 
co-religionists. And here we find the “pragmatic” side of this rev-
olutionary, ideological, principle of social justice: by presenting 
itself as the defender of Palestinians’ rights, Iran aims at winning 
the favor of the Arab masses (a kind of soft power that anyway 
has deeply been eroded as a consequence of Iran’s support of 
Bashar al-Assad’s slaughtering of its own people24). Indeed, by 
means of its support for Sunni Arab groups such as Hamas and 
Palestinian Jihad, Iran aims at rebutting critics who portrait it as 
pursuing a sectarian agenda. More broadly, by attacking the re-
gional “oppressors”, i.e. Israel and the Arab regimes, Iran attacks 
the hierarchy of powers in the international system.
The second principle is that of independence. Stemming 
from the above-mentioned Iranian nationalism, the strong em-
phasis on independence has grown stronger through the years, 
in particular as a consequence of the political developments 
originated in the late XIX century. Although it was never sub-
ject to formal colonialism, in the early 1800s Persia found it-
self at the center of the “great game” between the Russian and 
British empires25. Anglo-Russian rivalry in central Asia trans-
lated into what was a de facto, though “informal”, colonialism, 
with London and Moscow literally trying to buy the favor of 
the Qajar Shahs in order to bring Persia into their own sphere 
of influence. Whether through actual war26 or through trade 
24 M.R. Djalili and T. Kellner, “Scramble for Syria”, The Cairo Review of  
Global Affairs, Summer 2017, https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/
scramble-for-syria/?platform=hootsuite 
25 A. Wynn, Persia in the Great Game – Sir Percy Sykes: Explorer, Consul, Soldier, Spy, 
London, John Murray, 2003.
26 Following the first Russo-Persian war of  1804-1813, which ended with the 
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concessions, Russian and British interference in Persian affairs 
was widespread, thus inciting public anger (which ultimately 
led to the 1906-1911 Constitutional Revolution). 
The sense of interference into their own affairs continued 
even after the demise of the Qajar dynasty and the end of Anglo-
Russian informal colonialism. Actually, many of the injuries still 
alive in the nation’s collective imagination can be traced back 
to the XX century. The memory of the 1953 US-UK sponsored 
coup, which removed Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq – 
as well as his dream of nationalizing Iran’s oil industry – is very 
much alive in today’s Iran and can help explain its resistance to 
let foreign investors in, as well as the much-heated debate on 
the new petroleum contracts. The special relationship between 
the Pahlavi dynasty and the US, especially in the 1960s – that 
culminated in the so-called “capitulations” allowing US citizens 
residing in Iran a privileged, over-the-law, status – further exac-
erbated this sense of subjugation. 
It was by means of the encounter with these perceived im-
perial powers – Russia, Britain, and the US – that Iran de-
veloped its claim for independence, which during the 1979 
Revolution culminated in the “Neither East nor West, only 
Islamic Republic” slogan. In addition, Iran started blaming its 
shortcomings and underdevelopment on foreign powers, espe-
cially Britain and the US. 
The principle of independence is enshrined in Articles 2, 3, 
and 153 of Iran’s 1979 Constitution, stating that Iran explicit-
ly rejects any form of submission to “oppressors”, highlighting 
treaty of  Gulistan, Iran was forced to cede most of  its Caucasian territo-
ries, among which modern day Georgia, Dagestan, and most of  Azerbaijan. 
Following the second Russo-Persian war of  1826-1828, which ended with the 
Treaty of  Turkmenchay, Persia lost territories in the Southern Caucasus, in 
modern day Armenia, as well as the remaining territories in Azerbaijan. With 
the Anglo-Persian war of  1856-1857, Persia was forced to surrender its claims 
over Herat (in modern day Afghanistan), which – though formally part of  Persia 
– had declared its independence and placed itself  under the protection of  the 
British in India. E. Abrahamian, A History of  Modern Iran, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008
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its quest for “self-sufficiency” and, most of all, forbidding “any 
form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural 
resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as 
other aspects of the national life”. 
Indeed, the translation of the principle of independence in 
Iranian foreign policy manifests itself in Iran’s strong calls against 
foreign dominance both at the regional and international level, 
as well as in its strong emphasis on self-reliance in the security 
realm. The latter often mixes up with the IRGC shows of force, 
such as ballistic missiles tests. However, the same principle of 
independence is also called upon by more pragmatic factions, 
which express the desire to participate in international fora and 
for Iran to be recognized as a major power in the region. 
Going hand-in-hand with the principle of independence is 
the principle of resistance, mainly called upon by more radical 
factions and institutions such as the IRGC, the hardline media, 
as well as by the Supreme Leader himself. Resistance against 
what? This principle is directed mainly against foreign interfer-
ence, bringing the principle of independence to an upper level: 
resistance is applied first of all against Israel, seen as the emblem 
of imperialism and foreign occupation, and then against for-
eign meddling in the region. Once again, by pursuing its ide-
ological agenda of resistance against Israel, Iran reinforces one 
of its main revolutionary pillars while developing, at the same 
time, instruments of regional influence – namely, its proxies in 
the region (see the section below), that provide it with diplo-
matic leverage. 
The main geopolitical axes
In this section, I will analyse how the two previous sections 
combine in shaping today’s Iranian foreign policy. With this 
aim, I will examine the primary axes of action and the Rouhani 
executive’s actual room for manoeuvre. 
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The Saudi-Iranian rivalry
Although often depicted in religious terms as a Sunni vs. Shia 
ancient conflict, the bitter rivalry that has literally divided the 
Middle East into two camps – in a sort of “Cold War” or “Proxy 
war” – is very little religious in nature and very much geopo-
litical. Indeed, it is this geopolitical rivalry that over the last 
years has exacerbated ethno-religious hostilities, thus bringing 
about a new wave of sectarianism27. While Riyadh sees Iranian 
expanding influence in the region as a threat, Iran sees Riyadh 
as obstructing its claims to an acknowledgment of its leadership 
– or at least interlocutor’s – role in the region. This rivalry plays 
out in practically every battlefield in the Middle East, from 
Syria to Yemen, with Riyadh and Tehran supporting opposing 
sides. However, Rouhani has made the easing of tensions with 
Saudi Arabia one of its key foreign policy goals, in a sense giv-
ing continuity to former Presidents Rafsanjani’s (1989-1997) 
and Khatami’s (1997-2005) policies of seeking some form of 
pragmatic engagement with Riyadh with the aim of improving 
Saudi-Iranian relations. The timing, anyway, is not on Tehran’s 
side. The transition of power in Saudi Arabia, with the young 
and bold newly-appointed Crown prince Mohammad bin 
Salman preparing to become king, as well as Washington’s re-
cent realignment with Riyadh, has emboldened Saudi Arabia’s 
confrontational approach vis-à-vis Tehran. On the Persian side 
of the Gulf, this is playing into the hands of the conservatives 
and those opposing Rouhani’s pragmatic engagement with 
Saudi Arabia. The age-old Iranian perception of Saudi Arabia 
as stirring internal unrest in Iran by supporting ethnic insur-
gents and terrorist groups has recently been revived following 
the June 2017 Tehran attacks: the IRGC has promptly blamed 
the Saudis for the attacks, specifically pointing to the fact that 
they happened soon after US President Trump’s visit to Saudi 
27 U. Makdisi, “Understanding Sectarianism in the Middle East”, The Cairo Review 
of  Foreign Affairs, 12 July 2017,  https://www.thecairoreview.com/uncategorized/
understanding-sectarianism-in-the-middle-east/ 
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Arabia. Trump’s reaction to the attacks – ultimately blaming 
Iran itself for its “role of sponsoring terrorism”28 – gave further 
ammunition to the Guards, thus reinforcing the confrontation-
al approach at the expenses of the pragmatic policy of engage-
ment. This demonstrates that the enduring reason for Saudi-
Iranian rivalry is their continued reciprocal lack of trust and 
perception of “mutual threat”. But with the shifting balance 
of forces on the ground, i.e. actual Iranian expanded influence 
in the region, as well as the shifting geopolitical landscape, i.e. 
Washington’s realignment with Saudis, both actors should un-
derstand that they have much to gain from toning down their 
competition, which undermines the long-term interests of both 
countries and the region. 
The Levant: Israel, Syria, Lebanon and 
the axis of resistance 
As outlined above, Iran has long sought – and still seeks – to 
portray itself as the champion of resistance against Israel, per-
ceived as the emblem of Western imperialism and interference 
in the region. This also gives it the possibility to portray itself as 
the champion of Palestinians’ rights. Thus, Iran has developed a 
number of methods, the main being the support to Palestinian 
opposition groups (mainly Hamas, even though, after the Arab 
Spring and the inception of the Syrian crisis, Iranian support has 
shifted more towards minor groups such as Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad, PIJ), as well as the traditional support to Hezbollah, the 
Lebanese political and paramilitary organization which allows 
Iran to exercise deterrence on Israel. In this context, Syria has 
traditionally been Iran’s main ally, permitting Tehran to over-
come that sense of “strategic loneliness” and giving it strategic 
depth, by maintaining an Arab ally in the heart of the Middle 
28 Statement by the President on the Terrorist Attacks in Iran, The White House, 
Office of  the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, 7 June 2017 https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/07/statement-president- 
terrorist-attacks-iran 
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East and by ensuring its arms-transfer routes to the Levant. 
In addition to traditional diplomatic, military, and econom-
ic relations between Tehran and Damascus (and Hezbollah), 
the events unfolding after the Arab Spring, especially in Syria, 
have brought Tehran to rely more and more on proxies and 
foreign militias in order to keep Assad in power. The IRGC, 
and especially the Quds force – responsible for extraterritori-
al operations – are tasked with carrying out this “Resistance 
strategy”, which aims at keeping the Tehran-Damascus-Beirut 
axis alive. However, once again, beyond the operational, on-
the-ground, level, there is a parallel diplomatic level: Tehran, 
till 2015 excluded by the Geneva Syrian peace talks, has always 
sought a status as a partner in negotiating a political solution 
to the Syrian crisis. The Iranian endgame in Syria remains the 
preservation of Syria – or at least of a useful part of it – as a stra-
tegic bridge into Lebanon to reach Hezbollah, with the aim of 
maintaining geostrategic depth and deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. 
The inclusion of Iran among the stakeholders of the peace pro-
cess, however, is essential in order to implement what already 
in 2014 Aron Lund advanced as the only realistic way out of 
the Syrian impasse: “foreign states to try to gradually impose 
a series of deals that would draw in enough credible actors on 
both sides to dampen the fighting and isolate radical holdouts, 
then try to consolidate this under some form of live-and-let-live 
political arrangement”29. 
As far as Israel is concerned, it is worth pointing out that, 
despite the Conservatives’ aggressive rhetoric, Rouhani and his 
government have attempted to tone down the rhetoric and adopt 
a less confrontational stance toward Tel Aviv. Examples in this 
sense are Rouhani’s and Zarif ’s condemnation of the Holocaust 
(in contrast to Ahmadinejad’s regular Holocaust denial), Zarif ’s 
happy Rosh Hashanah greetings to Jews, as well as his controver-
sial expression of willingness to recognize Israel as a legitimate 
29 A. Lund, Iran’s Unrealistic Endgame in Syria, Carnegie Middle East Center, 11 
April 2014, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55323 
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state if it were to achieve a peace deal with the Palestinians30. 
However, as is the case for other sensitive dossiers, Rouhani and 
his cabinet’s pragmatic declarations will continue to incite a 
pushback from Khamenei and the conservative security estab-
lishment, which remain fundamentally hostile to Israel. One of 
the latest examples of this was the IRGC’s last March launching 
of missiles carrying the slogan “Israel must be wiped out”31. 
Iraq and the fight against Daesh
Bearing in mind the formative and traumatic experience of the 
Iran-Iraq war, Tehran’s foremost objective in Iraq since 2003 
has been ensuring that Iraq never again poses a similar threat as 
under Saddam Hussein’s rule. By benefitting from the vacuum 
of power created by the US 2003 intervention, Iran has since 
expanded its influence in the country. Fast forward to today’s 
necessity of rolling back the Islamic State from the land between 
the two rivers – dangerously close to Iranian borders – and we 
find a de facto cooperation with the other actors fighting Daesh, 
including the Global Coalition. However, Iranian policy in 
Iraq – which is carried out by Quds Force commander Qassem 
Suleimani directly on behalf of Supreme Leader Khamenei – 
seems today aimed at reinforcing the “axis of resistance”, by 
creating a land corridor to the Mediterranean, stretching from 
Tehran to Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut. Moreover, the ex-
tensive presence in today’s Iraq of Tehran’s trained Shiite mi-
litias fighting under the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) 
banner raises serious concerns for the future of the Iraqi state’s 
sovereignty and integrity. If we add the element of the religious 
competition between Qom and Najaf to two different models 
of authority – the traditional, “quietist”, Ayatollah Sistani’s, and 
30 L. Rozen, “What Iran’s Foreign Minister told German TV about Israel, 
Iran”, Al-Monitor, 6 February 2014,   http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi-
nals/2014/07/iran-zarif-palestine-israel-phoenix-netanyahu-recognize.html 
31 “Iran fires two missiles marked ‘Israel must be wiped out’”, The Independent, 
9 March 2016,   http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-
fires-two-ballistic-missiles-marked-israel-must-be-wiped-out-a6920741.html 
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the revolutionary, Khomeinist merge of religious and political 
authority – we can assume that Iran is in for the long haul. 
Yet, room for cooperation and “constructive 
engagement” 
As the argument went, the JCPOA would have empowered 
Rouhani at home and provided him with more leverage also 
on foreign policy issues. Although it is not possible to ascertain 
any direct cause-effect phenomenon, the re-election of Rouhani 
in May 2017 seems to confirm the “empowering moderates” 
mantra. However, as discussed above, Rouhani did not change 
Tehran’s foreign policy dramatically, and neither has the power 
to do it. The final say on crucial policies – namely, the most 
linked with the revolutionary pillars of the state – is up to the 
Supreme Leader and his allies within the IRGC. Moreover, 
changing the core principles of Iranian foreign policy would 
mean in some way diluting the pillars on which the regime’s le-
gitimacy rests: it would be tantamount to admitting the failure 
of the Revolution. 
Thus, Iranian foreign policy under Rouhani’s Administration 
will continue to adopt a schizophrenic appearance: in many 
dossiers, it will likely reflect core positions that have endured 
since the 1979 Revolution. However, in other dossiers, there 
could actually be a relaxing of tensions and the opening of new 
room for cooperation. While key foreign policy issues such as 
the relations with Israel and Iranian politics in the Levant will 
likely remain under control of the Supreme Leader and the 
IRGC, the Rouhani government will remain in charge of spe-
cific foreign policy portfolios, such as improving relations with 
Europe and attempting a relaxing of tensions vis-à-vis Saudi 
Arabia. Even in these portfolios, however, the Rouhani exec-
utive will have to face the internal opposition of conservatives 
who are unlikely to change their views on the core principles of 
Iranian foreign policy. 
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With this aim, it is worth remembering that – willy-nilly – 
Iran is crucial to stabilize a wider arc of crisis that today extends 
from the Levant to the Gulf of Aden. Equally important, it is 
worth remembering that past containment strategies not only 
did not bear any success, but they also ended up playing into 
the hands of the Conservatives and the Hardliners, undermin-
ing reformist and pragmatic executives’ efforts at engaging their 
regional partners and the West. 
On the contrary, a cooperation focusing on aspects of com-
mon interest could mitigate Iranian insecurity and sense of en-
circlement – both at the rhetoric (cf. Trump’s aggressive rhetoric 
against Iran) and the operational level. It is worth remember-
ing, in fact, that it is Iran’s sense of encirclement, isolation, 
and threat perception that ultimately favors the hardliners. As 
outlined above, “despite often projecting an uncompromis-
ing stance, regime survival, not ideology, is paramount for the 
country’s theocratic elite”32. Continuing the policy of engage-
ment with the aim of reducing regional insecurity could ac-
tually benefit the pragmatists, helping them to overcome the 
multiple constraints outlined above. 
32 K. Sadjadpour, “How relevant is the Iranian street?”, The Washington Quarterly, 
vol. 30, no.1, Winter 2006-2007, p. 160.

Section II
A Fateful Triangle: Iran, the EU, and the US

4.  Under Pressure: US-Iranian Relations 
     in the Age of Trump
Sanam Vakil
The November 2016 election of Donald Trump to the White 
House reset the tone and direction of US policy towards the 
Islamic Republic of Iran away from Barak Obama’s eight-year ef-
forts of pragmatic engagement back towards the traditional and 
longstanding US policy of Iranian containment. In the absence 
of meaningful diplomatic relations with profound ideological 
differences separating Tehran and Washington, containment has 
long been Washington’s go-to Iran policy. This shift comes amidst 
the region’s interconnected conflicts that include multiple actors 
and goals such as the counterterror fight against ISIS and al-Qaʻi-
da, the Syrian civil war involving Russia, Turkey and proxies, the 
war in Yemen, instability in Iraq, and ongoing Saudi-Iranian ten-
sions where the potential for US and Iranian confrontation has 
increased as the two countries have opposing objectives in most 
if not all arenas.  Moreover, this shift has put in jeopardy the sur-
vival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 
nuclear deal signed in July 2015 between Iran and the E3/EU+ 3 
(France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and the 
US) which yielded constraints to Iran’s nuclear program in ex-
change for international sanctions relief. In the current regional 
climate, President Trump’s policy, while not unexpected, reverses 
hopes that the nuclear agreement could yield stronger relations 
between the two countries and brings Washington on a direct 
and dangerous collision course with Tehran.  
Stemming from limited diplomatic contact and deep ideo-
logical differences between Washington and Tehran since the 
early days of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, both sides ultimately 
seek to limit the other’s influence in the region of the Middle 
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East. For Washington, the Islamic Republic has long been a 
destabilizing force and an aggressor in the Middle East as a 
sponsor of terrorism and an opponent of Israel and other US 
regional allies.  Iran’s use of ballistic missiles and reliance on 
asymmetrical proxy groups along with its appalling domestic 
human rights record only add fuel to Washington’s anti-Iranian 
fire.  Its revolutionary, religious ideology has moreover alit the 
dangerous flame of regional sectarianism alive.   
Against this backdrop, Tehran’s perspective is conversely de-
fensive in orientation.  The Islamic Republic ultimately seeks to 
reduce America’s footprint in the Middle East.  Political elites 
in Tehran have long been suspicious of American intentions 
towards the Islamic Republic, never having received the respect 
or legitimacy they have long sought since their overthrow of the 
US-supported Pahlavi monarchy. Their hostility is predicated 
on decades of American meddling throughout the region and 
longstanding US hopes for a change of regime in Tehran.  
While both sides successfully negotiated a resolution towards 
Iran’s nuclear standoff, wider regional tensions, domestic ideo-
logical political constraints in Tehran and Washington and a 
diplomatic trust deficit continue to obstruct prospects for long-
term rapprochement between the two capitals.  Because of these 
multiple issues, the Trump Administration put “Iran on notice” 
and has begun a comprehensive review of its Iran strategy with 
the aim to increase pressure on Tehran on multiple fronts.
This comes after an intense presidential political campaign 
in Tehran resulting in the May 2017 re-election of centrist can-
didate Hassan Rouhani. The election was widely perceived as a 
referendum on the nuclear deal and the future direction of Iran’s 
domestic politics.  Winning 57% of the vote against hardline 
conservative clerical candidate Ebrahim Raisi, Rouhani prom-
ised to build on the momentum of the nuclear deal to promote 
greater economic growth and foreign investment, along with 
improved civil liberties. Rouhani’s win sparked hope among 
the electorate and the international community that his plans 
for economic rehabilitation and pragmatic engagement would 
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continue leading to a more open, pragmatic Iran. 
In the climate of increased US posturing, President Rouhani 
faces an impossible battle to moderate policies, promote eco-
nomic liberalization and simultaneously balance against hard-
line conservative politicking against his vision. The Trump 
Administration’s plans to increase pressure on Iran while adher-
ing to the nuclear deal will be an equally difficult balancing act. 
These tensions bring to light the deep ideological, domestic, 
and historical divide separating Tehran and Washington. How 
these interconnected themes and policy challenges play out will 
have enduring consequences for Tehran’s domestic political 
opening, wider Middle Eastern stability, and prospects for US-
Iranian relations in the years to come.  
The view from Washington 
In the 2016 US presidential election campaign, both Donald 
Trump and Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton were deci-
sively critical of the Islamic Republic indicating early on that a 
shift in Iran policy was in the offing. This policy would undo the 
efforts of the Obama Administration to reorient and moderate 
American opposition to the Islamic Republic. After decades of 
no official diplomatic contact, Obama called for “engagement 
[with Tehran] that is honest and grounded in mutual respect”1. 
He sought to kick-start secret diplomatic efforts that would re-
solve outstanding issues between the two countries. The nuclear 
portfolio was among the most sensitive and pressing for both 
Tehran and Washington.  Iranian opacity and obstruction on 
its nuclear program had resulted in a number of United Nations 
Security Council resolutions condemning Iran’s activities and 
pressuring Iran through economic and financial restrictions2. 
1 Barack Obama, “Message to the Iranian People”, 20 March 2009, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/03/20/nowruz-president-obama- 
speaks-iranian-people.
2 Resolution 1696 was passed on 31 July 2006 demanding that Iran suspend 
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Additional EU sanctions resulted in an oil embargo in 2011 
that further pressured Iran to the negotiating table.   
Secret negotiations mediated through the Omani govern-
ment began in 20133.  The result led to a more open discussion 
on the nuclear file with greater trust and confidence emerging 
between the US and Iranian counterparts.  The election of cen-
trist candidate Hassan Rouhani to the presidency that year cre-
ated an opportunity for greater momentum to build among the 
parties. Rouhani had campaigned on the promise of resolving 
the nuclear dispute and removing international sanctions that 
were dramatically strangling the economy and the livelihood of 
the Iranian population.  
The result of protracted negotiations was a first agreement 
known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) signed in November 
2013 followed by a Framework Agreement concluded in April 
2015. The final JCPOA was concluded in July 2015 culminating 
over three years of negotiations. Under the terms of the agreement, 
Iran agreed to curtail uranium enrichment, convert facilities that 
all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and threatening sanctions. 
Resolution 1737 passed on 23 December 2006 made mandatory for Iran to 
suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and cooperate with the 
IAEA, imposed sanctions banning the supply of  nuclear-related materials and 
technology, and froze the assets of  key individuals and companies related to 
the program. Resolution 1747 passed on 24 March 2007 imposed an arms em-
bargo and expanded the freeze on Iranian assets.  Resolution 1803 passed on 3 
March 2008 extended the asset freezes and called upon states to monitor the 
activities of  Iranian banks, inspect Iranian ships and aircraft, and monitor the 
movement of  individuals involved with the program through their territory. 
Resolution 1929 was passed in June 2010 and required UN members to block 
the transfer of  technology related to either missiles or nuclear weapons and cut 
off  commercial access to uranium mining or nuclear materials production in 
their territories. It also imposed new restrictions on travel for Iranian officials as-
sociated with proliferation. It targeted Iranian shipping lines affiliated with Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guards and called on member states to refuse them financial and 
insurance services. Finally, resolution 1929 called on member states to block new 
branches of  certain Iranian banks in their territories.
3 J. Limbert, “The Obama Administration”, in R. Wright (Ed.), The Iran Primer, 
United States Institute of  Peace (USIP), 2010.
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were thought to have potential use for nuclear weapons produc-
tion, and allow stringent inspections by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations nuclear watchdog. 
In return, Iran’s frozen assets were released, and financial and en-
ergy sanctions were lifted. Oil and gas exports – severely restrict-
ed since the end of 2011 – were resumed, and foreign investment 
was one again free to flow into the country.  
The US agreed to recommence sales of commercial aircraft 
and parts, but an arms embargo would remain in place until 
2023.  US secondary sanctions would be lifted through exec-
utive orders. US businesses and citizens, however, still subject 
to primary US-imposed human rights and terror sanctions, 
would be prevented from engaging in any commercial enter-
prise with the Islamic Republic4. This latter provision, along 
with the possibility of snapback sanctions should the agreement 
unravel, has impacted the smooth implementation of the deal. 
Importantly, all sides agreed to implement the agreement “in 
good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual 
respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the 
letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine 
its successful implementation”5.
For the Obama Administration, the nuclear deal was consid-
ered an opportunity to translate such gains stemming from a direct 
contact into political shifts in Tehran. Moreover, Obama believed 
that trust and communication between Tehran and Washington 
would reduce tensions in a number of Middle East issues. These 
hopes for long-term change were scuttled in both capitals though. 
In Washington, criticism of the nuclear agreement and Obama’s 
perceived leniency towards Iran mounted in Congress, as oppo-
nents feared the deal would bolster Iran’s regional influence and 
destabilizing power. Regional opposition to the nuclear agree-
ment also emerged among US allies Saudi Arabia and Israel who 
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believed the deal would legitimize the Islamic Republic and bol-
ster Tehran’s authority in the Middle East.  
Against this backdrop, this Trump Administration’s shift in 
policy is not surprising. Thirty-eight years after the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, American policymakers and the US electorate still 
bear hostility towards the Islamic Republic.  Considering this, 
both Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump 
took harder positions towards Iran throughout the American 
election campaign. Reflecting the historical arch of American 
suspicion towards Tehran, dating from the Revolution and the 
subsequent hostage crisis, both candidates were staunchly crit-
ical of Iran’s expanding regional influence, support for terror, 
and proxy groups throughout the Middle East, its ballistic mis-
sile program, and human rights record.    
With the exception of the Obama Administration, all US gov-
ernments since 1979 have employed some policy of containment 
when dealing with the Islamic Republic6. Containment was the 
age-old US strategy articulated by US Cold War strategist George 
Kennan to rollback Soviet influence in the aftermath of World 
War II. Soviet containment would protect against “the extremes 
of conflict and appeasement” through the development of a “third 
path” or policy option.  This policy would ward off war and grad-
ually stave off Soviet expansionism. After the 1991 dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, this policy was perceived as a successful model 
to be used against other threatening states that did not seek peace-
ful relations with the US, including post-revolutionary Iran.  
In the absence of a wider American commitment towards en-
gagement or regime change in Tehran or any other alternative, 
the containment policy has endured for decades as an effective, 
low-cost strategy. Different US Administrations have used more 
passive or active forms of containment against Iran using a basket 
of sanctions, diplomatic efforts of isolation, covert actions, and 
military deployments to the Persian Gulf to pressure Tehran7.  
6 K. Pollack, “Containing Iran”, in R. Wright (Ed.), The Iran Primer, United States 
Institute of  Peace (USIP), 2010.  
7 “George Kennan’s Cold War policy of  Containment,” The Economist, November 2011.
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After numerous attempts at interfering in the Revolution 
followed by failed engagement with the new regime in Tehran, 
the Carter Administration settled on a policy of containment to 
prevent the impact of the Iranian Revolution to spread beyond 
Iran’s borders. This policy was perpetuated under the Reagan 
Administration despite the Iran-Contra negotiations8.  President 
Bush, despite initial interest in engagement with Tehran, was 
never able to translate this initial interest into a tangible poli-
cy shift. The Clinton Administration, however, more stringently 
implemented a “dual containment” policy towards both Iran and 
Iraq, resulting in the imposition of tough Congressional sanctions 
against Tehran and pressuring international companies from in-
vesting in Iran through the use of extraterritorial sanctions9. 
Despite tentative diplomacy between the George W. Bush 
Administration and Iran after the 9/11 terror attacks, contain-
ment was again employed as no alternative policy to deal with 
competing interests and outstanding issues could be found.  In 
2002, revelations regarding Iran’s covert nuclear weapons pro-
gram elevated the need for a new policy that would move be-
yond containment to prevent Iran’s nuclear gains10. President 
Bush employed a “carrot and stick” approach to coax and 
pressure Iran to change its behavior, followed by Obama11. 
Increased sanctions, coupled with diplomatic openings as dis-
cussed above, opened the door to the JCPOA.
Throughout the Obama Administration, Washington poli-
cy elites remained critical of the nuclear deal believing that the 
agreement was not strong enough and too limited in scope to 
contain or change Iranian behavior. In the context of changing 
regional dynamics, Republicans generally believed that the nucle-
ar deal empowered Tehran, resulting in larger Iranian influence 
8  K. Pollack (2010).
9  S. Vakil, “Obama’s Iranian Gamble”, The International Spectator, vol. 49, no. 3, 2014.
10 S. Sinha and S. Campbell Beachy, “Timeline on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” New 
York Times, 2 April 2015.  In 2002, Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedin-e-
Khalq, revealed that Iran had a covert nuclear program.
11 Ibid. 
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outside of its borders. Rather than moderate Iranian activity in 
the region after the deal, Tehran has increased its proxy network 
and stepped up its menacing behavior in the Persian Gulf. Overt 
Iranian support for Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, 
Iraqi militia groups, and Yemen’s Houthis contribute to this the-
sis. CIA Director Mike Pompeo has echoed these sentiments stat-
ing, “Today, we find [Iran] with enormous influence, an influence 
that far outstrips where it was six or seven years ago. Whether it’s 
the influence they have over the government in Baghdad, wheth-
er its increasing strength of Hezbollah and Lebanon, their work 
alongside the Houthis in Yemen, the Iraqi Shias that are fighting 
along now the border in Syria – certainly the Shia forces that en-
gaged in Syria. Iran is everywhere throughout the Middle East”12. 
In light of this context, President Trump’s swing back to the tra-
ditional Iranian containment strategy as the default American 
position is not surprising.
The Trump Administration has indicated that they may be 
moving beyond a standard containment strategy. A new series of 
sanctions, coupled with hostile statements from members of the 
cabinet, all indicate that the Administration intends to increase 
pressure on Tehran. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has stated, 
“our policy towards Iran is to push back on [its regional] hegem-
ony, contain their ability to develop, obviously, nuclear weapons 
and to work towards support of those elements inside of Iran 
that would lead to a peaceful transition of that government”13. 
Tillerson’s remarks suggest that regime change is under review as 
a policy option. Secretary of Defence James Mattis has echoed 
these sentiments as well14. The inclusion of Iranian citizens in 
President Trump’s travel ban has further inflamed tensions15. 
12 “CIA Director Warns of  Iran’s Regional Role,” Radio Farda, 26 June 2017, 
https://en.radiofarda.com/a/cia-pompeo-iran-regional-influence/28578224.html.
13 Secretary of  State, Rex Tillerson, told House Foreign Relations Committee on 
Wednesday, 14 June 2017.
14 T. Fischer, “Defense Secretary Mattis Interview with the Islander”, The Islander, 
20 June 2017.
15 The Trump travel ban has imposed strict travel restrictions on nationals from 
six nations including Iran limiting their travel to the United States for a ninety-day 
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Despite labelling the nuclear deal as the worst deal in his-
tory, in May and July 2017 the US Administration reaffirmed 
Iran’s compliance with the nuclear deal forcing a reluctant 
President Trump to renew the JCPOA sanctions waivers16 and 
institutionalizing what has become a contradictory Iran poli-
cy. Congressional Republicans with the backing of the Trump 
Administration have imposed a number of new sanctions on 
Iran. Since early 2017, the circle of individuals and entities 
sanctioned for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program has 
been expanded17. Congress has also introduced half a dozen bills 
designed to sanction enablers of Iran’s ballistic missile program, 
designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a 
state sponsor of terror and targeting Iran and Russian support 
for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria18.  When these sanctions 
pass, they too will increase economic pressure on Tehran and 
test the willingness of all parties to maintain their JCPOA com-
mitments alongside wider regional goals. While Tehran has ex-
pressed its intent to support the agreement, the shift in tone and 
search for a tougher policy in Washington reveals the depth of 
mistrust dividing both capitals and the challenging path ahead. 
The view from Tehran
The Iranian policy perspective is equally important to consid-
er when assessing future prospects for US-Iranian relations. 
Tehran’s worldview is ingrained in its post-revolutionary history 
period.  “Trump Travel Ban Comes into Effect for Six Countries”, BBC News, 30 
June 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-40452360.
16 A. Mohammad and Y. Torbati, “U.S. extends sanctions relief  under Iran nucle-
ar deal,” Reuters, 17 May 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear- 
usa-idUSKCN18D1W6.
17 This includes seven Iranian and Chinese organizations.
18 E. Borden and S. Maloney, “Will the Iran Nuclear Deal Survive? Time 
and Sanctions Will Tell”, Brookings Institution, Markaz Blog, 30 May 2017, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/05/30/will-the-iran- 
nuclear-deal-survive-time-and-sanctions-will-tell/.
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and experience. The impact and interpretation of this history 
have colored factional politics exacerbating tensions between 
hardliners and centrist politicians. Understanding this world-
view and experience is necessary to contextualize President 
Rouhani’s contemporary political and economic challenges 
both of which are connected to US-Iranian relations. 
Iran’s 1979 Iranian Revolution was predicated on the con-
cept of independence. The revolutionary slogans of “independ-
ence, freedom and the Islamic Republic” and “neither East nor 
West” were emblematic of this ideology and vision. Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolutionary founding father of Iran’s 
new political system, captured this philosophy stating, “If we 
cannot live up to the tough measure of “neither East nor West” 
and have not made Iran truly independent, then we have not 
achieved anything”19.  
For almost four decades now, independence has driven 
Tehran’s economic, political, and regional relationships. This 
single-minded vision has often affected its own internal stabil-
ity and leads it to pursue asymmetrical regional alliances that 
unconventionally protect and advance its national and eco-
nomic interests.  
Drawing from historical fears of foreign interference in 
Iranian affairs dating back to the mid-XIX century, Khomeini 
sought to protect the newly created Islamic Republic from the 
mistakes of the past. He condemned the United States and the 
Soviet Union along with Israel as countries working against 
Iran’s indigenous interests. Consequently, a major foreign pol-
icy goal from the time of the Revolution has been to preclude 
all forms of political, economic, and cultural dependence on 
neither West nor East. In contemporary terms, Iran has main-
tained unmoving hostility towards the United States but has 
sought to diversify its regional, economic, and international 
relationships with ties to China, Russia, India, and European 
countries too.  
19 Quoted in R. Farhang. “Why Alone?”, in T. Juneau and S. Razavi (Eds.), Iranian 
Foreign Policy since 2001: Alone in the World, Abingdon, Routledge, 2013. 
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Part of Iran’s quest for independence is bound to the belief 
that the US presence and involvement in Iran and the wid-
er Middle East have been decidedly negative and designed to 
contain Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, this is evidenced in 
the unstable outcome of the main regional wars such as the 
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, 1990 first Persian Gulf war, the 2001 
Afghan war, the 2003 Iraq war, the 2012 Libya campaign, and 
support for the 2015 GCC-led Yemen war20. Based on this in-
terpretation of regional history, Middle Eastern security should 
be managed from within the region rather than through US 
interference and balancing efforts21.   
To offset for the increased American regional presence evi-
denced most recently in the 2001 war on terror and 2003 Iraq 
war, Iran has worked through a strategy of diplomatic, eco-
nomic, religious, and military support for state and non-state 
actors.  Because Iran has a limited conventional military ca-
pability, it has cultivated a network of partners and proxies to 
buffer against its perceived regional threats. While Tehran views 
this “forward defence strategy” as protective, Iran’s neighbors 
see Tehran as expansionist and aggressive, thereby increasing 
regional tensions22.
This ideological context can help explain the fluctuating 
events of the past three decades, including the impact of the 
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war and its consequences, the post-war 
effort at economic integration, the reform movement, President 
Ahmadinejad’s politics of confrontation, and Rouhani’s elec-
tion. While not providing a complete picture of Iran’s domestic 
politics, these turning points highlight the factional divisions 
that emerged and solidified within the Iranian elite. Taken 
20 S.H. Mousavian, “What Trump Needs to Know About Iran”, 
Huffington Post, 6 January 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
trump-iran-facts_us_586fb7bae4b02b5f85886829.
21 Saudi Arabia by contrast sought US regional protection as a counterweight to Iran.
22 A. Vaez, “Trump Can’t Deal with Iran if  He Doesn’t Understand It”, 
Foreign Policy, 23 February 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/23/
trump-cant-deal-with-iran-if-he-doesnt-understand-it/.
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together, these historical inflection points reveal a divided 
country: those seeking to reform the system pitted against those 
wanting to preserve the status quo.  
The impact and effect of Iran’s war with neighboring Iraq 
have had monumental consequences for Tehran, its worldview, 
and regional relationships.  While the war did help the young 
revolutionary regime consolidate its power, it also passed on 
a profound sense of vulnerability that can be felt still today 
among Iran’s political elite and the war generation.  Regional 
tensions with Iran’s neighbors and the profound sense of isola-
tion, paranoia, and encirclement fueled Iran’s security anxieties 
setting its asymmetrical foreign proxy support for groups such 
as Lebanon’s Hezbollah in motion and explain Iran’s use of bal-
listic missiles to push threats away from its borders.
Domestic dynamics
Unimpeded factionalism and political competition between 
conservatives and reformist politicians have dominated domestic 
Iranian politics since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. 
These tensions, which remain ongoing, are a defining feature of 
domestic politics. The differences among factions over economic 
and regional policies affect Iran’s relations with the wider world. 
The dispute between hardline conservative and pragmatists 
lies at the heart of the ideological divide splitting Iran’s political 
elite. Both groups seek the shared ends of stability and secu-
rity of the Islamic Republic but have different means of ob-
taining their goals. Hardliners ultimately seek to protect the 
Islamic Republic but through the preservation of the status quo. 
Pragmatists such as President Rouhani, on the other hand, have 
long argued that only through transformation and liberaliza-
tion can the system survive economic and political pressures. 
The nuclear deal, for Rouhani, was an opportunity to promote 
economic change and revitalize Iran’s languid economy.  
Dating back to the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani 
(1989-1997) these issues have divided Iranian politics bringing 
Under Pressure: US-Iranian Relations in the Age of Trump 91
factional disputes and ideological disagreements to the surface. 
After the Iran-Iraq war, Rafsanjani sought to promote eco-
nomic reconstruction and international reintegration – a two-
pronged policy of rehabilitating Iran’s image and economy. In 
this environment, which included a period of greater cultural 
openness, disillusioned political elites who believed that Iran’s 
Revolution had lost its way gave birth to Iran’s reformist move-
ment. Reformism was anything but unified in interpretation 
but in general espoused “reform” or liberalization of the polit-
ical and social spheres. The overwhelming popular support for 
reformist President Mohammad Khatami seen in the 1997 and 
2001 elections proved threatening to the conservative political 
elite who believed that Khatami’s presidency would weaken the 
Islamic Republic. The reformist spring and “dialogue of civili-
zations” advocated by Khatami came to an abrupt end with the 
election of the populist, conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
(2005-2013).  
Ahmadinejad altered the tenor and tone of Iranian domestic, 
economic, and foreign policy spearheading a more confronta-
tional rather than concessionary approach to Iran’s covert nucle-
ar program and relations with the international community23. 
Regional engagement in the context of the 2001 Afghan and 
2003 Iraq wars also sought to advance Iranian interests while 
protecting Tehran from US regional encirclement24. The 2009 
Green movement protests amidst rising international pressure 
on Iran for its nuclear obstruction, led to a heightened political 
atmosphere and a stringent domestic crackdown.  
Rouhani’s 2013 election sought to rebuild bridges among the 
elite and between state and society after the dramatic rupture of 
2009. The economic pressure of nuclear sanctions and the pros-
pect of improved domestic politics resulted in almost uniform 
23 For more details on President Ahmadinejad’s tenure and politics see A.M. 
Ansari, Iran under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of  Confrontation, Adelphi Book, IISS, 
2007. 
24 V. Perthes, “Ambition and Fear: Iran’s Foreign Policy and Nuclear Programme”, 
Survival, vol. 52, no. 3, June-July 2010, pp. 95-114.
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support for Rouhani’s nuclear negotiations.  The divided polit-
ical elite recognized the necessity of compromise for national 
interest purposes. However, in the aftermath of the deal, old 
divisions have been laid bare leaving the Iranian elite to face the 
options of continuity or change. Once the deal was signed, hard-
line opponents of President Rouhani began to criticize the nu-
clear deal as a massive concession and demonstration of Iranian 
weakness. During the negotiations, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali 
Khamenei had supported this compromise and demanded fac-
tional unity from Iran’s feuding political groups.  This unity had 
benefitted Rouhani’s negotiation team and blanketed internal 
dissent albeit temporarily. Upon conclusion of the agreement, 
hardliners resumed their criticism of both the President and 
the contents of the agreement. Ayatollah Khamenei lead the 
charge stating, “The nuclear deal, as an experience, once again 
proved the pointlessness of negotiating with the Americans, 
their bad promises and the need not to trust America’s prom-
ises”25. Hardliners have long been suspicious of Western influ-
ence, arguing instead that Iranian independence and non-align-
ment as pursued since 1979 should be maintained. For them, 
compromise with the West and particularly the United States 
is a sign of weakness that would invite further meddling in in-
ternal Iranian affairs, the consequence of which would be the 
dissolution of the Islamic Republic.
To balance against these domestic ideological pressures, 
Hassan Rouhani’s government has prioritized liberalization and 
foreign investment as the key to bolstering growth and promot-
ing employment. In addition to negotiating the JCPOA, the 
Rouhani Administration has successfully reduced inflation to 
single digits, provided greater exchange rate stability, increased 
tax revenue, and reduced subsidies.  With sanctions relief and 
the resumption of oil exports, economic growth has equalled 
pre-sanctions levels26. However, multiple economic and political 
25 “Iran’s Khamenei renews criticism of  nuclear deal”, Reuters, 1 August 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-khamenei-idUSKCN10C2LH.
26 “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2016 Article IV Consultation with the 
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issues have limited Rouhani’s effectiveness in this arena.  Having 
renewed his four-year mandate at the ballot box, Rouhani has 
a small window of opportunity to build on his diverse array 
of campaign promises that include greater economic growth, 
tackling corruption, addressing issues of gender discrimination, 
and opening the Internet. To address these challenges, Rouhani 
will have to wade into the waters of the factional disputes and 
relations with the international community.
The Rouhani Administration has experienced signifi-
cant obstacles to attracting investment. Long before the deal 
was penned, Iran’s economy was heralded as the “last emerg-
ing market to emerge”27. To improve economic conditions 
as well as diversify its energy-dependent economy, Rouhani’s 
Administration announced the goal of seeking $150bn in in-
vestment across multiple sectors to promote growth, create 
employment, improve technical skills, and increase access to 
technology. Seeking to capitalize on these economic opportu-
nities, European and Asian investors courted Iran and com-
menced a wave of provisional agreements and Memorandums 
of Understanding (MoU). While a number of these agreements 
translated into concrete investment deals, including those with 
Boeing, Airbus, Total, Peugeot, Volkswagen, Glaxo Smith 
Kline, and Vodafone to name a few, wider scale Iranian invest-
ment, as promised by the Rouhani government, has been ob-
structed.  Domestic economic and political challenges coupled 
with the erratic position of the Trump Administration’s Iran 
policy have constrained the nuclear deal dividend. 
American opacity has been but one obstacle in limiting 
Iran’s economic gains. Risk averse companies and banks have 
been reluctant to enter the Iranian market fearing the impact 
of renewed US sanctions.  Companies are additionally con-
cerned about inadvertently breaching US regulations including 
Islamic Republic of  Iran”, International Monetary Fund, 27 February 2017.
27 I. Black, “Post sanctions Iran could be the best emerging market for years to 
come,” The Guardian, 6 July 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
jul/06/iran-sanctions-emerging-market-business-free-market.
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prohibitions in transacting in US dollars and investing with 
sanctioned entities and individuals associated with financial or 
terror crime in Iran.  International banks, fearing similar pen-
alties as those imposed on French bank BNP Paribas who was 
fined close to $9bn for violating US sanctions, are particularly 
reluctant to underwrite investment deals leaving multinationals 
struggling to find investment support28. These obstructions are 
seen as violations of the JCPOA. An important provision of the 
deal is that all sides should “refrain from any policy specifically 
intended to [...] affect the normalization of trade and economic 
relations with Iran” and implementing the JCPOA “in good 
faith and in a constructive atmosphere”29. Iranian politicians 
complain that US policy towards Iran and ambiguity around 
the nuclear deal has in fact challenged this principle. 
This has, in turn, weakened Rouhani’s domestic platform. 
Rouhani’s vision is tied to an economically, regionally, and in-
ternationally integrated Iran. Strengthened diplomatic and bi-
lateral relationships would benefit Iran commercially as well as 
strategically. Hardliner conservative opponents of the President, 
ranging from the IRGC to affiliates of the Supreme Leader who 
have built an expansive network of religious and military en-
tities along with vast economic interests, are sceptical of this 
approach fearing that integration would invite foreign inter-
ference in Iranian affairs.  Such interference would eventually 
result in a transformation of the Islamic Republic ultimately 
diluting hardliner political control as well as forcing their eco-
nomic divestiture.    
For Rouhani, the IRGC’s political and economic influence 
is a thorn in his side. Because members and economic entities 
are sanctioned by the US for their support of terror activities, 
28 N. Raymond, “BNP Paribas sentenced in $8.9 billion accord over sanc-
tions violations”, Reuters, 1 May 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-bnp-paribas-settlement-sentencing-idUSKBN0NM41K20150501.
29 Joint Comprehensive Plan of  Action, 14 July 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/ar-
chives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive- 
plan-of-action_en.pdf.
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many international companies are wary that their Iran related 
investments will bring them into contact with sanctioned busi-
nesses and individuals.  To address these issues, Rouhani has 
struggled to limit IRGC banking relationships as well as push 
back the Guards’ economic influence through behind-the-scenes 
agreements. Rouhani publically addressed the Guards authority 
stating that “A part of the national economy is in the hands of 
a government that does not have military might and has been 
handed over authority by a government that does”30 pointing to 
the factional tensions at the heart of his Administration. 
After the Iran-Iraq war, the IRGC became an active player 
in the Iranian economy. According to the Iranian Constitution, 
it acts as the “guardian of the Revolution”, a clause that has 
given them greater political, military, and economic influence. 
Today, their economic conglomerate Khatam al-Anbia has in-
vested heavily in telecommunications, infrastructure, energy, 
automotive, and the services sector to name a few31. Through 
preferential contracts and government connections, they have 
grown in economic and political influence with some estimates 
placing their economic control at over 60%32. During the peri-
od of nuclear sanctions, the IRGC’s business interests received 
preferential contracts benefiting from the absence of interna-
tional rivals. Under Rouhani, while they remained supportive 
of the nuclear agreement, they have often worked to undermine 
the President as a means of protecting their sphere of influence. 
Their opposition to the new Iran Petroleum Contracts (IPCs) is 
one such example where they initially opposed the new, more 
attractive terms offered to foreign firms33. Only when the IRGC 
30 A. Alsalmi, “IRGC Commander Attacks Rouhani Policies, Boasts about 
Military Might”, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 28 June 2017.
31 A.R. Nader, “The Rise of  the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of  
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,” RAND National Defense Research 
Institute, 2009, p. 55.
32 Ibid.
33 D. Ramin Jalilvand, “What’s Fueling New Opposition to Iran’s New Oil 
Contracts?”, Al-Monitor, 25 May 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi-
nals/2016/05/iran-petroleum-contract-framework-delayed.html.
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was offered the first IPC did they remove their obstructionism.  
As part of their economic reform plan, Rouhani’s govern-
ment has advanced a diversification program aimed at reduc-
ing long-term reliance on the energy sector and converting the 
Iranian economy to serve as a regional manufacturing hub. To 
accomplish this, though, Rouhani’s government must address a 
number of interconnected challenges such as attracting foreign 
investment and technology and training to bolster other sec-
tors.  Much needed macroeconomic change including banking, 
regulatory, and labor market reform, which will also be criti-
cal to stabilize the economy and provide transparency and ac-
countability for investors. Rolling back the economic influence 
of the IRGC and state sector in the economy is another more 
challenging political objective for the President. 
Unemployment remains the principle economic test for the 
Rouhani team. Despite the JCPOA, the Iran population has yet 
to feel the benefits of the nuclear deal dividend. The Statistical 
Centre of Iran put the number of Iranians out of work at 
2.5 million in the past Iranian calendar year 1394 ending 20 
March 2016. That figure amounts to 11% of the workforce, 
and shows a 0.4% increase compared with the previous Iranian 
year. Official data also shows that the unemployment rate that 
year was 9.3% and 19.4% for men and women, respectively34. 
However, unofficial statistics suggest that unemployment, espe-
cially among the youth, hovers around 40%. To date, the gov-
ernment has failed at promoting job creation but must attempt 
to meet its promise of creating one million jobs annually in 
order to be accountable to the electorate35.  
34 “Statistical Centre Announces Unemployment Rate,” April 6, 2016, www. 
Tabnak.ir 
35 M. Bizaer, “Fed Up with Talk, Iranians Demand Action on Jobs”, Al-Monitor, 
3 July 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/iran-unem-
ployment-job-creation-rouhani-final-year.html.
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The regional nexus
Similar factional and international challenges exist on Iran’s re-
gional frontiers. 
Here, Rouhani is facing a shifting regional landscape that 
threads together sectarian tensions and terrorism. Through 
the support of proxy and militia groups, Tehran has come to 
the aid of the Iraqi government in its fight against the Islamic 
State (IS), supported Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian Civil War, 
and strengthened its longstanding relationship with Lebanon’s 
Hezbollah, all in an effort to push regional conflicts away from 
Iranian borders. In pursuing this defensive policy, however, 
Iran’s neighbors, ranging from Saudi Arabia to Israel, have as-
sembled in anti-Iranian unity to challenge Tehran’s influence 
and ambitions. The Trump Administration has entered into 
the foray working with its allies to rein in Iranian regional 
interventionism.   
The age-old regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
have an important place in this story. Iran and Saudi Arabia have 
long been at the competing ends of regional as well as global in-
terests ranging from oil policy, relations with the United States, 
and maintaining the helm of religious leadership, all together 
proxies to the common ambition of regional political leader-
ship36. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and more acutely 
since the 2011 Arab Spring protests, such divisions have exacer-
bated Saudi-Iranian relations. Diplomatic relations were official-
ly ruptured in January 2016 after the Saudi embassy in Tehran 
was attacked in response to the Saudi execution of a Shia cleric, 
Nimr al-Nimr. Despite Iranian efforts to bridge the divide be-
tween the two countries, Riyadh has consistently rebuffed recent 
diplomatic overtures remaining suspicious and contemptuous 
of Iran’s regional activities and support of Assad among others.  
The signing of the July 2015 nuclear agreement resulted in 
a shift from the Saudi status quo containment policies towards 
Iran. From Riyadh’s perspective, the nuclear deal legitimized 
36 M. Milani, “Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off ”, Foreign Affairs, 11 October 2011.
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Iran’s regional policies and return to the international economy 
at the expense of its own and wider Sunni interests. Unwilling 
to tolerate Iran’s economic return to the international arena and 
claiming that Tehran underwrites regional terrorism, Riyadh 
has actively sought to challenge Iranian regional influence37. By 
doing so, however, this strategy has reinforced sectarian divi-
sions and regional tensions.   
Such policies have played out in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, 
and Yemen where Iran’s hardliners believe that asymmetric, 
proxy level relationships successfully protect Iran’s regional posi-
tion. The IRGC strategy is designed to advance a two-pronged 
goal of acting as a strategic buffer and advancing Tehran’s inter-
ests at the local level.  Meanwhile, Iran’s foreign ministry pro-
motes bilateral diplomatic relations at the top strata38.  
Syria is the most dangerous arena of a conflict pitting Iran 
against the US, and Saudi Arabia, and Israel.  Since the 2011 
outbreak of the Syrian Civil war, Tehran has sided with the 
Assad regime. Together with Lebanese Hezbollah, Tehran has 
provided military, financial, and logistical support for Assad 
against the Saudi funded opposition. Tehran used the fight 
against IS-sponsored terrorism to justify its regional presence. 
Through the years, Iran along with Russian intervention in the 
Syria campaign helped to bolster Assad’s control.  With IS grad-
ually in retreat, on the ground conditions have shifted, sparking 
fears of a long-term Iranian footprint in the Levant through a 
land bridge connecting Tehran to the Mediterranean39.  
This was made possible because in Iraq too, Iran has spon-
sored the creation of Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) com-
posed of local religiously inspired militias that, with Iranian 
funding and training, have come together to fight IS as well. 
37 A. al-Jubeir, “Can Iran Change?”, New York Times, 19 January 2016, https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/saudi-arabia-can-iran-change.html.
38 A. Vaez (2017).
39 M. Chulov, “Iran Changes Course of  road to Mediterranean coast to avoid US 
forces”, The Guardian, 16 May 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
may/16/iran-changes-course-of-road-to-mediterranean-coast-to-avoid-us-forces.
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Iranian media has reported that Iraqi and Syrian Shiite militia 
groups are joining along the shared border between the two 
countries. Longstanding support for Hezbollah in Lebanon 
provides Tehran with significant influence there as well. To 
counter this strategy, foreshadowing an arena of increased con-
flict, the US military has conducted three airstrikes in the area 
sending stark messages to the Syrian government and to Tehran 
to respect American red lines. Failing to do so would result in 
wider military escalation40.
To balance against conflicting regional and American pres-
sures, the Rouhani Administration has looked to offset the 
US-led efforts to contain Tehran through a diversification plan. 
Iran’s strategy is directed to drive a wedge between the United 
States and major European powers such as Germany, France, 
and Italy. The three have restored commercial relations with 
Iran and as supporters and signatories of the nuclear deal be-
lieve in preserving the agreement.  This divide-and-conquer 
strategy also extends to Moscow and Beijing, both of whom 
seek to protect the JCPOA and their strong commercial and 
strategic ties with Tehran.  
What to expect going forward?
In light of these growing tensions, a number of scenarios could 
unfold impacting US-Iranian relations and wider regional and 
international linkages.  The first foreseeable option is the grad-
ual collapse of the nuclear agreement. Either coming from the 
result of US withdrawal or in response to US sanctions, the 
JCPOA’s vulnerability is readily apparent. While neither Tehran 
nor Washington wants to be held responsible for the deal’s fail-
ure, continued pressure, sanctions, and ambiguity from the 
Trump Administration could accelerate its defeat. Here, Iran’s 
40 A. Majidyar, “Rouhani takes credit for enhancing Iran’s Military capa-
bilities”, MEI Observed, 12 July 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/io/
rouhani-takes-credit-enhancing-iran-s-military-capabilities-aiding-iraq-and-syria.
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calculated response is critical. Should Rouhani remain commit-
ted to the deal despite an American breach, Tehran could main-
tain the moral high ground, protect its economic investments 
and retain European, Russian, and Chinese economic and 
diplomatic ties.  This would be the best option for Tehran but 
would require significant restraint of hardliners who would be 
looking to capitalize on this opportunity. In an alternative re-
action, Tehran could equally recommence its nuclear program 
– a move that would rally international support against Iran 
thereby accelerating a return to Iranian isolation and sanctions.
A second scenario could result in military escalation between 
Tehran and the US on the Syrian frontier. While not deliberate, 
a series of exchanges or missteps could snowball into a wider 
confrontation. In this sequence of events, Tehran would strug-
gle to de-escalate the conflict and the US would likely see this as 
an opportunity to weaken and roll-back Iran’s presence. Seeing 
the Syrian conflict in zero-sum terms, Tehran will mitigate 
against this possibility by respecting American red lines while 
simultaneously participating in the Russian-led Astana peace 
process. Despite Tehran’s current diversification tactics, the 
chance of escalation and military missteps still exists.    
The third possibility would see the maintenance of the status 
quo relationship. Political obstacles and lack of decision making 
within the Trump Administration could prolong the current 
state of affairs between Tehran and Washington. Distracted by 
multiple internal political issues, as well as occupied with for-
eign policy challenges in Europe and Asia, Washington could 
remain indecisive about its Iran policy. This would result in 
continued American verification of the nuclear deal but also 
in an increased anti-Iranian rhetoric, sanctions, and prolonged 
ambiguity surrounding future policy steps. While this seems 
like the most plausible option, uncertainty does not bode well 
for Rouhani’s economic engagement plans.  
A final option includes a large-scale negotiation designed to 
resolve the outstanding issues between Tehran and Washington. 
President Rouhani indicated during his election campaign that 
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he intended to negotiate the removal of wider sanctions against 
Iran. To arrive at such an end, both sides would need the po-
litical will, factional unity, and momentum to engage in long 
rounds of negotiation. In the current climate, none of these 
conditions exist. While this scenario is less likely, it is ultimately 
necessary for long-term Middle Eastern stability.  
Each of these four scenarios suggests that a myriad of domes-
tic, economic, and international tensions loom on the Iranian 
horizon. Going forward, Rouhani’s grand ambitions will be 
tested by the two-pronged challenge of domestic factional 
tensions and the shift in policy from Washington. How the 
President navigates this perfect storm of internal and external 
pressure will be critical for Iran’s future domestic evolution as 
well as for regional stability. While the outcome of his manoeu-
vring is far from certain, what is clear is that this is a moment of 
consequence for the Rouhani Administration, Iran, the United 
States, and the wider Middle East. 

5.  EU-Iran Relations: 
     Building Bridges in Stormy Waters
Rouzbeh Parsi
Europe and Iran have a long history of interaction, enmities, 
and alliances. In the last two hundred years, Europe as the 
preeminent continent of imperial powers has played a signifi-
cant part in the construction and constitution of modern Iran. 
In the post-1945 world, Europe was in some ways replaced by 
the United States and Iranian bureaucrats, professionals, and 
students turned their attention across the Atlantic. The rela-
tionship between Washington and Tehran, the United States 
and Iran, is both competitive and co-dependent insofar that 
they use each other as a foil to project their fears and prejudices. 
This is much less true of the EU-Iran relationship, which lacks 
the melodramatic fair of that between Washington and Tehran, 
but has proven to be quite resilient and significant for both par-
ties. Thus, exactly because the relationship between European 
capitals and Tehran has been less binary, whenever the latter 
has reached out to the world it has more often than not started 
with Europe. Conversely, the European approach to the Islamic 
Republic has always been influenced by the transatlantic rela-
tionship and, as that has varied and is currently changing sig-
nificantly, Europe needs to ask itself what kind of relationship it 
wants to have with a close regional power like Iran.
Background: History of Iran-EU relations
Most Western European countries had a good relationship with 
the Pahlavi monarchy. This was both due to the general alli-
ance with the United States and against the Soviet Union, but 
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also because of the Shah’s eager purchase of European goods 
and technology. The Revolution changed all of this, and the 
shock and disappointment with the Islamic Republic were 
as much about the cruelty of “revolutionary justice” as it was 
about the ostensible contradiction of a religious Revolution. 
Iran went from being a model example of modernization and 
Westernization to what seemed to be a paradoxical experiment 
in medieval political thought wrought on a society undergo-
ing progress as understood in the West. On the other side of 
this expanding divide, the revolutionaries also liked to define 
themselves as the very opposite of the West (primarily the US 
but also European countries). For some, this stance was pri-
marily informed by the Islamist ideology, for others it was 
about anti-imperialism. Both strands were welded together by 
the group around Khomeini that took the reins of power after 
having eliminated their former comrade in arms on the left. 
Khomeini’s motto “neither East nor West” came out of a qua-
si-colonial experience stretching back a century but was also a 
harbinger of a defiant positioning that increasingly was about 
the outside world not wanting to go near Iran more than the 
other way around. Thus, the revolutionaries may have used this 
banner to signal their willingness to upend all the rules of in-
ternational order and behavior but they soon discovered the 
immense cost of such disruptive politics and rhetoric. The war 
initiated by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in September 1980 lasted 
for eight years, and the willingness of the world to look on 
sanguinely left a deep mark of suspicion and resentment among 
decision makers in Tehran. They learnt the hard way (and often 
totally ignoring the role their own actions played in creating 
this isolation and exposure) not to trust or expect help from 
anyone – especially the West. 
The end of the war in 1988 and the death of the father of the 
Revolution Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 opened up the space 
to reflect and discuss what this Islamic Republic should become 
and thus also its relations with the outside world. The outreach 
by the newly elected President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
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to Europe (and to some extent also to the US) became an op-
portunity for individual Western European countries to start 
rebuilding some kind of relationship with Tehran. But equally 
important was that this also took place within the framework 
of the European Union itself. In a sense, the vagaries of trying 
to have some kind of relationship with Iran has been one of the 
several experiences that have informed and shaped the mecha-
nisms and idiosyncrasies of a European foreign policy. 
For the EU, this was a challenge: Iran was still a pariah state 
with a reputation for being a serial human rights abuser and a 
revolutionary state upsetting a regional order which the United 
States and Western Europe were heavily invested in. Thus, 
the critical (1992-1997) and comprehensive (1998-2003) di-
alogues were born. At this point, the EU could not envision 
the kind of institutionalised collaboration that it initiated 
with other states (such as Trade and Cooperation Agreements, 
TCAs), hence the dialogue format. The issue, however, was that 
Iran could be made into a neutral, even a collaborative, actor 
through an engagement that did not elide from the pre-existing 
disagreements but would also not let these preclude the ability 
to cooperate. Thus, the EU discussed both human rights and 
trade with Tehran. While decision makers in Tehran balked at 
the idea of having to discuss what they considered their internal 
affairs (civil liberties and political rights) the truth is that the 
external pressure coincided with forays in the same direction 
that was being taken from inside the country. Both among re-
ligious thinkers and veteran revolutionaries there was a discus-
sion, an appraisal of both the legacy of the Revolution and the 
future of the Islamic Republic1. No matter the Iranian rhetoric 
on human rights then and now, the issue has become integrated 
1 For an early analysis of  the discourse in the early 1990s see M. Boroujerdi, “The 
encounter of  post-revolutionary thought in Iran with Hegel, Heidegger and 
Popper” in S. Mardi (Ed.), Cultural Transitions in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 
1994. The effect of  the human rights discourse is also evident in the publication 
of  Islamic Views on Human Rights: Viewpoints of  Iranian Scholars by the Organisation 
for Islamic Culture and Communications in Tehran in 2001.
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into the Iranian political discourse – even those critical of the 
concept claiming it is a kind of Western discursive imperialism 
still feel obliged to study and discuss it. 
Detractors of these initiatives in the EU believed them to 
be futile exercises – revolutionary governments cannot be re-
formed, and Iran would only take advantage of the European 
Union’s willingness to reach out. The detractors in Iran, on the 
other hand, were afraid that this forging of new ties and build-
ing of bridges would do exactly that – mellow the Revolution 
at home and abroad and bring Iran closer to the international 
order they detested. 
Thus, while it may seem almost as ancient history the de-
bates, positions, and agonies of the 1990s are not entirely dis-
similar to the discussions we have now about Iran, where it is 
going, and its relations with the outside world in general and 
the EU in particular. 
The election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 was a very pos-
itive surprise and showed that if not the system then at least 
the electorate could be a source of momentum for further re-
forms. While the hope that Khatami could fulfil all the unreal-
istic expectations had faded by the beginning of his second term 
(2001-2005), the engagement with the EU had progressed to 
such an extent that a TCA could be envisioned further down 
the road. In the ensuing derailing of the whole process, two mis-
calculations stand out. First, the EU assumed that the reformists 
would continue to succeed at the ballot box regardless of the 
slow pace of negotiations with Brussels on closer economic ties. 
The expectation was that the cunning Rafsanjani would return 
to implement what Khatami had been too soft to push through 
Iran’s slow moving and unresponsive political system. This lazy 
calculation, where somehow Iranians would continue to be will-
ing to support reforms regardless of actual tangible dividends, 
proved to be erroneous. The second miscalculation of note was 
the Iranian belief that the EU had invested sufficiently in this 
relationship that it would not fall prey to the relationship most 
European capitals and Brussels have with Washington, DC. In 
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fact, the very divisive war against Iraq that George W. Bush initi-
ated in 2003 was seen in Europe as a reason to mend fences with 
the United States rather than assert independence from it. Thus, 
when the nuclear issue came to the forefront in 2002, the gravity 
of the issue and the context in which it was embedded was not 
sufficiently appreciated by the Iranian side. This notwithstand-
ing, Khatami’s team spearheaded by Hassan Rouhani managed 
to maintain a decent negotiation line with Brussels and the 
three negotiating partners (the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany, also known as EU3). The deterioration and break 
came with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. 
Sanctions and isolation
The EU3 negotiations with Iran were difficult for several reasons 
that echo into the present. The EU wanted Iran to completely give 
up its nuclear enrichment program, something that made Tehran 
even more determined to keep it as a way of asserting its sovereign-
ty. What was meant to be a research program quickly bloomed 
into an industrial scale one, partly in response to the increasingly 
aggressive demands for its suppression. In return, the EU could 
offer Iran a closer trade and cooperation relationship but this 
was done in the looming shadow of the Bush Administration’s 
unwillingness to play along. In the aftermath of the quick victory 
against the remnants of Saddam Hussein’s military in Iraq, the 
prospect of an American continuation against Iran seemed real 
enough. But security guarantees from Washington would require 
acknowledging that Tehran was a legitimate interlocutor, some-
thing the self-assured Bush Administration could not bring itself 
to do. Thus, on the one hand, the EU3 acted as one and EU 
foreign policy was partly formulated on the international scene 
through this negotiation process with Iran. On the other hand, 
during the same negotiation process, the EU was not able to de-
liver the one thing that Tehran really needed in order to take a 
step back from its obstinate insistence on nuclear enrichment: 
American security guarantees.
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The candidate Ahmadinejad had promised to take the West 
to task on many issues but especially on the nuclear program – 
gone were the negotiations based on good faith and the futile 
expectations that the Europeans might stand up to Washington. 
Once elected, Ahmadinejad made good on his bold promises 
and made nuclear enrichment a national issue, embellishing 
his own position internationally by constantly challenging the 
United States and the EU. 
The EU3 tried through several agreements to slow down the 
Iranian program and freeze the stand-off in order to create the 
space and time for a more lasting final agreement. These at-
tempts failed because of the American unwillingness to commit, 
which in turn played into the failure of the reformists to keep 
the presidency in Iran. Thus, from 2006 onwards, it became a 
game of positions between an increasingly synchronised US-
EU position versus the Iranian insistence on its own reading of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Brussels and Washington leveled 
new sanctions on Iran and managed to get the UN Security 
Council to explicitly demand an end to Iran’s nuclear enrich-
ment program in December 2006 (UNSCR 1737). Tehran, 
in turn, produced more centrifuges and more low-enriched 
uranium to show its defiance and independence. The Obama 
Administration followed the same line but was more successful 
in getting Russia and China on board for further sanctions. 
Washington systematically forced its trade partners to choose 
between Iran and the United States and used its secondary sanc-
tions to intimidate companies from trading with Iran. In this 
endeavor, the EU cooperated and in essence ceded the Iranian 
market to its foremost competitor, China. The crucial part 
played by the EU is exactly due to its relationship and trade 
with Iran. The EU does not have to contend with a Congress 
that is inherently anti-Iranian, nor with a publicly and politi-
cally strong lobby group like the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC). The fact that it has had relatively good 
trade relations with Iran means that it can be flexible and both 
enhance and decrease its interaction with Iran. In 2011-2012 
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it used this leverage to increase the pressure on Iran. In early 
2012, the EU ended its oil imports from Iran inflicting a blow 
to Iranian exports. Later the same year it took advantage of the 
fact that the world’s leading banking transfer system, SWIFT, is 
run by a bank association registered in Belgium, to exclude all 
Iranian banks from the system. This meant that transfers to and 
from Iran suddenly became significantly more cumbersome as 
the protocols and transfer system now rejected Iranian entities. 
Again, while these seem like specific and tailor-made actions, 
they have long term repercussions that go beyond the individ-
ual case of Iran. 
The breakthrough: the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA)
Ahmadinejad was a lame duck in the last year of his presi-
dency, and it had become clear to decision makers in Tehran 
that they needed to break the impasse. Negotiations during 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency had not gotten anywhere, and the 
mutual mistrust had had a paralysing effect on their ability and 
willingness to rethink the entire situation. Already in 2012, 
there were contacts between the US Administration and Tehran 
and the conclusion from both sides was that their counterpart 
was serious and could deliver. What made the behind-closed-
doors communication into an actual political process was the 
election of Hassan Rouhani to President in June 2013. While 
the positive interaction between Secretary of State John Kerry 
and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif was tremendously important 
for the negotiation process, the foundation of the final agree-
ment signed in July 2015 is the relationship between the EU 
and Iran. The Obama Administration had understood that the 
old demand of zero enrichment in Iran was not going to be 
achievable and they instead needed to concentrate on confining 
the program as much as possible. The incentive for Iran was the 
lifting of sanctions to allow its economy to grow again. But it 
was clear that the Obama Administration would never get the 
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US Congress to agree to the lifting of American sanctions. The 
best Washington could offer was, therefore, a systematic waiv-
ing of secondary sanctions inhibiting non-American (primari-
ly European) businesses from returning to the Iranian market. 
The actual rebuilding of the Iranian economy would be done in 
co-operation with Europe, the old trading partner. 
Thus, it is clear that regardless of whether the purpose has 
been to pressure or incentivise Tehran the variable of the equa-
tion has been the European Union. The United States, after all, 
is a machine with only two gears when it comes to Iran: lots of 
pressure and somewhat less pressure.  
Prospects after the sealing of the JCPOA
With the jump start of negotiations in the autumn of 2013 (the 
Joint Plan of Action, JPA, was signed in November), optimism 
for a resuscitation of the Iranian economy grew. The subsequent 
negotiations were thorny, and it took until July 2015 for the 
final deal to be sealed. The Iranian economy has grown since 
then, but not nearly as fast as the Rouhani Administration, that 
has staked its political future on the deal, needs. In essence, the 
economic clock ticks slower than the political clock2. There are 
several reasons for the slow uptick in the economy. Domestically, 
Iran’s banking sector is in need of a major overhaul before ma-
jor foreign investments can be made. There are issues of trans-
parency, for instance in terms of actual ownership and possible 
connections to entities tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC). The Iranian banking system has been sealed off 
from international banking for well over a decade, which means 
that they lag behind on practices and standards. These issues, in 
turn, make it difficult to ascertain their solvency and health and 
thus their reliability as partners in financing business ventures. 
2 For an indepth survey of  the economic landscape see R. Parsi, Great Expectations. 
The Iranian Economy after the Nuclear Deal, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 
2016, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/12987.pdf
EU-Iran Relations: Building Bridges in Stormy Waters 111
As part of the attempt to solve this, Iran initiated a process with 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to tackle money laun-
dering and terrorism financing. There is now an Action Plan and 
since June 2016 (renewed in June 2017), the FATF has suspend-
ed its countermeasures against Iran while monitoring the pro-
gress on the outstanding issues related to financial institutions3.
The government has also made battling inflation a priority. 
The inflation was brought down from 34% (peak) in 2013 to 
single digit for the first time in decades in 2016 (8.9%). Since 
then, it has risen to 11.2% but remains well below the historical 
average. The success was partly achieved by implementing aus-
terity measures such as downsizing investments and cutting state 
budget allocations. Thus, structural investments of the kind that 
generates jobs and in turn attracts foreign investments have 
been delayed. While Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) do not 
immediately translate into jobs, they are part and parcel of the 
political package and the public perception of economic change. 
Thus, the Rouhani government has been trying to tout its suc-
cess on this front, but the public that has seen little change in 
their everyday economic life remains unconvinced4. While the 
FDI has risen in absolute numbers, it only constituted 0.52% 
of Iran’s GDP in 2015 (recent high was 2002, 2.74%), and the 
projections of the government have yet to be fulfilled5.
The major bottleneck outside of Iran is the continued uncer-
tainty of how Washington will honor its commitments under 
the JCPOA. The election of Donald Trump has significantly 
increased the arbitrariness of the US policy towards the Middle 
East and the return of hawkish and neoconservative thinking 
3 FATF, “Public Statement - 24 June 2016”, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publi-
cations/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-state-
ment-june-2016.html.
4 For an example of  how the government views the economic development see 
Javad Zarif ’s speech at the Iran international exhibition of  exchange, bank and 
insurance, 2017, “Three gains from the agreement for the Iranian economy”, 16 
April 2017, http://www.eghtesadnews.com/
5 World Bank data, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.
WD.GD.ZS?end=2015&locations=IR&start=1970&view=chart
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in the new Administration has considerably worsened the sit-
uation. In such a climate, even if Trump continues to sign the 
waivers as stipulated under the JCPOA, European companies 
will be very hesitant to invest in Iran. On top of this, the US 
Congress is trying to undo the JCPOA itself by implement-
ing new sanctions on Iran6. The Trump Administration itself 
can use the grey-zone tools at its disposal; slowing down the 
Office of Foreign Asset Control’s licensing process that issues 
licences to companies wanting to do business with Iran, or sig-
nalling disapprove on business interaction with Iran (which is a 
violation of the JCPOA)7. While candidate Trump (like many 
Republicans) made it sound as if the JCPOA was an agreement 
between the Unites States and Iran, he has probably been made 
aware that this is a multilateral agreement where a unilateral 
American withdrawal will leave it isolated rather than Iran. In 
essence, unless Washington can show clear Iranian violations 
of the agreement, an American withdrawal will not necessarily 
mean the collapse of the JCPOA, since all other parties are still 
committed to it. Thus, the Administration’s approach is to kill 
the agreement through a thousand paper cuts: the economic 
dividends for Iran are the primary motivation and line of de-
fence for the JCPOA. If these dividends were to dwindle, de-
fending the agreement will become even more difficult for the 
Rouhani government, whose fate is tied to this opening towards 
the West. In such a scenario, the Trump Administration would, 
in essence, aim to provoke Iran into formally abrogating the 
JCPOA. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has gone on the 
record stating that if the United States continues to violate the 
JCPOA, Iran might consider leaving the agreement8.
6 T. Cullis, “New Iran Sanctions Bills Could Kill the Nuclear Deal, Pave the 
Way to War”, LobeLog Foreign Policy, 1 April 2017,  https://lobelog.com/
new-iran-sanctions-bills-could-kill-the-nuclear-deal-pave-the-way-to-war/
7 R. Marashi and T. Cullis, “Trump Is Violating The Iran Deal”, 
HuffPost, 14 July 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-is- 
violating-the-iran-deal_us_5968cd05e4b03389bb16ccdb.
8 For a confirmation of  this outline see P. Baker, “Trump Recertifies Iran Nuclear 
Deal, but Only Reluctantly”, New York Times, 17 July 2017, https://www.nytimes.
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Despite these structural and immediate problems, the 
Rouhani Administration had success in the parliamentary elec-
tion in February 2016 and won the presidential election in 
May 2017 with a greater margin than 2013. This is a strong 
indication that a majority of the electorate want to continue 
the opening and bridge building with the world and Europe 
in particular – despite the lacklustre economic dividends so far 
from the JCPOA. 
EU trade with Iran has grown, and several Member States 
have been trying to make up for lost time. Germany and Italy 
have leveraged their good reputation in Iran and the tradition-
ally close industry ties to increase business. France has had a 
very strong role in the Iranian automotive industry and recently 
Total pushed through with their ambitions to be a major play-
er in the rejuvenation of the Iranian oil & gas industry9. The 
major stumbling blocks (the problems in Iran are enumerated 
above) on the European side are primarily related to the United 
States and its secondary sanctions. Major European banks have 
their assets spread across the globe, and the United States is a 
big part of the portfolio. The structure of global banking is also 
very much tied to the dollar and thus subject to US law. The 
large banks are therefore predisposed to taking political sen-
sitivities in the US very seriously – and, if forced to choose 
between the lucrative American market and the prospective 
Iranian market, the answer is easy.
Yet it is imperative for the EU and the survival of the JCPOA 
that European trade and investments in Iran grow and grow 
significantly10.
com/2017/07/17/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-recertify.html
9 “Total marks Iran return with South Pars gas deal”, Reuters, 3 July 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-total-southpars-idUSKBN19O1IO
10 A. Ramezani, “Europe must adopt long-term vision for trade with Iran”, Al-
Monitor, 6 July 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/07/iran- 
europe-trade-post-sanctions-era-conditions-trade-invest.html
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The personality and the policies: 
the United States beyond President Trump
For obvious reasons, the greatest attention has been paid to 
President Trump and his antics. His many erratic statements 
on policy, domestic and foreign, have left many bewildered, 
concerned, and horrified. His opinions and statements seldom 
amount to a policy nor, in any case, to a discernible and reliable 
line of action. This is particularly evident in his forays on the 
Middle East and the relationship with Saudi Arabia and Israel. 
Yet, the strategic and long term dangers are not tied to the 
person of Donald Trump. The uncertainty and unreasonable-
ness in American politics are not tied to a single individual but 
rather to the transformation of the Republican Party. The party 
of George Schultz, Brent Scowcroft, and Colin Powell, hard-
nosed realists with a willingness to use American power (in all 
senses) but within the framework of alliances and institutions, 
is gone. The present Republican Party is defined by the religious 
right (the rise of evangelicals in American politics dates to the 
late 1970s)11 and the Tea Party, a highly ideologically charged 
group that prefers purity of purpose over pragmatic solutions. 
Their domestic agenda is very radical, while their understand-
ing of foreign policy is fundamentally contradictory in nature. 
There is an isolationist inclination, a belief that America has 
helped the world but owes it nothing, that is difficult to recon-
cile with the continued belief in American global supremacy as 
an inherent value that must be maintained. Thus, they want to 
have their cake and eat it too: for them, America should look 
inward and care for its own interests, and yet global issues and 
decisions must be taken with the United States in the lead, be-
cause it is indispensable. 
The radical departure in American foreign policy personified 
by Trump has structural causes with repercussions far beyond 
11 See ch. 7 in F. Lamberts, Religion in American Politics: A Short History, Princeton 
University Press, 2008, and Andrew Preston, Sword of  the Spirit, Shield of  Faith: 
Religion in American War and Diplomacy, Anchor Books, 2012.
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the fate of his presidency. This is easily illustrated by considering 
the ideological positions of those in line of succession should 
Trump in any way be incapacitated to continue exercising his 
mandate. The Vice President Mike Pence is a Christian funda-
mentalist in favor of a hawkish foreign policy, especially in the 
Middle East. If he too were to be incapacitated, the third person 
in line of succession is the Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, a 
bona fide member of the Tea Party who opposed the JCPOA as 
vigorously as all the other heavy weights in the Republican Party. 
The relevance of this radical departure and deterioration in 
how the American political elite understands the world and 
their own role in it for the issue of EU-Iran relations is quite 
straightforward. Western Europe during the Cold War and the 
EU after the fall of the Soviet Union has considered the trans-
atlantic relationship to be the bedrock on which European se-
curity and foreign policy rests. In fact, the EU-US relationship 
is the centerpiece of the international order they built together 
after World War II12. 
In essence, EU relationships to regional powers like Iran, es-
pecially when these have a dubious standing in the world, are 
a function of its relationship to Washington13. The Iranian case 
is, of course, extra-sensitive, since the Islamic Republic and the 
US have a very public antagonistic relationship. Iran wants the 
United States to leave the Middle East, and Washington has done 
its best in the last three decades to isolate and marginalise Iran. 
This means that the EU-Iran relationship has seldom been 
considered from either side on its own merits. Brussels al-
ways sees it in the shadow of Washington, instead of taking 
into account the importance of maintaining a specific kind of 
12 A.M. Dorman, J.P. Kaufman (Eds.), The Future of  Transatlantic Relations, Stanford 
University Press, 2010, and for a case study, P. Müller, EU Foreign Policymaking 
and the Middle East Conflict: The Europeanization of  national foreign policy, Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2011.
13 R. Parsi, “That Other Track, That Other Partner: The EU and Iran”, Iran: 
Turmoil at Home, Assertiveness Abroad?, Woodrow Wilson Center Occasional Paper 
series, Winter 2011.
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relationship with a regional power in a region of great conse-
quence for Europe. Iran has perhaps been a bit more able to 
appreciate its relationship with Europe on its own merits, but 
even here the focus has often been on the US (threat, competi-
tion, need for recognition). Europe has either been a stepping 
stone towards détente with Washington or a “natural” partner 
too much under the spell of Washington to know what is in its 
own interest.
The Iran file as precedent and template
While it is easy to portray the nuclear file of Iran as an ex-
ception, the fact is that the saga of this nuclear program has 
spawned and enhanced a number of policy tools and perspec-
tives. Sanctions on such a scale as those levied against Iran, a 
functioning state, are unprecedented. Secondary sanctions, pre-
viously very much considered an infringement of sovereignty, 
have come to be accepted by many states when faced with the 
US trying to punish Iran. What the EU refused to accept when 
the US adopted the Iran Libya Sanctions Act in the 1990s, 
Brussels acquiesced to in the late aughts when it followed the 
American lead to force Iran to abandon its nuclear enrichment 
program. The point is that all these tools may seem tailor-made 
for Iran but, in fact, they are now available for other cases as 
well. The US, in particular, has been quite enthusiastic and ag-
gressive in extending its justification with regard to a number 
of criminal violations far beyond its own borders. The US court 
system is now an American battlefield that many actors in the 
world must learn to orientate in, as many other sovereign states 
has acquiesced and acknowledged US claims to try purported 
crimes that have taken place outside of the United States.
Thus, Iran was a mid-way point in a development that 
preceded its nuclear program crisis and will most likely contin-
ue and extend beyond this specific case, which has been settled 
through the JCPOA.
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Strategic autonomy: bolstering the EU’s ability to 
act on the international stage
When Donald Trump was elected President of the United 
States, the line in Europe was to wait and see, to react to what 
the President would do rather than pre-emptively take positions 
on what the candidate had said during the campaign. This is a 
prudent approach that might have worked under more normal 
circumstances and on issues where there are a strong consen-
sus and institutional foundation (as the NATO article 5 debacle 
shows, the usual assumptions of steadiness of alliances are in 
jeopardy). These are not, however, normal circumstances. The 
chaotic modus operandi of the Administration and the political 
nature of the JCPOA requires a more proactive and robust ap-
proach. European leaders (e.g. Angela Merkel and Emmanuel 
Macron) have learnt this in the last couple of months and have 
stated their support for multilateral cooperation in general, and 
HR/VP Federica Mogherini has, on numerous occasions, reit-
erated the EU’s adherence in the JCPOA specifically. Her in-
sistence on the importance of maintaining the JCPOA given 
that Iran has fulfilled its obligations under the agreement is an 
important counterweight to the Washington rhetoric14. Yet it 
would be naive to believe that this is sufficient. The JCPOA is 
a political agreement to a much larger degree than it is a legal 
document; thus, its viability is dependent on a political consen-
sus beyond the letter of the clauses of the legal text. The agree-
ment is a victory for non-proliferation but also a useful tool for 
Europe in its attempts to stabilise the Middle East. In short, Iran 
is one of the “neighbours of our neighbours”15 in a very unstable 
14 European Union External Action Service (EEAS), Speech by the High 
Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini at the 2017 Carnegie Nuclear Policy 
Conference, Washington, 20 March 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headquarters-homepage/23056/high-representativevice-president-federi-
ca-mogherini-2017-carnegie-nuclear-policy-conference_en
15 “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on strengthening the European neighbourhood policy”, 
COM(2006)726, 12 April 2006, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
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neighborhood which is of vital relevance to the European Union 
and therefore forging a more strategic relationship with Tehran 
is prudent16. As mentioned previously this growth is the pri-
mary incentive with which the proponents of a rapprochement 
have been able to win over sceptics and build support among 
the population at large for the negotiations and the final agree-
ment. Thus, the continued support for adherence to the agree-
ment will very much depend on the actual realization of these 
economic dividends. This is where there is a significant and dan-
gerous disconnect between the European and Iranian position. 
The EU sees the agreement in political terms and tries to en-
courage European businesses to trade with Iran without antag-
onising or challenging Washington too much. Tehran expects 
European political powers to more actively push their respective 
businesses communities in this direction because they believe, 
quite correctly, that the American shadow looms too large. As 
Foreign Minister Zarif put it, Tehran wants the “agreement to be 
the foundation and not the ceiling” of a renewed relationship17. 
In short, the different understandings are based on a too com-
partmentalised view of the whole agreement18 and the future it 
makes possible. At first, encouraging trade with Iran might seem 
to make more political than economic sense, at least as long as 
the European banking community is in fear of the United States 
and doubts the ability and willingness of the European political 
establishment to stand up for them should push come to shove.
TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0726&from=EN
16 R. Parsi and D. Esfandiary, “An EU Strategy for relations with Iran af-
ter the nuclear deal”, EU Parliament Policy Department report, June 2016, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578005/
EXPO_IDA(2016)578005_EN.pdf
17 J. Heilbrunn, “Exclusive: Iran’s Foreign Minister Warns Donald Trump That Tehran 
Can Abandon the Nuclear Deal”, The National Interest, 17 July 2017, http://nationalinter-
est.org/feature/exclusive-irans-foreign-minister-warns-donald-trump-tehran-21565.
18 For a similar understanding of  this issue see E. Batmanghelidj, “We 
Shouldn’t Defend the JCPOA at the Expense of  the Iran Deal”, 
Lobelog Foreign Policy, 14 July 2017, http://lobelog.com/we-shouldnt- 
defend-the-jcpoa-at-the-expense-of-the-iran-deal/
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Leaving aside the specifics of the Iranian case, this points to 
the need for the EU to assert greater independence in order to 
safeguard its own version of national interest. As discussed above, 
the classic assumptions of the transatlantic alliance are in serious 
doubt, and regardless of the fate of the Trump presidency, they 
will not be restored anytime soon. It is therefore imperative for 
the EU to pursue the strategic autonomy mentioned in the glob-
al strategy document published in June 201619. Strategic auton-
omy does not mean pursuing multilateral solutions but rather 
to create and maintain the ability to chart a more independent 
course when necessary20. This is perhaps most often assumed to 
be about defence capabilities, but in reality, it is more likely to 
be needed for the more mundane foreign policy issues – long be-
fore friction becomes conflict. In order to have strategic autono-
my, the Union needs to develop tools that allows it to act inde-
pendently but also to not have to act when pushed. The paradox 
is that in a globalised world where most multilateral institutions 
have been built on a consensus (at times not so harmoniously 
as it might be perceived in hindsight) between Europe and the 
United States, the tools required for European strategic auton-
omy must be containable within Europe itself. This in order to 
avoid extraterritorial legislation of the kind that, for instance, 
the United States has developed. A prime example of this is the 
banking sector, where most sizeable European banks have assets 
across the globe and peg transactions to the US dollar and are 
therefore subject to US laws. Both for Iran and for the long term 
European ability to use trade as part of its foreign policy with 
less impediments, it would make sense to have a medium-size 
European bank with assets limited to euro and Europe. Such a 
bank would be much easier to protect from secondary sanctions 
and other transitory regulations beyond Europe.
19 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, June 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/
docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf
20 H.P. Bartels, A.M. Kellner and U. Optenhögel (Eds.), Strategic Autonomy and the 
Defence of  Europe. On the Road to a European Army?, Dietz Verlag, 2017.
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Conclusion
The EU has invested a lot in the attempt to solve the problem of 
the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. While the initial sanc-
tion approach may have yielded some results, in the end it was 
the acceptance of the existence of a program that allowed for a 
successful breakthrough in the negotiations. Since the signing 
of the JCPOA, Brussels has stood by the agreement, which is 
both a landmark in non-proliferation and a constitutive experi-
ence for a common European foreign policy. While Iran might 
value Europe’s participation and support to the agreement, 
Tehran believes that Europe will need to do more to offset the 
attempt by the Trump Administration to undermine and de-
stroy it. This will require further political acumen in European 
capitals to more proactively strengthen the political resilience 
of the agreement, all the while ensuring the European business 
community that they have the necessary political backing to 
trade with Iran. The JCPOA is in Europe’s interest not only 
because of its non-proliferation dimension but also because it 
allows it the forging of a more endurable relationship with a 
regional power like Iran in a highly volatile region. 
6.  Squaring the Triangle: 
     The EU Between Rouhani and Trump
Cornelius Adebahr
Europe’s relations with Iran are a function of a broader trian-
gular relationship: that of the United States, Iran, and the EU 
and its Member States. For the past 70 years, the transatlan-
tic bond has been the bedrock not only of European security 
but also of a rules-based order. Meanwhile, relations between 
Tehran and Washington, DC, have been fraught with enmity 
for nearly four decades. European-Iranian affairs, in contrast, 
have been comparably less developed and, in effect, open to 
influence from the other two sides of the triangle. The nuclear 
deal of July 2015 is at the core of this triangular relationship, 
marking the only unifying political issue for the three parties. 
Against this backdrop, it came as no surprise that the elec-
tion of President Donald Trump in November 2016, who on 
the campaign trail had promised to “dismantle the disastrous 
deal with Iran”1, shook people’s minds in European capitals. 
Six months later, in May 2017, EU policymakers were eagerly 
watching the much shorter presidential election campaign in 
Iran in which the incumbent, Hassan Rouhani, banked his suc-
cess on the perceived economic benefits that the nuclear deal 
of 2015 had brought (and would, as the argument went, con-
tinue to bring under his leadership). Indeed, the moderate won 
in Tehran by promising to continue his policy of opening the 
country to Europe. Meanwhile, an unrelenting Iran hawk en-
tered the White House threatening to undermine the founda-
tions of Europe’s security and prosperity more broadly.  
1 S. Begley, “Read Donald Trump’s Speech to AIPAC”, TIME Magazine, 21 March 
2016, p. 34, http://time.com/4267058/donald-trump-aipac-speech-transcript/
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Both these elections, different as their outcomes are, have an 
impact on the implementation of the deal and thus on the foun-
dation on which the EU and Iran want to build a more com-
prehensive and cooperative set of relations. Yet, Iran’s foreign 
policy besides the nuclear issue continues to put the European 
interests in the Middle East at stake. In this situation, the EU 
needs to face up to both vertices of the triangle: to Washington, 
when it comes to the JCPOA, as well as to Iran with regard to 
its regional power projection. In fact, by taking a firm approach 
on a matter of global political importance – maintaining the 
nuclear deal while contributing to crisis management in the 
Persian Gulf – the EU could prove its qualities as a foreign 
policy actor beyond the realm of its bilateral relations with Iran. 
This chapter will first look at EU-US relations as a determi-
nant of Europe’s approach to Iran, which will be treated in the 
second part. Based on this two-fold analysis, it will put for-
ward a number of recommendations on what the EU can do 
to maintain the deal and slowly improve the regional outlook. 
Persisting transatlantic disagreements about Iran
EU-US policy cooperation was instrumental in bringing about 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by Iran 
and the E3/EU+3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
as well as the EU plus China, Russia, and the United States). 
That said, such transatlantic agreement on how to deal with Iran 
has been the exception rather than the rule. More often than not, 
policymakers in European capitals were at odds with their coun-
terparts in Washington over how to treat the regime in Tehran. 
Disturbingly, the two partners seem to be heading towards an-
other period of estrangement, including over Iran policy. 
Ever since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States 
has been much more confrontational towards Iran than its 
European allies. Where the latter sought to incrementally nudge 
Tehran towards a less ideological course by maintaining diplo-
matic ties and investing in trade, Washington pursued a policy 
Squaring the Triangle: The EU Between Rouhani and Trump 123
of isolation and economic sanctions. To come together across 
the Atlantic in what came to be called a dual-track approach 
during the second term of President George W. Bush, each side 
had to give up one of its planks: after the 2002 revelations of 
Iran’s clandestine nuclear program, the EU warmed to the idea 
of toughening its diplomatic efforts with multilateral sanctions, 
while the United States agreed to back up its decades-old sanc-
tions with a concerted push for negotiations that included both 
China and Russia2. 
In other words, Washington abandoned its isolationist po-
sition in 2006 when it entered the nuclear negotiations the 
Europeans had started in 2003, whereas the EU reduced its eco-
nomic engagement and eventually, by 2012, agreed to a stinging 
sanctions regime3. Building on a gradually strengthened United 
Nations sanctions regime, this broad international consensus 
would eventually bring about the July 2015 agreement that cur-
tailed Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for economic respite.  
Such near-universal consensus notwithstanding, the imme-
diate aftermath of the negotiations showed how differently each 
side of the Atlantic viewed the outcome: European governments 
welcomed the deal and immediately explored commercial rela-
tions with Iran, whereas a heated domestic debate began in the 
United States (just as it did in Iran). It was only in the absence 
of a vote of disapproval from Congress, which the Democratic 
minority could block on procedural grounds, that US President 
Barack Obama could sign the deal and begin implementing it 
through executive orders4. 
This lack of statutory power as a law passed or a treaty was ap-
proved by the US Congress was unavoidable given US domestic 
2 R. Alcaro, “Learning From a Troubled Experience – Transatlantic Lessons 
from the Nuclear Standoff  with Iran”, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of  
International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 4, December 2011, pp. 115-136.
3 C. Adebahr, Easing EU Sanctions on Iran, Washington, DC, Atlantic Council Iran 
Task Force, June 2014.
4 J. Steinhauer, “Democrats Hand Victory to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal”, The 
New York Times, 10 September 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/
politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html.
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realities, yet it contains one of the JCPOA’s central weaknesses: 
it hinges on the goodwill of the US President alone (just like it 
depends on the continuous though conditional support of the 
Supreme Leader in Iran)5. Consequently, a number of contend-
ers for the 2016 US presidential race, including Donald Trump, 
vowed to scrap the deal “on day one”6. With Trump now in office, 
he can make good on his contradictory promises to variously undo, 
renegotiate, or strictly enforce what he sees as the “dumbest” deal7. 
That the US President has so far refrained from breaking up 
the deal is of little comfort. The apparent dysfunctionality of 
his Administration makes the development of a coherent, even 
if confrontational, policy towards Iran much harder. This – and 
a generally more fitful posture towards Tehran – risk creating 
a spiral of provocations that could lead to the unintentional 
unraveling of the deal. As recently as in May 2017, Foreign 
Minister Javad Zarif threatened to walk away from the deal if 
the United States were to fall foul of its commitments8. 
In response to the election of President Trump, the EU and 
its member states confirmed their commitment to uphold this 
landmark deal9. For the Europeans, the JCPOA represents the 
5 J. Bellinger, “The New UNSCR on Iran: Does it Bind the United States (and 
future Presidents)?”, Lawfare blog, 2015; K. Katzman and P.K. Kerr, Iran Nuclear 
Agreement, CRS Report, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, 20 
November 2015.
6 E. Abrams, “Unraveling the Iran Nuclear Deal on ‘Day One’”, CFR Blog, 
20 July 2015, http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2015/07/20/unraveling-the-iran-
nuclear-deal-on-day-one/; K. Zezima, “Donald Trump, Ted Cruz headline 
Capitol rally against Iran nuclear deal”, The Washington Post, 9 September 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/09/09/
donald-trump-ted-cruz-to-headline-capitol-rally-against-iran-nuclear-deal/.
7 N. Wadhams, “Shredding Iran Nuclear Deal May Be Harder Than 
Trump Thinks”, Bloomberg, 2 December 2016, https://www.bloomb-
erg.com/news/articles/2016-12-02/shredding-iran-nuclear-deal-could- 
prove-harder-than-trump-thinks
8 A. Majidyar, “Javad Zarif: Iran ‘Completely Ready’ to Resume Nuclear 
Program”, Middle East Institute IranObserved, 21 March 2017,  http://www.mei.
edu/content/io/javad-zarif-iran-completely-ready-resume-nuclear-program
9 Council of  the European Union, Conclusions on Iran, Press Release 654/16, 14 
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best alternative to either another war in the Middle East or an 
Iranian nuclear bomb, threatening both the global non-prolif-
eration regime and neighbors like Israel. Preserving it by en-
suring full compliance from all sides in both its letter and its 
spirit is in the EU’s genuine interest10. On the first anniversary 
of the JCPOA’s implementation, Federica Mogherini, the High 
Representative of the EU’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
and Vice President of the European Commission, recalled that 
“the JCPOA is working for all”11. 
The Europeans have also made it clear that they would not 
reopen the nuclear file or embark on new sanctions, unless trig-
gered by Iranian noncompliance12. As Mogherini confirmed in 
a mid-December 2016 interview, “there is no way the agree-
ment can be reopened bilaterally”13. As it happens, this position 
concurs with that of the American people (if not their govern-
ment): nearly two-thirds of Americans oppose the withdrawal 
from the deal and instead prefer to keep it “as long as Iran con-
tinues to comply with the terms”14. However, the Europeans 
cannot uphold the JCPOA by themselves. 
November 2016, Bruxelles, General Secretariat of  the Council.
10 European Union External Action Service (EEAS), Remarks by High 
Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini at the end of  the informal dinner of  the 
EU Foreign Ministers, Bruxelles, 14 November 2016.
11 European External Action Service (EEAS), Statement by Federica Mogherini on 
the first Anniversary of  the Implementation of  the JCPOA, Bruxelles, 16 January 2017.
12 C. Lynch and D. Luce, “In Private Meeting, Euro Diplomats Beseech Trump 
Team to Uphold Transatlantic Pacts”, Foreign Policy, 16 November 2016, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/in-private-meeting-euro-diplomats-beseech- 
trump-team-to-uphold-transatlantic-pacts/; L. Norman, “Europe Hopeful 
Trump Will Stick With Iran Nuclear Deal”, The Wall Street Journal, 13 December 
2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-hopeful-trump-will-stick-with-iran- 
nuclear-deal-1481661689
13 L. Norman and J.E. Barnes, “Federica Mogherini, Top EU Diplomat, Says 
Bloc Is Prepared for Trump”, The Wall Street Journal, 14 December 2016, http://
www.wsj.com/articles/federica-mogherini-top-eu-diplomat-says-bloc-is-pre-
pared-for-trump-1481740445
14 University of  Maryland, Most Americans Oppose Withdrawing From Iran Deal, 
Washington, DC, Program for Public Consultation (PPC), 6 January 2017.
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In fact, even before the election of Donald Trump, the deal 
had run into domestic difficulties in the United States. From 
the need for official licensing of trade agreements with Iran by 
the US Treasury to the persisting restrictions on financial trans-
actions through non-nuclear sanctions, a number of obstacles 
remain15. The difficulties to re-establish business ties between 
Iran and Europe are testament to this conundrum as a majority 
of US policymakers believe trade with Iran to be tantamount 
to strengthening the Iranian regime. Instead, members of 
Congress from either party want to force Iran to its knees with 
new sanctions over its missile program and its regional activities 
(cf. next part). 
In addition, there is the necessity to re-issue presidential 
waivers on a regular basis to suspend US statutory sanctions. 
Those are in effect for a specified duration, generally 120 or 
180 days16. The first test case was in mid-May 2017, two days 
before the Iranian presidential election, when a first set of waiv-
ers – signed by the outgoing Obama Administration on its last 
day – was due to expire. In what is no small detail, Washington 
extended the necessary sanctions waivers to fulfil its part of the 
deal17. However, the waiver renewals will come up again every 
couple of months, hanging like Damocles’ sword over the deals 
European companies do with their Iranian partners. 
Similarly, the US President has to confirm to Congress every 
90 days that Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA18. The most 
recent confirmation, on July 17, came “only reluctantly”, as 
news reports confirmed: despite having no tangible complaint 
15 C. Adebahr, “The Linchpin to the Iran Deal’s Future: Europe”, The Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 4, 2016, pp. 115-131.
16 US Department of  the Treasury and US Department of  State, Guidance Relating 
to the Lifting of  Certain U.S. Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of  Action 
on Implementation Day, Washington, DC, 16 January 2016.
17 “U.S. Extends Iran Nuclear Sanctions Relief, Adds Other Sanctions”, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Iran Blog, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/us-ex-
tends-iran-nuclear-sanctions-relief/28494069.html
18 K Katzman and P.K. Kerr, Iran Nuclear Agreement, CRS Report, 20 November 
2015, Washington DC, p. 32.
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and notwithstanding all his advisors pressing him to acknowl-
edge Iranian compliance, President Trump for a long time in-
sisted that “he did not want to” do so19. Yet had he not issued 
this certification, the US Congress could have immediately 
slapped sanctions on Iran, thus putting the United States in 
violation of the deal. This continuing hair-trigger situation puts 
the JCPOA in serious jeopardy every couple of months, thus 
raising the risk of its undoing. 
Not only the necessity for consistent suspension of existing 
sanctions poses a problem, but also the prospect of newly im-
posed ones. Even if these are explicitly non-nuclear in nature, 
they can look like the old ones terminated under the JCPOA. 
Generally speaking, new sanctions must not take away the pre-
cise economic gains that Iran has received in return for moth-
balling a large part of its nuclear program. Re-enacting nucle-
ar-related sanctions as non-nuclear-related sanctions would 
lead not only Tehran but also other JCPOA signatories such 
as China and Russia and, possibly, the EU to claim that the 
United States was violating the deal.
In June 2017, the US Senate passed new sanctions legisla-
tion, pending House confirmation, which mainly targets Iran’s 
missile program and its domestic human rights abuses20. In a 
hopeful sign, lawmakers apparently worked closely with former 
Administration officials with intimate knowledge of the deal in 
order to make the new measures “JCPOA-proof”. Ironically, 
the senators had not displayed such care during the previous 
term, when they could be certain that then-President Obama 
would veto anything that clearly violated the deal. Now, with 
no such safeguards in place, they have to be more careful not to 
make Washington the ultimate deal-breaker21.
19 P. Baker, “Trump Recertifies Iran Nuclear Deal, but Only Reluctantly”, The 
New York Times, 17 July 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/pol-
itics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-recertify.html
20 US Senate, S. 722: An Act – To provide congressional review and to counter Iranian and Russian 
governments’ aggression. Washington, DC, Government Publication Office, 2017.
21 J. Pecquet, “Senate tones down Iran sanctions bill after input from Obama 
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Equally worrying has been the linkage of sanctions and is-
sues by the US Congress. Lawmakers tied a set of sanctions 
against Russia (which they feared President Trump could veto) 
to a toughening of measures against Iran (in line with his ap-
proach)22. While this may make sense on the domestic politi-
cal scene, it does not help to incentivise Iran to comply with 
any of the American demands, as these would be legally tied 
to Moscow’s action in Ukraine (over which Tehran has no con-
trol). In the past, Congress has proved to be chronically unable 
to undo its own sanctions laws23. 
Any increase in sanctions addressing non-nuclear issues such 
as Iran’s regional policies in Syria, Iraq or Yemen, or its missile 
program, would thus have to be carefully calibrated. Moreover, 
there is no credible international sanctions leverage to force Iran 
into new concessions, as a former state department official has 
pointed out24. Those who went along with US extraterritorial 
sanctions in the past now are not without choice when it comes 
to deciding whether to abide by them or not. Washington 
would, therefore, have to win over its allies and partners, in par-
ticular from the E3/EU+3 group but also beyond. The question 
will be whether Trump has the patience for such an approach. 
Instead, the US President seems to have opted for a new 
team”, Al-Monitor, 25 May 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi-
nals/2017/05/senate-tone-down-iran-sanctions-bill-obama-team.html
22 P. Zengerle, “U.S. Senate votes near unanimously for Russia, Iran 
sanctions”, Reuters, 15 June 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-sanctions-idUSKBN1962AU
23 Moreover, the fact that Congress plans to impose secondary sanctions 
on European companies investing in the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline con-
necting Russia to Germany but linked those to the advancement of  US ex-
ports of  liquefied natural gas to Europe, smacked of  trade promotion rath-
er than smart sanctioning (“US bill on Russia sanctions prompts German, 
Austrian outcry”, DW Online, 15 June 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/
us-bill-on-russia-sanctions-prompts-german-austrian-outcry/a-39270624). 
24  R. Nephew, “Want to renegotiate the Iran deal? Much harder than it 
looks”, Markaz Blog, 9 December 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/markaz/2016/12/09/want-to-renegotiate-the-iran-deal-much- 
harder-than-it-looks/
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American-Sunni(-Israeli) axis. From the Arab perspective, 
Donald Trump’s visit to Riyadh in May 2017 (the first port 
of call on his maiden foreign tour) represented an important, 
and not merely symbolic, return to old lines of conflict: the US 
President announced a $110bn arms deal with the Kingdom 
and denounced (Shia) Iran as the leading state sponsor of ter-
rorism in front of a gathering of mainly Sunni leaders from 
more than 50 Arab and Islamic countries25. He also declared 
jointly with Saudi King Salman that “the nuclear agreement 
with Iran needs to be re-examined in some of its clauses”26. 
This policy change along the US-Iranian edge of the tri-
angle not only affects transatlantic relations, as the Trump 
Administration did not consult with its European partners pri-
or to it. While a certain re-balancing of the perceived court-
ing of Iran by the Obama Administration at the expense of 
traditional Arab allies would have been expected even under 
a Clinton presidency, the complete reversal witnessed by fully 
aligning with the Saudi view of the regional power relations at 
the expense of America’s own interests or that of its allies did 
indeed surprise the latter. This also has immediate effects on the 
EU’s relations with Iran. 
A careful warming of EU-Iran relations
Clearly, the arrival of President Trump at the White House has 
got Iranian officials think twice about their country’s main pre-
dicament: its strategic loneliness27. One possible partner that 
25 President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit, The White House, 
Office of  the Press Secretary, Washington DC, 21 May 2017.
26 Joint Statement Between the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia and the United States 
of  America, The White House Office of  the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, 
23 May 2017.
27 B. Slavin, “Strategically Lonely” Iran Exploits Opportunities for Regional Influence, 
Washington, DC, Atlantic Council of  the United States, 2011, http://www.atlan-
ticcouncil.org/?id=5653:issue-brief-launch-strategically-lonely-iran-exploits-op-
portunities-for-regional-influence-3-25-11-transcript.
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Tehran is finding a renewed interest in is the European Union. 
Though central to the decade-long negotiation efforts that 
brought about the JCPOA28, Brussels has been clearly of little 
relevance to Iranian policymakers focused on bilateral relations 
with EU Member States. 
The EU has been eager to use the JCPOA as a stepping-stone 
to develop broader relations with Iran. Both Brussels and 
the Member States see Tehran as a key player in the Middle 
East that must be engaged, not isolated, despite objecting to 
its regional activities. Therefore, the EU does not only aim to 
increase economic ties but also collaborate on energy issues, 
migration challenges, and educational exchanges. This is mir-
rored in the assignment of the EU’s Iran Task Force manned 
by the European External Action Service (EEAS). It supervises 
the implementation of the JCPOA, develops the EU’s bilateral 
relations with Iran, and engages in policies to promote regional 
cooperation. 
At the center of the EU’s work on implementing the deal 
is its chairing of the meetings of the Joint Commission estab-
lished under the JCPOA. This body, comprising representatives 
of the eight signatories (China, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), is tasked 
to oversee the agreement’s implementation over its entire dura-
tion29. Given that the Joint Commission’s members have equal 
voting rights, Americans and Europeans together hold five out 
of eight votes. 
So far, Iran has broadly fulfilled its obligations under the 
JCPOA. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the 
UN watchdog tasked with supervising the implementation of 
the agreement, has confirmed this in its regular reports begin-
ning in January 201630. More importantly, the violations that 
28 C. Adebahr, Europe and Iran: The Nuclear Deal and Beyond, Abingdon, Routledge, 2017.
29 European External Action Service (EEAS), Press Release on the outcome of  the 
first Joint Commission on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of  Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian 
nuclear programme, Vienna, 19 October 2015. 
30 In April 2017, also US Secretary of  State Rex Tillerson acknowledged Iran’s 
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the IAEA did detect were minor infringements in the amount 
of heavy water that Tehran was allowed to produce31. While the 
Joint Commission was able to resolve these issues fairly quickly, 
it will have to consider each alleged case on its merits. Crucially, 
the Joint Commission not only has to adjudicate on possible vio-
lations of the letter of the accord but has to uphold its spirit too. 
This is increasingly difficult in a hostile environment in 
which the United States and Iran accuse each other of material 
breaches. The re-election of President Rouhani provides some 
breathing space, as his campaign was a de facto referendum on 
whether Iran would stick to its nuclear deal. However, his do-
mestic opponents continue to criticize him and his team in-
cluding for their conciliatory position on the nuclear file32. In 
the end, both Iran and the United States are capable of – and 
apparently willing to – “rock the boat”. This leaves the EU in 
the middle: trying to preserve an international agreement while 
carefully expanding cooperation with Iran to provide an envi-
ronment conducive to its implementation. 
To explore areas of EU-Iran cooperation – the second fo-
cal point – a high-level EU delegation, including Mogherini 
and seven other commissioners, visited Tehran in April 201633. 
It was a visible expression of the Europeans’ intent to develop 
a broad and comprehensive agenda for bilateral cooperation 
compliance with the JCPOA in a report to the US Congress, though without 
using those words and instead headlining the note with “Iran Continues To 
Sponsor Terrorism” (Press Statement by Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of  State, 
Washington, DC, US Department of  State, 18 April 2017). See also, International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of  
Iran in light of  United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), 2 June 2017, 
GOV/2017/24, Wien.
31 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and monitoring in 
the Islamic Republic of  Iran in light of  United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 
(2015), 9 November 2016, GOV/2016/55, Wien.
32 R. Faghihi, “Rouhani faces unprecedented attack by Iranian hard-liners”, Al-
Monitor, 27 June 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/
iran-rouhani-quds-day-american-sheikh-hardliner-attacks.html
33 European Commission, EU visit to Iran: cooperation envisaged in various sectors, 
European Commission Press Service, Bruxelles, 16 April 2016.
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between the EU and Iran. Such partnership should include 
“economic relations, energy, environment, migration, drugs, 
humanitarian aid, transport, civil protection, science and civil 
nuclear cooperation, as well as culture”34. 
This is in line with the European Parliament’s resolution out-
lining an “EU strategy towards Iran after the nuclear agreement” 
of 201635. It proposed ‘a dialogue of the four Cs’: comprehen-
sive in scope, cooperative in fields of mutual interests, critical, 
open and frank in areas of disagreement, and constructive in 
tone and practice. Importantly, the resolution made the further 
developing of EU-Iran relations conditional on the continuous 
and full implementation of the JCPOA. 
As if to confirm this approach, EU-Iran trade nearly dou-
bled throughout 2016 following the JCPOA’s entry into force, 
compared to the previous year36. However, the current trade 
volume of €13,7bn still stands at only half of its 2011 value. 
Importantly for Iran, exports to the EU more than tripled, 
though from a very low base due to the post-2011 European oil 
embargo. Yet even this was not easy to achieve, as the example 
of the first Iranian tanker reaching Europe a full year after sanc-
tions were lifted shows: even with formal restrictions gone, the 
issues of re-classing, flagging, insuring, and certifying Iranian 
vessels bogged down the export of Iranian crude37. 
At the moment, much of the European-Iranian trade honey-
moon is on-and-off, as most companies are waiting for clarity 
34 European External Action Service (EEAS), Joint statement by the High 
Representative/Vice President of  the European Union, Federica Mogherini and the Minister 
of  Foreign Affairs of  the Islamic Republic of  Iran, Javad Zarif (Tehran, 16 April 2016), 
Bruxelles, 2016.
35 European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of  25 October 2016 on the EU 
strategy towards Iran after the nuclear agreement (2015/2274(INI)), Strasbourg, 2016.
36 European Commission, European Union, Trade in goods with Iran, Directorate-
General for Trade, Bruxelles, 2017.
37 D. Jalilvand, “Resumption of  Iranian oil shipping off  to slow start”,  Al-
Monitor, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/02/iran-oil-
tanker-shipping-nitc-sanctions-nuclear-deal-spain.html
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from the US government about its Iran policy38. Technically, the 
remaining US sanctions only forbid American firms from re-en-
tering the Iranian market, whereas European companies are in 
principle free to trade and invest again under the nuclear deal. 
However, a mixture of real obstacles and perceived threats pre-
vents them from doing so. One difficulty consists of companies 
being unable to do US dollar transactions involving Iran, or to 
find global banks providing credit for Iran-related business39. 
Moreover, European companies need to obtain licenses from 
the US Treasury for certain commerce if more than a tenth 
of the product in question is made in the USA (as are Airbus 
aircraft, for example)40. Should the responsible Treasury office 
decide to toughen the rules, this would further deter European 
companies from doing business with Iran. In the United States 
itself, the $16bn deal selling eighty aircraft to state-owned Iran 
Air – an explicit exception to the US trade ban stipulated in 
the JCPOA41  – is under heavy fire from Congress42. This is a 
bad omen for future orders and possibly even for the wholesale 
execution of existing ones43. 
With the signing of an agreement to promote nuclear safe-
ty in Iran in April 2017, the two focal points of the EU’s 
38 G. Motevalli, “European Companies Flocking Into Tehran Widen 
Divide With Trump”, Bloomberg News, 5 July 2017, https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-05/european-companies-flock 
ing-into-tehran-widen-divide-with-trump
39 Y. Torbati and J. Schectman, “For European banks, U.S. assurances on Iran 
come with asterisks”, Reuters, 18 May 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-sanctions-iran-idUSKCN0Y92WI
40 US Department of  the Treasury and US Department of  State (2016), p. 38.
41 E3/EU+3 and Iran, Joint Comprehensive Plan of  Action, Vienna, 14 July 
2015; and European Commission (2017). 
42 S. Lane, “GOP chairman pans ‘disappointing’ Boeing sale to Iran”, 
The Hill, 12 December 2016, http://thehill.com/policy/finance/ 
310065-gop-chairman-pans-disappointing-boeing-sale-to-iran
43 In addition, companies also face Iran-related factors such as political instability, 
lack of  transparency and the rule of  law, and widespread corruption. This ex-
tends to an uncertainty whether Iranian business partners actually have the cash 
to pay for their acquisitions.
Post-Vote Iran: Giving Engagement a Chance134
post-JCPOA approach converge. Through its instrument for 
nuclear safety cooperation, the EU will support the work of the 
respective Iranian authorities44. The aim is to develop a nuclear 
regulatory framework, to undertake stress tests at the Bushehr 
nuclear power plant, and to support Iran’s accession to interna-
tional conventions such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety. 
This should help alleviate the more rational fears of Iran’s neigh-
bors regarding the possibility of an accident creating a nuclear 
disaster in the Persian Gulf region. 
The geopolitical side of regional cooperation and competi-
tion – its third task – is much harder for the EU to resolve. 
This is not least due to Iran’s own regional policies such as its 
backing of Hezbollah and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and 
its ongoing ballistic missile program. Israel and the neighbor-
ing Persian Gulf states see Tehran’s support for Shiite militias 
in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen as a threat. They believe 
the problem with the JCPOA does not lie in temporary re-
strictions on the Iranian nuclear program (indeed, they sup-
port this restriction) but in the elevation of Tehran’s status in 
the region’s politics following successful negotiations with the 
Obama Administration. 
Given that the EU has not traditionally been a strong player 
on security and only partly a driver in the Middle East Peace 
Process, it is hard for the Europeans to build up a profile on 
regional cooperation in the confrontational Persian Gulf envi-
ronment. This marks a formidable foreign policy challenge for 
the EU and its Member States. 
What the EU can – and should – do 
The contingencies outlined above highlight the significance of 
the EU-Iran-US triangle: one side (EU-Iran) cannot prosper if 
the other (Iran-US) deteriorates. As it happens, with the arrival 
44 K. Geropoulos, “EU, Iran ink nuclear deal”, New Europe, 24 April 2017, 
https://www.neweurope.eu/article/eu-iran-ink-nuclear-deal/
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of Trump at the White House, even the third leg (EU-US) is 
shaken to its foundations. The JCPOA is, on the one hand, the 
only international agreement that binds the three sides together; 
it is also, on the other, an extremely vulnerable link in this chain. 
The EU’s incredibly difficult task is to preserve the nuclear 
deal in a time of uncertainty. Even so, the Iran deal, crucial 
as it is, will most likely not be the biggest bone of contention 
between the Europeans and the Trump Administration; larger 
issues include maintaining the transatlantic alliance itself and 
confronting Russia (or not); dealing with the Middle East more 
broadly and the Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts in par-
ticular; and saving the global compact on climate change. 
Although Rouhani’s re-election means that the rapproche-
ment between Europe and Iran will continue (provided Iran 
continues to uphold its JCPOA obligations), tensions with the 
United States are likely to increase. While the United States 
itself is unlikely to pull out of the actual agreement, it (deliber-
ately) runs the risk of endangering the deal with its provocative 
rhetoric and new non-nuclear measures. The Iranian institu-
tions surrounding the Supreme Leader are likewise opposed to 
the deal, making an uncontrolled escalation likely.
Still, the EU has a number of options at its disposal.
As the JCPOA’s “guardian”, the EU needs to enlist the back-
ing of the other two more sanguine signatories (China and 
Russia) to keep the two more confrontational partners (Iran 
and the United States) on board. The first half of 2017, with 
the new US Administration extending the sanctions waivers 
and the Iranians re-electing their incumbent President, was al-
ready a test case for the deal’s survival. In this sense, both High 
Representative Mogherini and leaders of the E3 should remind 
all parties of their obligations related to the letter and the spirit 
of the deal, avoiding any provocation among each other. 
Expanding bilateral relations in the face of American resist-
ance will demand courage and farsightedness from the EU. 
Europe demonstrated both these qualities when it began nu-
clear talks with Iran in 2003. It is, however, difficult to imagine 
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Europe opposing the United States on a key security policy is-
sue. The EU’s steps are thus likely to be more incremental. 
Since Washington is unlikely to make concessions on the re-
maining US sanctions de facto hampering legitimate business 
activities, the EU must take the initiative to further promote 
EU-Iran trade. It could do so, for example, by providing fi-
nancing and payment channels or exercising due diligence to 
verify that Iranian business partners are not affected by existing 
sanctions. 
The EU should use the Joint Commission process to deal 
with even minor violations, as has happened in the past over 
Iran’s excess production of heavy water and US Congress’s ex-
tension of its sanctions legislation. To avoid giving hardlin-
ers of the Islamic Republic the opportunity to renege on the 
deal in response to the United States allegedly breaking it, 
the benchmark for unwarranted sanctions should be whether 
the envisaged measures would receive approval from the Joint 
Commission or not. 
Speaking of sanctions: the JCPOA does indeed allow for 
sanctions to counter non-nuclear activities such as the financ-
ing of terrorism or gross human rights violations. The difficulty 
would be to not simply repackage previous legislation on the 
nuclear program (for example, by relisting the exact firms and 
persons that have benefited from the lifting of sanctions). While 
this instrument in principle is available also to the EU, Brussels 
is unlikely to use it against Iran under current circumstances. 
Going beyond merely refusing to support new (unwarrant-
ed) US sanctions against Iran and threatening to actively object 
to such measures would be a risky adventure, though. Indeed, 
the EU’s blocking regulation, which dates back to previous 
transatlantic disputes over Iran (and Libya as well as Cuba) pol-
icy and forbids EU companies to observe US sanctions, is still 
in the books and could technically be reactivated45. Politically, 
45 A. Vaez, President Trump and the Art of  the Iran Nuclear Deal, ICG Statement, 
23 November 2016, https://crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/
gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/president-trump-and-art-iran-nuclear-deal
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however, this threat would be difficult to follow through on, as 
Washington would not back down easily. Moreover, threaten-
ing to take the United States to the World Trade Organization 
over sanctions (as the EU did in the late 1990s) would be futile 
if Trump is ready to start a trade war with no respect for the 
global trading system.
Whereas President Trump apparently has, for the time being, 
settled on waiting for Iran to violate the deal rather than killing 
it himself, the EU needs to be on guard. When necessary, it 
should quickly step up its diplomatic engagement in defence 
of the Iran deal. This would include concerted, back-channel 
efforts at the level of heads of state or government. In the public 
domain, if Washington were to seriously ponder its exit from 
the JCPOA (again), the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council could task 
the High Representative with developing a plan to safeguard the 
deal. Merely discussing European options to possible US policy 
changes would increase the EU’s preparedness – and send a stern 
message to the Administration in Washington early on. 
If President Trump was to focus on renegotiating the deal, 
the EU should direct his attention to medium-term, not short-
term adjustments: rather than trying to get a better deal now, 
which really cannot be done because the one in place already 
works, the dealmaker President should set his eyes on the 
JCPOA’s eight- and ten-year benchmarks when the deal’s stipu-
lations on nuclear-capable missiles and uranium enrichment in 
Iran expire. Finding ways to ensure that Tehran does not revert 
to an industrial-size nuclear program in the mid-2020s is a wor-
thy goal indeed. This is what a recent report called “good-faith 
attempts to improve” the deal46.
Ultimately, the EU’s response depends on two main ele-
ments, besides its own political will, each relating to the other 
two vertices of the EU-Iran-US triangle: whether the Trump 
Administration is open to any of the aforementioned arguments 
and whether Iran would continue to uphold its obligations 
46 Implementing the Iran Nuclear Deal: A Status Report, International Crisis Group, 
Report 173, Washington/Bruxelles, 16 January 2017. 
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under the JCPOA even in the face of a US policy change. There 
is little the Europeans can do if one of the two most important 
partners of the nuclear deal goes “rogue”. 
Preserving the Iran deal goes beyond maintaining an inter-
national agreement that reduces the risk of a regional arms race 
and nuclear competition. For the Europeans, it also means pre-
serving both their diplomatic achievement and the authority of 
the rules-based order without which they cannot thrive. At the 
same time, a weakened transatlantic relationship would shake 
the whole building. This makes the EU-Iran-US triangle a del-
icate construct in need of continuous rebalancing.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
for the EU
The re-election of Hassan Rouhani in May 2017 was greeted 
with favor both inside the country, where he won a second term 
with more than 23 million votes to Ebrahim Raisi’s 15.8 mil-
lion –, and outside the country, where international actors that 
during his first term had become partners, or returned to be 
such – like the Europeans – were reassured of Iran’s intention to 
honor its commitments under the JCPOA. 
After the signing of the July 2015 JCPOA, Iran witnessed 
a gradual reintegration into both the economic and diplo-
matic arenas, in a sense actualizing Hassan Rouhani’s calls for 
“constructive engagement”, as he outlined in an op-ed in the 
Washington Times soon after his first election in 20131. 
Despite a number of obstacles – thoroughly analyzed in 
chapters 4 and 5 – EU-Iran relations went on a honeymoon 
with an increase in official state visits, the signing of MoUs, and 
the gradual engagement in a multi-level dialogue carried out 
by the Iran Task Force set up by the European External Action 
Service (EEAS). The EEAS, and especially its HR/VP Federica 
Mogherini, has periodically confirmed its commitment to the 
JCPOA and to dialogue and constructive engagement with 
Tehran; this held true also in particularly “tense” moments, 
such as soon after the election of President Trump in the US or 
the 7 June Tehran attacks. 
1 President of  Iran Hassan Rouhani: Time to engage, The Washington Post, 
19 September 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-of-
iran-hassan-rouhani-time-to-engage/2013/09/19/4d2da564-213e-11e3-966c-
9c4293c47ebe_story.html?utm_term=.1bc1ccb815d6 
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However, it would be naïve to take the EU-Iran engagement 
for granted. The new US Administration took office in January 
2017 and, since then, it has shown nothing but a deep hostility 
towards Iran, as exemplified by the many calls for the renegotia-
tion of the deal, as well as by the new sanctions’ bills that are be-
ing discussed by the Congress. This hostility has been coupled 
with an ambiguous – at times even contradictory – behavior. 
The US Administration has since renewed twice the waivers 
guaranteeing the lifting of US secondary sanctions, and it has 
certified before Congress Iran’s compliance with the agreement. 
Yet, the deal is far from safe. The looming scenario is “death by 
a thousand cuts”, as stated by former Deputy Secretary of State 
William J. Burns, who had helped negotiate the agreement2. 
Till now, President Trump’s harsh rhetoric has not succeeded 
in provoking Tehran. President Rouhani has so far denounced 
US actions while, at the same time, promising that Tehran 
would continue to respect the deal3. However, at the same time, 
Iran is calling on the West to reconsider its policies if the Iran 
deal is to survive4. But, as highlighted in chapter 1 and chapter 
3, Iran is far from a unitary regime. Rouhani has already come 
under fire from conservatives and hardliners, as exemplified by 
the arrest of his brother Hossein Fereydoun – officially on fi-
nancial crimes charges – on 16 July. 
As already happened in the past, the US aggressive rhetoric 
and behavior risk playing into the hands of hardliners, ready 
to capitalize on Rouhani’s failure and to demonstrate that 
“America cannot be trusted”.
2 The Iran Nuclear Deal Faces ‘Death by a Thousand Cuts’, Bloomberg, 
29 June 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-28/
after-surviving-trump-day-one-iran-deal-risks-a-lingering-death 
3 Iran skips opportunity to upset nuclear deal over U.S. sanctions: sources, Reuters, 21 July 
2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-idUSKBN1A6248 
4 As outlined in this Op-Ed by Ali Akbar Salehi, vice-president of  Iran and Head 
of  its Atomic Energy Organization, who helped negotiate the deal. Ali Akbar 
Salehi, If  the Iran deal is to survive, the west must change course, The Guardian, 
23 June 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/23/
iran-nuclear-deal-survive-west-change-course-engagement 
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Moreover, the American foreign policy in the Middle East 
– though far from clear – has till now showed a renewed sid-
ing with traditional allies, namely Israel and Saudi Arabia, thus 
fueling Iran’s fears and sense of encirclement, which ultimate-
ly spurs a more aggressive behavior, as outlined in chapter 3. 
Despite the fact that Tehran is actually “winning” in Syria (and 
in Iraq) – with the establishment of a land corridor connecting 
Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut – its sense of encir-
clement and lack of acknowledgment of its role as a regional 
power may lead to more aggressive policies, which go at the 
detriment of stability in the region. Once again, it’s the typi-
cal self-fulfilling prophecy: by attempting to rolling back Iran’s 
influence in the region by means of aggressive rhetoric and be-
havior, the US and its traditional allies in the Middle East end 
up with stirring more conflict. 
So, how to break the impasse?
There actually is a right way to talk to Iran, which is by 
no means an irrational, ideological, and suicidal, regime. As 
demonstrated by the success of the JCPOA negotiations, the 
right way is diplomacy. 
Unfortunately, the EU is now alone in pursuing this path – 
as far as the so-called Western world is concerned. As outlined 
in chapter 6, Brussels now finds itself between a rock and a hard 
place, and – should the US go through their promise of a more 
aggressive behavior – the EU would risk finding itself back to 
the early 2000s, when it gave up its policy of engagement with 
Tehran and aligned itself with the US policy of containment, 
allowing the nuclear dossier to monopolize its relationship with 
Iran.
Except that this time things are different: a nuclear deal is in 
place and it is working. There is literally no reason to renege on 
the deal and to jeopardize such a diplomatic success, allowing 
the politics of confrontation to replace that of engagement. 
Iran is a crucial partner for the EU, at the economic, politi-
cal, and diplomatic level: “A neighbour of our neighbours”, as 
outlined in chapter 5, an actor that – willy-nilly – has a say in 
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literally every issue in the enlarged Middle East, from Syria to 
Afghanistan. If the EU wants to play a constructive role in sta-
bilizing its neighborhood and putting an end to humanitarian 
and security crises whose effects spill directly onto its borders, 
the dialogue with Iran is crucial.
This is not the time for weakness. Such serious and difficult 
times require a strong and bold leadership. The EU should be 
prepared to act in its interests – which coincidentally and fortu-
nately overlap with those of its Member States. 
What follows are a series of policy recommendations that the 
EU should implement to save the deal, preserve engagement, 
and continue to build upon this rapprochement in order to 
confront other important issues5.
Hope for the best but prepare for the worst: 
Prepare contingency plans and put in place measures to 
shield European businesses from new US sanctions 
Following through the promise of a renewed economic engage-
ment will be essential in order to permit Rouhani to deliver on 
his promises, as well as to create enduring bonds tying Iran and 
the EU together. In this way, a sort of path dependency would 
be created, thus reducing the incentives on both sides to renege 
on their commitments. Should the US put in place new sanc-
tions, the EU should signal its willingness to follow through on 
its commitments under the JCPOA in the form of economic 
packages allowing its businesses to operate in Iran. In order to 
do this, the EU should find a proper way to protect its business-
es by entering into a serious dialogue with the US signaling that 
it will not yield to further sanctions, whose extra-territoriality 
is ultimately illegal. At this end, the EU should raise the possi-
bility of reviving the EU “Blocking Regulation”, which would 
forbid compliance with US extra-territorial sanctions lacking 
the consent of the Joint Commission (Council Regulation no. 
5 The author would like to thank the other contributors for their precious sug-
gestions that have helped laying out this section. 
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2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of 
the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third 
country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom6). At 
the Member States’ level, the Ministries of Economic Affairs 
should prioritize issuing guidelines and clarifications about 
sanction-relief technicalities, reassuring companies that wish to 
do business with Iran – especially the small and medium sized 
enterprises, as they usually do not benefit from diplomatic and 
economic shields such as bigger, state companies. 
Continue engaging Tehran and seeking a broader dialogue, 
by talking to Iran as it is, not as you would want it to be 
Iran and the EU already hold regular high-level talks on dif-
ferent sets of issues, from “soft ones” such as business, energy, 
education, and academic cooperation, to tougher ones such as 
human rights and regional crises. These meetings actually en-
courage trust-building while at the same time providing the oc-
casion to raise issues of concern. However, equally important to 
what is discussed, is the way in which these meetings are carried 
out. The EU should not convey the message that it is following 
the “empower the moderates” mantra. Although it is crucial to 
take advantage of the window of opportunity represented by 
the presence of a pragmatic Iranian delegation, the EU should 
abstain from giving ammunition to Iranian hardliners who are 
fearful and suspicious of Western attempts to favor soft regime 
change. In particular, the EU should abstain from a patroniz-
ing approach on human rights, which could only backfire as it 
already happened in the past. This does not mean that the EU 
should renounce the ethos of a civilian power, only that the di-
alogue should not be pre-conditioned and, most of all, should 
not raise the suspicion that the nuclear agreement was no more 
than a Trojan horse to change Iran from within. Indeed, one 
of the most important lessons we learned from the nuclear 
6 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996R2 
271:EN:HTML 
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negotiations is that change can really happen only if a broader 
consensus among different factions is reached (and with the 
backing of the Supreme Leader, performing its balancing func-
tion among factions). 
Institutionalize the relationship: it is high time for the EU 
to open a delegation to Tehran
As in all relationships, the actual moment of truth is represent-
ed by its institutionalization. If the EU and Iran want to shield 
and nurture the seeds of dialogue, they should move forward 
with high-level talks and explore the possibility of integrat-
ing them into a broader diplomatic engagement, in the form 
of the opening of an EU delegation to Tehran. Actually, the 
debate on this issue goes back in time: already in 2002, the 
EU had proposed the embedding of an EU representative – 
who would have switched every six months from one Member 
State’s embassy to another – but the fanciful proposal was soon 
abandoned as the nuclear dossier began monopolizing EU-Iran 
relations. In 2013, just before the signing of the Geneva interim 
agreement (Joint Plan of Action, JPA), the proposal was revived 
in the form of the embedding of an EEAS diplomat at one of 
the existing EU countries’ embassies in Tehran. Although, on 
the one side, this gradual, soft, approach would prevent the per-
ception of the EU’s entrance in Iran as a kind of revived coloni-
alism, on the other side the seriousness of the moment is such 
that it requires bold actions. Since 2016, an EU liaison team 
has been present in Tehran, temporarily hosted by the Dutch 
embassy. Now it is high time the EU softly but firmly engaged 
in negotiations with Iran for the opening of a permanent dele-
gation. Only by framing their relationship into the context of 
a permanent operational forum, Iran and the EU will be able 
to actually expand their dialogue and foster trust-building and 
mutual knowledge. 
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